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M AT H I J S  P E L K M A N S onto minority groups. European fears concerning Mus-
lims—fear that migrants will flood the continent even 
though their labour is direly needed (Albahari, p. 30); 
fear that an increased Muslim presence will undermine 
freedom of expression (Caeiro and Frank, p. 26); and re-
cent Dutch fears that dual citizenship breeds disloyalty 
to the nation—show the way connectedness breeds 
obsessions with purity and homogeneity. Remarkably, 
these anxieties are based on the behaviour of small, 
and often low-key, groups of people, as Moors shows in 
her analysis of the “burka” debate in the Netherlands (p. 
5). This suggests that these fears are equally propelled 
by the looming threat of an uncontrollable flux as they 
are informed by a lack of concrete interaction with “oth-
erness.” Focusing on the UK, Tarlo shows that the media 
spectacle surrounding a face-veil controversy actually 
conceals the variety of opinions of British Muslims on 
veiling, thereby fostering the idea of British—Muslim 
incompatibleness and bolstering politicians’ argu-
ments on anti-immigration policies. Fear of difference, 
particularly of religious difference, is clearly mocked in 
the title “The Islamists are Coming!” (Noor and Zöller, p. 
15). Despite the cynical title, the authors optimistically 
conclude that more face-to-face contact would lessen 
the misunderstandings and miscommunications that 
feed these anxieties. By reflecting on the desires and 
worries that promote, discourage, and channel move-
ment, the articles in this issue contribute to the ongo-
ing discussion of how Muslim societies and communi-
ties continue to shape themselves in an increasingly 
interconnected world.
Market expansion and technological innovations have 
aided (or forced) the global movement of ideas, peo-
ple, and commodities. But the directions, contents, and 
consequences of these movements continue to defy 
simplistic categorizations: they broaden horizons and 
have synergetic qualities, while also producing frictions 
and reinforcing attempts to fortify boundaries. Desire 
and disillusion, hope and fear are propelled side by side 
in a globally interconnected world. Connectedness 
also produces disconnectedness, as illustrated by the 
pictures on the back cover. Driven by hopes of a bet-
ter life and enticed by images of the modern, migrants 
risk everything to reach desired destinations in Europe, 
only to find themselves stuck in refugee camps on the 
Canary Islands, waiting to be “returned” to square one. 
Their faces show exhaustion and despair, reflecting 
their encounter with an entrenched Europe as much 
as the arduous journey. What, then, does global con-
nectedness mean for the less fortunate, what paths do 
people, ideas, and goods follow, and what forces try to 
curtail these flows? By looking at the mechanisms that 
govern connectedness we highlight its unevenness 
and unforeseen consequences.
Demonstrating that you are “connected” is often cru-
cial for establishing authority, even among groups that 
are usually portrayed as local or “traditional.” The female 
marabouts in Dakar described by Gemmeke (p. 36) 
boost their authority not only by demonstrating links 
to the divine, but also by stressing their credentials 
of international travel and a clientele which extends 
beyond national boundaries. As Howell (p. 22) shows, 
urban Sufi groups in Indonesia de-emphasize links with 
the past, instead using the language of “modern-style 
general education” to attract middle and upper class 
Indonesian cosmopolitans. While this desire to con-
nect to the modern can be detected in many cases, the 
models to which people aspire are no longer singularly 
located in “the West.” Muslim businessmen in India look 
to the cities of the Arab Gulf for models of a “Muslim 
modernity” (Osella and Osella, p. 8). In post-Soviet Kyr-
gyzstan, following a 70-year separation from the rest 
of the Muslim world, residents are rediscovering Islam 
through the Orientalized images of Moroccan Muslims 
featured in Brazilian soap operas. Ironically, these im-
ages enable Kyrgyzstani watchers to overcome Soviet 
stereotypes and conceive of a modern Islam (McBrien, 
p. 16). Such perceptual shifts regarding the locus of the 
modern may reflect the waning desirability of Europe, 
certainly for Muslims. 
The title of Arjun Appadurai’s recent book Fear of 
Small Numbers (2006) poignantly captures this trend. 
He links the new xenophobic sentiments in Europe to 
“the anxiety of incompleteness” (p. 8), a fear produced 
by the effects of global transformations yet projected 
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) 
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communities. ISIM was established in 1998 by the University of Amsterdam, 
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response to a need for further research on contemporary developments of 
great social, political, and cultural importance in the Muslim world from social 
science and humanities perspectives. ISIM’s research approaches are expressly 
interdisciplinary and comparative, covering a large geographic range which 
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ISIM
A N N E L I E S  M O O R SA few days before parliamentary elec-
tions were held in the Netherlands last 
November, the minister of immigration 
and integration, Rita Verdonk, stated 
the Cabinet’s intention to ban the burka 
from all public space.1 In the course of 
the last years the term burka has been 
added to the Dutch vocabulary, as hap-
pened previously with terms such as 
fatwa and jihad. It has not only become 
a common sense notion in public debate 
but has also made its appearance in of-
ficial discourse and state documents.
Up until 2005 the Dutch media mainly used the term burka to refer 
to a particular style of Afghan women’s dress that covers women from 
head to toe and has a mesh in front of the eyes. In 2003, when a school 
banned students wearing face-veils from its premises, the word burka 
was occasionally used, but other terms such as niqab or face-veil were 
still more common. This changed when Geert Wilders, a populist, right-
wing member of parliament, who sees the Netherlands as threatened 
by a “tsunami of Islamization,” proposed a resolution requesting the 
Cabinet to take steps “to prohibit the public use of the burka in the 
Netherlands.”2 Since then the term burka has not only come up time 
and again in the media but also in parliamentary discourse and official 
documents. This raises the question of why the term burka has been 
chosen when Dutch equivalents of face-veil or face-covering could 
have easily been used. Why has this term gained such rapid and wide-
spread acceptance?
Rather than a coincidental use of a foreign term, it seems that burka 
has become the preferred term among politicians as well as the gen-
eral public because it resonates with a particularly sensitive recent his-
tory, that is the rise of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its de-
mise, in which, incidentally, the Dutch military has become involved. 
Not only has the Taliban come to represent the most repressive regime 
for women ever, the burka has been turned into the visual symbol of 
women’s oppression par excellence. The very term has come to stand 
for the banning of women from schools, health care services, and em-
ployment, with harsh punishments meted out to those infringing its 
rules.3
Turning to the Dutch streets, it is not only evident that the number of 
women wearing a face-veil is exceedingly small (estimates are between 
50 and 100 women in the entire country),4 but also that, in contrast to 
what one may expect from these debates, those who cover their faces 
generally do so with a thin piece of cloth that covers the lower part of 
the face and leaves the eyes visible. This is far more similar to some Arab 
styles of covering the face than to the so-called Afghan-style burka. In 
fact, if one were to encounter a woman wearing the latter type of burka, 
this is far more likely to be a journalist or researcher checking the reac-
tions of the public—a style of reporting that has become a genre in it-
self—than someone wearing it out of religious conviction. Yet, in spite 
of discussions in the Dutch press about which term should be used and 
recognition that the term burka is problematic, it is this term (in its now 
favoured Dutch spelling boerka) that has become normalized.
The most often heard arguments for banning the burka from public 
space are an odd mix of references to security issues, women’s oppression, 
and women’s refusal to integrate into Dutch society. These arguments are 
contradictory in themselves. The refusal to integrate (in itself a question-
able argument) may well be considered a form of agency rather than 
oppression.5 Moreover, the fact that the women concerned often wear a 
face-veil against the wishes of their family makes it even more problem-
atic to argue that banning the burka is necessary to liberate women. Yet, 
the term burka in itself, evoking images of the Taliban regime and its op-
pressive policies against women works 
to conceal such contradictions. 
Whereas politicians, such as Wilders, 
work to fixate the meaning of the 
burka, new developments in the field 
of fashion design, production and 
marketing make it ever more difficult 
to assume that items of dress have 
a unitary and fixed meaning. If in the 
early 1990s Turkey was one of the first 
countries where Islamic fashion shows 
were held, more recently such fashion 
shows of upscale, colourful and even 
flamboyant yet Islamic styles of dress have drawn wide media attention 
in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran. Moreover, such im-
agery has gained a global presence through its widespread dissemina-
tion through the Internet. In the case of Iran, women push the bounda-
ries of state regulations about dress and appearance by wearing more 
revealing clothing. At the same time, the organizers of fashion shows, 
including state institutions respond to this trend by developing styles 
of dress that intend to appeal to Iran’s female population as fashion-
able, yet simultaneously conform to their notions of Islamic modesty.
Such a new presence of fashionable yet Islamic styles of dress is one 
more indication that the centres of fashion are becoming increasingly 
diverse. Moreover, such developments are not limited to the catwalks 
of Muslim majority countries. Fashion magazines such as Marie Claire 
with its December photo shoot of fashion in Dubai, have started to in-
clude reports on and pictures of Islamic fashion, while some would also 
point to the incorporation of “Islamic elements” in the long-established 
fashion capitals of London, Paris, and Milan. During the presentation 
of the new 2007/8 collection, Louise Goldin, for instance, sent a model 
down the catwalk wearing an outfit that covered everything except the 
eyes, and models in Milan were wearing Prada tur-
bans. Neo-con websites have been quick to con-
demn this as a dangerous flirt with, in their words, 
“jihad chic” or “Islamofascism.”6 Such attempts to 
fix meaning, like those of the Dutch politicians 
mentioned before, seem first and foremost a de-
fensive reaction to the increasingly common blur-
ring of boundaries between fashion and religion. 
In a visual comment on such attempts at closure 
in the Netherlands, artist and fashion designer 
Aziz Bekkaoui in his Times Burka Square employs 
glossy billboards with elegant, playful women 
modelling black face veils in combination with 
slight adaptations of famous advertising slogans, 
such as “Because I’m more than worth it.”7 This is 
not to say then that fashion in itself equals eman-
cipation; on the contrary, some Muslim women 
are also critical of Islamic fashion because of the 
pressures all fashion exerts. At the minimum, 
though, the imagery conveyed through fashion 
should unsettle the fixed notions about women 
and face veils as summarized in “the burka of the 
Taliban.”
 
In Europe, face veils have become the ultimate 
symbols of Muslim “otherness.” The (presently 
stalled) attempts of the Dutch government to 
introduce a burka-ban highlight how misguided 
arguments about women's emancipation and 
national security are used to push a strongly  
assimilationist agenda. Ironically, while 
politicians hold on to a singly negative view of 
face-veils, trends in the fashion industry show 
that the boundaries between religion, fashion, 
and everyday social life are far more flexible 
than the political gaze is able to capture. 
Annelies Moors is an anthropologist and holds the ISIM Chair at the University of Amsterdam.
“Burka” in Parliament 
and on the Catwalk
Notes
1. The elections resulted in a change of 
government and the new minister of 
integration shelved this idea.
2. Tabled on 21 December 2005 and supported 
by a parliamentary majority of right-
wing parties as well as by the Christian 
Democrats. It is registered as parliamentary 
document 29754 no. 41.
3. See Saba Mahmood and Charles Hirschkind, 
2002, “Feminism, the Taliban, and the Politics 
of Counter-Insurgency,” Anthropological 
Quarterly 75, 2: 339-54 and Lila Abu-Lughod, 
2003, “Do Muslim Women Really Need 
Saving? Anthropological Reflections on 
Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American 
Anthropologist 104, 3: 783-90.
4. That is 1 in every 10,000 Muslim residents of 
the Netherlands.
5. The irony is that quite a few of these women 
are Dutch converts.
6. See, for instance www.debbieschlussel.com, 
www.atlasshrugs.com or www.jihadwatch.
org (all accessed 19 March 2007).
7. This plays on L’Oréal’s original and famous 
slogan “Because I’m worth it.”
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Transnational Ties
M A G N U S  M A R S D E N
Cosmopolitanism on 
Pakistan’s Frontier
Khowar-speaking Muslims in the re-
mote and mountainous Chitral region of 
northern Pakistan have been profound-
ly affected by movements of both local 
and global Islamic activism over the 
past thirty years. These have included 
the rise and fall of the Taliban regime in 
neighbouring Afghanistan, only a three 
hour drive from the region’s administra-
tive headquarters, together with the 
effects of violent conflict involving the 
region’s majority Sunni and Shia Ismaili 
sectarian communities. It would be easy to imagine, therefore, that Mus-
lim life in this geo-politically strategic setting has become increasingly 
“talibanized” in recent years. Yet over the past ten years my fieldwork has 
taken me to polo tournaments played out on high mountain passes, and 
to night-time male-only public musical programmes at which delight-
ed crowds have cheered local musical performers. Above all, in village 
homes, orchards and teashops, I have taken part in hours of conversa-
tion with my Chitrali friends, all of whom spend their days and nights in 
continual exploration of the arts of conversation, 
interpersonal debate, and public verbal exposi-
tion. They are people who think, react, and ques-
tion when they are called upon to change their 
ways or conform to new standards of spirituality 
and behaviour. Their reactions to the demands of 
so-called Islamisers from within and beyond their 
region are not necessarily dismissive or hostile. 
What they do believe, however, is that a man or 
woman wishing to live well and in tune with divine 
will must cultivate their mental faculties, exercising 
critical thought, and emotional intelligence on an 
everyday basis.
The vibrancy of everyday Muslim life in the re-
gion is not confined, however, solely to debates be-
tween Muslims who hold contrasting conceptions 
of Muslim virtuosity. Nor have collective forms of 
Chitrali Muslim self-understanding been “ethni-
cized” in any simple sense. The region, rather, has 
and continues to be home to Muslims from a very 
diverse range of ethnic, linguistic and, indeed, national backgrounds: 
both refugees from Afghanistan and, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Tajikistan, have lived in the intimate setting of Chitral’s villages 
and small towns over the past thirty five years. 
Chitral is part of an expansive transregional space within which inter-
actions between Muslims who have very different memories and direct 
experiences of both Soviet and British colonialism are a recurrent feature 
of everyday life. Known primarily today because of the ongoing search 
for al-Qaida militants, the “war-on-terror,” and heroin cultivation, few ap-
preciate the degree to which Northern Pakistan, Northeast Afghanistan, 
and Southern Tajikistan, is an interconnected region that is remarkably 
diverse in relation to its size and sparsely populated terrain. Interactions 
between both Sunni and Ismaili Muslims from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
and northern Pakistan often form a focus of discussion for the region’s 
people in relationship to their past and current experiences of mobil-
ity in this politically sensitive space. As is the case in other transregional 
“Islamic ecumenes,”1 such practices of mobility are central to the ways 
in which the region’s Muslims reflect upon the differentiating effects of 
British and Soviet colonialism, as well as the nature and consequences 
for everyday life of ongoing forms of political and religious transforma-
tion, most notably those emerging from “sectarian” conflict, and the so-
called “war on terror.” 
Recognizing the reflective and intel-
lectual processes that interactions 
between Central and South Asian Mus-
lims in village settings stimulate, offers 
an important contrast to the work of 
political scientists that focuses on the 
emergence of “transnational” or “glo-
bal” Islam in the region. Analytically, 
this body of work partly reflects an 
ongoing scholarly tendency to associ-
ate “working class” labour migrants, 
or mobile “village Muslims,” with the 
emergence of new, yet nevertheless, bounded types of “transnational” 
religious or diasporic identities. As a result, the ways in which non-elite 
people embody an “open-endedness” of cultural vision, understand the 
spaces through which they move, and experience the types of forces 
that connect these are rarely explored.2 The term “cosmopolitanism” is 
often used so broadly that its analytical value is rendered questionable. 
Pollock’s argument that cultural versatility and vernacular identities are 
interrelated and not opposing dimensions of cosmopolitan apprecia-
tions of diversity, however, provides a sharper focus for its ethnograph-
ic exploration. Exploring the ways in which diversely constituted tran-
sregional settings are connected and experienced by mobile Muslims 
who acquire and transmit different types of knowledge and establish 
relationships with people from backgrounds very different than their 
own, furnishes the possibilities for new insights into exploring person-
al and collective forms of Muslim self-understanding that thrive in the 
muddy waters between “local” and “global” Islam.3
In the northern Chitrali village where I stayed there were no official 
refugee camps: the “incomers” from Afghanistan and Tajikistan to the 
village lived, rather, either in rented rooms in the village bazaar, or in 
the homes of Chitrali villagers for whom they worked as agricultural 
labourers. The presence of these refugees in the village was and contin-
ues to be a focus of much discussion amongst Chitralis. The “incomers” 
are widely accused of having introduced “simple” Chitralis to a range of 
moral vices, including heroin addiction and violent revenge feuds. Yet 
all the Chitralis I know also talk about the cultural and familial networks 
that connect their lives to a wide range of ethno-linguistic communi-
ties living in neighbouring regions of both Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
Some Chitralis visit their Afghan friends who used to live in Chitral as 
refugees but, since 2001, have mostly returned to their “homeland.” 
During the course of their travels Chitralis may also visit the holy city 
of Mazar-e-Sharif, and seek employment opportunities in Kabul’s lucra-
tive construction industry. Simultaneously, one-time Afghan refugees 
travel to Chitral in order to meet long lost Chitrali friends and to sell 
cheaply Afghan-bought luxury vehicles at inflated Pakistani prices. The 
pushes and pulls of affect, profit, and religion, thus form a focus for the 
ways in which the region’s mountain moderns engage with the pos-
sibilities and constraints of their rapidly changing world. 
Sulton’s story
Sulton, for example, came to Chitral from the southern Gorno-Badak-
shan region of Tajikistan in December 1999, two years after the cessation 
of full scale military conflict there, but during a period of great economic 
hardship and political uncertainty. His mother tongue is an Iranian-Pamiri 
language Shughni, but he also speaks Tajiki Farsi, Russian, and now also 
Khowar and Dari, or Afghan Farsi. On his arrival in Chitral, a member of 
the family with whom I stay found him on a cold winter’s night outside 
one of the village’s places of Ismaili worship. Like the Khowar-speaking 
Chitrali family with whom we both stayed, Sulton was a Shia Ismaili Mus-
lim. During his first months in Chitral, Sulton frequently told the family, 
themselves descendents of influential pirs, that it was his search for Is-
Cosmopolitanism is usually associated with 
educated, affluent, and highly mobile citizens. 
But why would the “open-endedness” of 
cultural vision not apply to less fortunate 
global citizens? This contribution follows the 
experiences of an Ismaili man from Tajikistan 
who temporarily joined the Taliban in 
Pakistan. His trickster-like abilities to artfully 
instrumentalize relationships with a variety 
of groups provide important insights into the 
workings of actually existing cosmopolitanism.
… in the company 
of his newly 
found Taliban 
companions, he 
merely pretended 
to be a Sunni.
maili religious knowledge that had mo-
tivated him to embark on his journey to 
Chitral: Ismailis in Tajikistan, he said, had 
little knowledge about Ismaili doctrine 
as a result of the anti-religion policies 
of the Soviet Union, and he wanted to 
return home with a certificate of Ismaili 
education. 
Sulton’s stay in Chitral would not re-
sult in him acquiring any abstract sense 
of affiliation to a shared Ismaili commu-
nal identity, however. Sulton spent most 
of his days collecting water, threshing 
wheat, chopping wood, and even plant-
ing roses; yet his stay in the village was 
eventful. He was known as being “hot 
headed” by the villagers. On one occa-
sion, for instance, he gave a village boy, 
Aftab, who had a reputation for being 
something of a loafer—largely as a re-
sult of his public attempts to meet girls, but also because of his fondness 
for shamelessly smoking hashish in the village lanes—a sound beating 
over a disagreement concerning the division of the village’s scant water 
supplies. Sulton soon also fell out with the Ismaili family with whom he 
stayed: he accused them of putting him to work while teaching him 
nothing about religion. One evening, he fought with the family’s young-
er brother, saying: “I have come to Pakistan to go back with something 
and not to be treated like your slave.” He left the home, now pursued by 
the village police who were threatening to charge him with assault, and 
never returned. 
On 8 September 2001, I met Sulton again; this time on the polo ground 
in the region’s administrative headquarters, Markaz. Sulton had now 
radically transformed his personal appearance: when first in Chitral, like 
most other men from Tajikistan, he wore Western-style trousers and was 
clean-shaven; now he appeared bearded and dressed in shalwar kamiz. 
He also pointed in the direction of the group of men who had accompa-
nied him to the ground: bearded and donning black turbans, they were, 
he told me, Afghan Taliban based in the city of Jalalabad; he had been 
working for them as a driver since he left Chitral the previous year. 
If Sulton had not embraced any abstract commitment to Ismaili reli-
gious knowledge or community during his stay in Chitral, nor had he 
been unthinkingly talibanized by his experiences with the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan either. Sitting underneath the cool shade of the famous Chi-
nese Plane tree where Chitrali polo players rest their horses at half time, 
Sulton whispered to me that he had not become a Sunni, nor renounced 
his Ismaili faith. Rather, in the company of his newly found Taliban com-
panions, he merely pretended to be a Sunni. “They don’t know I’m an 
Ismaili, don’t tell them,” he told me. The dissimulation of adherence to 
Ismaili doctrine and practice, taqiya, is a marked feature of historic and 
present-day Ismaili experience. What is distinctive about Sulton’s case, 
however, is that it involved an Ismaili from Tajikistan joining the Taliban, 
a Sunni and predominantly ethnically Pashtun movement, widely known 
for its deeply hostile and violent attitudes to Shia Muslims. Pretending to 
be a hardline Sunni in such circumstances is not a simple task, especially 
for a post-Soviet Ismaili: Sunni and Shia Ismailis pray in very different 
ways, and Sulton told me that he used to stand at the back of gatherings 
and imitated his Taliban bosses as best he could. I noticed these men 
leaning on their plush new Toyota Hilux, gazing at Sulton and myself chat-
ting, and decided that this was not the place to linger. Instead, I returned 
to the polo ground and watched the equally captivating spectacle of a 
game between the Chitral Police and the Chitral Scouts descending into 
a physical brawl involving players and their uniformed supporters alike, 
an event that led to curfew being imposed the following day. 
After September 11 I lost touch with Sulton, but often wondered what 
had happened to my Tajik-Ismaili friend. In March 2002 I was informed 
that Sulton had returned to the region. He was now said to be working 
in the house of a man from a one-time noble (adamzada) background, 
known as a lord (lal) across the region, and who owned, by Chitrali stand-
ards, a substantial amount of land in a relatively remote village to the 
north of the region. This lal was a Sunni, although he was also known 
throughout Chitral for expressing near blasphemous statements. He 
also had a well-earned reputation for being Chitral’s most prolific hash-
ish producer, and it was now rumoured that his smuggling activities had 
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Transnational Ties
diversified to include apricot schnapps—the production of which my 
former Talib friend, Sulton, was said to be investing his talents in to great 
effect. 
The next time I met Sulton was with the aforementioned lord on a 
snowy afternoon in December 2005. We arranged to meet at dusk on the 
polo ground, where Sulton told me he felt he had become the proverbial 
“prisoner of the mountains”: if he returned to Tajikistan he would almost 
certainly be arrested by Tajikistan’s security forces, who were suspicious 
of all people who had fled to Pakistan or Afghanistan during the civil 
war, and even more of those who had still to return; yet, if he travelled 
to “down Pakistan” he feared that he would be picked up by the Pakistan 
police, and perhaps even sent to Guantanamo Bay. Sulton then pulled 
out a bottle of apricot schnapps, previously hidden down his trouser leg, 
and presented it to me as a gift, before bidding farewell.
Actually existing cosmopolitanism
Sulton’s story highlights a type of everyday behaviour that anthropol-
ogists have long recognized as characteristic of life along frontiers. Far 
from being buffeted passively around by distant international events, 
he embarks upon complex courses of action in response to changing 
geo-political circumstances. His trickster-like ability to artfully instru-
mentalize the relationships he purposefully builds with Chitrali Ismai-
lis, smugglers, and the Sunni Taliban is an important reminder of the 
social and moral fluidity of even the most apparently bounded forms of 
collective religious identity. Yet Sulton’s story is also shot through with 
a sense of self that is constantly reconstructed in a world defined by its 
political fragmentation. He claims that his mobility is motivated by a 
search for the purity of Ismaili religion, but that this search can also be 
dangerous, leading him to sources of moral contamination.
The anthropologist Enseng Ho has described the history of the Yeme-
ni Hadrami diaspora in relationship to a “landscape of places that closed 
or opened” to different categories of persons in relationship to “inter-
nal divisions” and “external rivalries.”4 Sulton’s Chitral odyssey illustrates 
the types of work deployed by persons who move 
through such shifting moral landscapes divided 
by colonially imposed boundaries and invested 
with shifting political, religious, and emotional 
significance both by the region’s people and the 
wider world. A wily trickster and a sophisticated 
mountain cosmopolitan, Sulton strategically de-
ploys his knowledge of this complex region of 
the world in order both to create and dissolve 
the shifting range of relationships upon which his 
survival currently depends. In the course of doing 
so he offers us insights into the making and work-
ing of actually existing cosmopolitanism. 
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F I L I P P O  O S E L L A  &  
C A R O L I N E  O S E L L A
Muslim Entrepreneurs 
between India & the Gulf
Kerala- and Gulf-based businessmen 
are at the forefront of India’s post-lib-
eralization economy. They are sharp 
innovators who have adopted the 
business and labour practices of global 
capitalism in both Kerala and the Gulf. 
Embodying the dream of success of all 
Kerala Muslims, these entrepreneurs 
enjoy a very public presence. Ostensi-
bly concerned with the “upliftment“ of the whole community, they are 
involved in community associations, orphanages, schools, trade organ-
izations, and everyday politics. Their orientation towards “moderniza-
tion” of social practices—in education, in particular—is intimately en-
meshed with, on the one hand, an effort to produce a “Muslim moder-
nity” (where the main referent points are the Gulf and, more recently, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia), and, on the other, the pursuit of particular 
business interests.
The role of Kerala middle class elites in the development of reform 
movements and political organizations is neither an unusual nor recent 
phenomenon. As among their Hindu counterparts, early twentieth 
century orientations towards socio-religious reform, modernization, 
and progress found support especially amongst the educated Muslim 
middle-classes. We see many “community leaders”—wealthy and typi-
cally Anglophile traders/businessmen—enthusiastically embracing 
colonial-driven modernization and building “modern” schools with the 
blessings of the colonial administration and the support of a growing 
reformist ulama.
But the conditions for modernist transformation amongst Muslims 
were significantly different from other communities. Muslim reformism 
had to deal with the aftermath of the 1921 Mappila rebellion, which 
confirmed to many the anti-Islamic nature of British rule. In reaction, 
rural Muslims distanced themselves from modern education, privileg-
ing Arabi-Malayalam over English, and even over written Malayalam. 
Islamic reformist ulama, on the contrary, took on the banner of mod-
ern education and social reform, building schools where science was 
taught alongside religious subjects. For the traditionalist ulama—in 
whose practices and orientations the majority of Kerala Muslims rec-
ognize themselves—generalized opposition to Islamic reformism was 
extended to a rejection of all forms of education promoted by the lat-
ter. In other words, outside the limited sphere of the educated urban 
middle classes and reformist ulama—for whom modern education in-
creasingly stood for the whole project of modernization and reform—
attempts to introduce “English” education were viewed with suspicion, 
or rejected outright.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Hindu middle classes had little 
problems in convincing their caste fellows of the links between west-
ern education, socio-religious reform, and progress. Middle class Mus-
lims had by contrast to walk a far rockier path to establish ideological 
and political hegemony over the community. Almost sixty years on, in a 
state proud of its people’s full literacy, education remains the yardstick 
by which Muslim progress is measured and imagined. It is by presenting 
themselves as enlightened educationalists and by promoting modern 
education that contemporary entrepreneurs inscribe their specific busi-
ness interests and practices in the rhetoric of the “common good,” there-
by legitimizing their claims to leadership within the wider community.
Contextualising Kerala Muslim businessmen
Kerala Muslim businessmen are neither reminiscent of the big-scale 
Indian entrepreneurs nor even of their close Tamil neighbours. Unlike 
the latter, they by no means all come from “good families”; but what 
we focus most on is relations with the community. While Tamil Hindu 
businessmen seem concerned with personal salvation and indulge in 
pursuit of Vedanta or holy-men, Kera-
la’s entrepreneurs have a strongly con-
gregationalist focus and a sharp sense 
of duty towards the wider Muslim com-
munity, towards contemporary re-im-
aginings of the dar ul Islam. They feel 
themselves morally accountable to the 
wider community, responsible for its 
development, and guided by a vision 
of the steps that need to be taken.
Contemporary Tamil leaders are abandoning traditional dynastic 
business and re-structuring enterprises through Japanese or American 
business plans and management techniques. Their Kerala counterparts 
follow a similar path—they are enthusiastic supporters of the sharp la-
bour practices of global capitalism—but they turn their back on the 
wholesale adoption of American styles, instead searching for Islamic 
business models. This brings them into dialogue with contemporary 
global Islam in its reformist and modernist trends. It is their attempts to 
craft identities as “modern Muslims” which most strongly flavours these 
men’s lives. Their preoccupations with how to shift the Muslim com-
munity away from practices or lifestyles considered “backward” and 
towards modern Islam is what marks out the parameters of their life-
goals. This brings them far closer to Malay entrepreneurs or to some 
Arab businessmen who are, indeed, often their patrons or partners.
While many Muslim businessmen have no direct political involve-
ment, they all exercise considerable influence in the community’s po-
litical and social life. They might be chided—or admired—for being 
behind-the-scene “king makers” who keep politicians in their pockets 
to forward their own business interests, but they are also praised for 
caring about ordinary Muslims. We are not talking here about members 
of an ill-defined Muslim middle class, but about a relatively small group 
of extremely wealthy men who have a prominent public presence and 
are recognized as community leaders.
Many Gulf-based entrepreneurs present their lives as rags to riches 
tales, where “traditional” Muslim skills of the bazaar—such as risk tak-
ing, hard work, familiarity with the politics of wasta (Arabic: favours, 
contacts)—are combined with the adoption of modern business tech-
niques to achieve success. They thrive in the Gulf because they have an 
affinity to Arabs, but they also benefit from close links with local politi-
cians who support their investments in Kerala. These men’s rags to riches 
tales mark them out as iconic figures for all Muslims, an image they are 
keen to cultivate. But they are not distant heroes: any Muslim will know 
someone—a friend or relative—who works for them and has a story 
to tell. And here a degree of accountability creeps in. These men are 
subject to wide public criticisms. As we might expect, the established 
middle classes commonly discount such men on the grounds that they 
are nouveaux riche with no family history. They are also sometimes por-
trayed simply as having extended the slippery rules of business beyond 
the usual rule-bending so taken for granted by all business people. And 
those who are employed by them might have different—and nega-
tive—experiences of their apparent enlightened benevolence.
Kerala-based businessmen are of course even more visible and prom-
inent in local public life than their Gulf-based counterparts. While the 
latter make major donations and initiate grand projects, the Kerala-
based men are often those who implement the grand projects on the 
ground, working continually in the public sphere to shape projects 
of change and reform. These local entrepreneurs assert continuity 
between their families’ past involvement in the bazaar economy and 
their present wealth. But there is also rupture: foreseeing the decline of 
bazaar-based trade, they moved into entirely novel businesses where 
they introduced new—and extremely controversial for Kerala—labour 
and production practices.
In recent years the role of wealthy 
entrepreneurs in Muslim political, religious, 
and social life has been largely neglected. 
The authors reverse this trend by considering 
the practices and orientations of some Kerala 
Muslim businessmen, who unite the pursuit 
of particular business interests with efforts to 
produce a Muslim modernity.
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Business interests and 
community “upliftment”
The relationship between private in-
terests and public good, the advance-
ment of business while apparently 
working for the “upliftment” of the 
whole community, unfolds in these 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to link the need 
for education to reform and future 
progress of Kerala Muslims. And they 
do not just talk about education: they 
promote and build schools, colleges, 
and universities in both Kerala and the 
Gulf through various private trusts or 
charitable organizations. If necessary, 
funds are raised by appealing to the 
sensitivities of specific Muslim audi-
ences in both Gulf and Kerala. Potential 
Arab donors are presented with the 
chance of bestowing benevolent gen-
erosity to support “backward” Muslims’ 
development and participating in the 
renaissance of Islamic culture and val-
ues. Kerala Muslims, especially Gulf mi-
grants, are offered the chance of doing 
good for the community, and also, as 
many of these educational institutions 
charge hefty fees, with a very attractive 
investment opportunity.
Migration and Gulf business-led investment has brought the devel-
opment, as among all other communities, of private services which 
are Muslim-owned and Muslim-run, and which then come to be per-
ceived as specifically Muslim and to attract a Muslim clientele. There 
is an often-expressed argument that such investment is necessary in 
order to encourage Muslims towards development. This in turn has 
also been reinforced by political events: locally, the emergence of 
strong and successful Hindu and Christian organizations which have 
built a whole string of community-owned services; nationally, the rise 
of Hindu nationalism; and internationally, widespread Islamophobia, 
all contributing to a sense of being a “community under siege” which 
needs to stick together and be self-reliant. Muslims, it is argued, need 
to build networks of professionals, skilled workers, and businessmen 
to strengthen the community and to provide economic and political 
leadership.
This long-term project, fostered by many wealthy businessmen, has 
a much wider objective—that of participating in a worldwide renais-
sance of Islamic moral values and culture. An Islamic renaissance, it 
is popularly argued, would not just rid Kerala of the social problems 
brought to bear on Muslim lives by globalization, but also set the basis 
for counteracting “American imperialism.” While a pan-Islamic orienta-
tion is not new, it has been significantly strengthened over the last 30 
years. Gulf migration brought thousands of Malayali Muslims close to 
what they consider the heartland of Islam and has exposed them to life 
in Muslim-majority countries. This has renewed a sense of participation 
to the wider dar-ul-Islam—which is, of course, open to very different 
interpretations and experiences on the opposite shores of the Indian 
Ocean—while also enabling them to tap into the business opportuni-
ties it opens up. 
Amongst Kerala Muslims the Gulf stands for the successful blending 
of Islam with cutting edge technologies and modern business practic-
es. Regardless of individual migrants’ experiences, Dubai’s skyscrapers, 
Kuwait’s sprawling oil refineries, or Riyadh’s opulent neighbourhoods 
stand for a world wherein Muslims are both wealthy and self-confident; 
a stark contrast to the circumstances of the many Muslims in India. The 
Gulf demonstrates that scientific or technological knowledge need not 
be in contradiction to Islam, but can be mastered to generate wealth 
for the well being of Muslims and to strengthen Islam. Gulf-based Ma-
layali businessmen have been successful not just because they have 
been lucky to be in the right place at the right time, but because they 
manage to combine an inclination for risk taking in business with an 
affinity for the politics of Arab wasta, with modern forms of manage-
ment learnt in the Gulf. Their experiences suggest that entering and 
succeeding in the global labour market requires more than “traditional” 
business acumen: it demands scientific 
skills and familiarity with new technol-
ogies such as those taught in emerging 
Muslim schools and colleges.
In the practices of Kerala Muslim 
businessmen and entrepreneurs we 
see some tensions between old and 
new business styles. But “know-who” 
has not been abandoned for “know 
how.” Because of the layering of serv-
ices and the complexity of contem-
porary business, where flexibility and 
sub-sub-contracting are the norm, 
contacts are undoubtedly important 
and “know-how” is often inseparable 
from “know-who.” In networking across 
the Gulf, Malayali Muslims have a great 
advantage, because of both Arabic 
language facility and their long-time 
contacts and familiarity with the re-
gion. And entrepreneurship can stand 
at the core of a Muslim identity and of 
contemporary reformulations of Mus-
lim morality. Here it allows—indeed it 
encourages—ideas of a productive in-
terplay between business and morality, 
where material progress and religious 
reform become intertwined indexes of 
modernity.
Muslim entrepreneurs are deeply rooted in the public sphere and are 
committed to action within it. Religious obligations are taken as exam-
ples of Islam’s preoccupation with social responsibility, while reformists 
try to re-shape obligations into more engaged forms. When successful 
Muslims plan what needs to be done for the common good in their 
own community, education becomes the core focus of charitable and 
activist energies. They believe in the possibility of a win-win situation: 
the uplift of the entire Muslim community and access to a flexible and 
qualified workforce shaped into global standards. But the Muslim com-
munity is outstripped every time by the achievements of Kerala’s Chris-
tians and Hindus. The Christian community and its educational institu-
tions are felt to offer both top class education and necessary training 
in rational and systematic lifestyles. But any simple emulation of such 
institutions is, for contemporary community leaders, no longer feasi-
ble. The early twentieth century Muslim elite were, like the Hindu elites 
of the time, happy to adopt practices drawn from both colonial and 
local Christian modern. Today, Kerala’s intimate and longstanding links 
to the Arab Gulf provide a direct example of the existence of another 
modern—a properly Islamic modern, a modern stripped of what are 
perceived as the excesses of Western modernity.
Ultimately, then, public sphere activity focused on education has a 
dual effect. It satisfies the moral and communitarian requirements of 
Muslim elites; but we take as an equally motivating factor the aim of 
producing the sort of workforce that these men feel they need: a work-
force of young men who are flexible, educated, and equally compe-
tent in English and Arabic speaking environments. And yet, just as in 
the early part of the twentieth century, middle class elite hegemonic 
projects might prove to be elusive. Islamist organizations have been 
extremely vociferous in their critique of the globalization process to 
which these contemporary entrepreneurs have associated themselves. 
This far-reaching moral critique of public and private life—which in-
creasingly targets the not-so-Islamic behaviour of many Arab Mus-
lims—has led some Islamist organizations to declare full support to 
the left parties during the recent assembly elections, contributing to 
the defeat of many candidates closely connected to leading entrepre-
neurs.
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B R U N O  D E  C O R D I E R
Shiite Aid Organizations
in Tajikistan
Rasht is a relatively remote part of 
Tajikistan, with a physical geography 
dominated by the Western Pamirs. 
The area consists of several districts 
with a joint territory of 18,000 square 
kilometres and an official population 
of 360,000, most of whom are Hannafi 
Sunni Muslims. During the Tajik civil 
war (1992–1997), much of the Rasht 
region was controlled by commanders 
affiliated to the United Tajik Opposi-
tion (UTO). It was cut off from the rest 
of the country until mid-2001 because 
of irregular militia activity along the roads that link it to the capital. The 
economy, based on agriculture and fruit farming, has received a major 
boost over the last few years by the reopening of transport links and 
the remittances from seasonal labour migrants, primarily to Russia. 
The ties with Russia that already existed in the Soviet era further 
intensified due to the economic crisis in Tajikistan and labour short-
ages in some parts of Russia since 1999. According to State Migration 
Agency statistics, the Rasht area had some twenty-five thousand reg-
istered emigrants during the first quarter of 2006—the actual number 
is likely to be much higher. As the functioning local markets and the 
range of goods for sale show, the influx of money generated abroad 
creates new purchasing power, stimulating the appearance of banks, 
money transfer services, and mobile phone coverage in district centres 
where there were no basic financial services and communications until 
two or three years ago. 
From community mobilization …
Between 1992 and 2001, much of Rasht’s population survived on hu-
manitarian aid provided by various UN, Western, and Muslim aid organ-
izations. Those still active today have gradually switched to long-term 
development and community mobilization programmes. One exam-
ple is the Aga Khan Development Network and its Mountain Societies 
Development Support Programme 
(MSDSP). The MSDSP started in 
1993 in Kuhistan-i-Badakhshan, a 
province in Tajikistan with a sub-
stantial percentage of Ismaili Shi-
ites.1 The MSDSP served as a frame-
work to switch from relief activities 
to agricultural and infrastructure 
development. By providing train-
ing, technical assets, and grants and 
micro-credits, it aimed to assist in-
dividual farmers to cope with the collapse of the Soviet state farms, the 
privatization of land, and to promote self-reliance and diversification. 
As the MSDSP expanded and its focus on individual citizens showed 
to be of limited success, community mobilization became increasingly 
important. Since 1998, the main mobilization channels are the so-called 
Village Organizations (VO), a concept used by the Aga Khan Rural Sup-
port Programme in Pakistan’s Northern Areas and Chitral district since 
1982. The VO group representatives of each of the village’s households 
receive training and ad hoc technical support from MSDSP. Each VO 
has a number of working groups on specific issues such as finance and 
accounting, animal husbandry, or irrigation. 
The VO’s task is to identify needs and mobilize resources for local 
initiatives that are to contribute to raising living standards in the vil-
lage or neighbourhood. Until 2004, the VO also served as a conduit for 
micro-credits yet this service is now provided by the AKDN-affiliated 
First Micro-Finance Bank. To promote social cohesion and self-reliance, 
the VO approach tries to instrumental-
ize existing kinship ties and informal 
authorities, for example village elders, 
clan heads, village mullahs, profession-
als, and key figures in the local formal 
and informal economy.
According to MSDSP project statis-
tics, as of late 2006 the VO programme 
in the Rasht valley area operates in 389 
villages with over 47,000 beneficiaries 
in total. About 180 projects have been 
realized or approved, eighty per cent of 
which involved the upgrading of irriga-
tion channels, roads, and bridges. Two trends can be observed more 
recently. First, some of the older Village Organizations identified other 
partners besides MSDSP in order to diversify their sponsorship base. 
Second, besides infrastructure there seems to be an increasing trend 
to invest in income generation projects for vulnerable groups, like the 
construction of a safflower mill, the distribution of chickens to poor, 
female-headed households, or the layout of an orchard. 
… to charity work
The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF) represents an entirely 
different approach. The IKRF started to work in Tajikistan during the war 
in mid-1995. Though officially a foundation and not a state institution, 
the IKRF is one of the main channels for social welfare in Iran as well 
as the Iranian government’s main conduit for international humani-
tarian aid. It has five field offices in Tajikistan and plans for two more. 
According to its statistics, the IKRF assists 6,000 needy households in 
the country, totalling some 35,000 beneficiaries. The foundation’s key 
target group are widows and orphans–a focal group in Islamic charity–
and poor female-headed households. The latter are indeed a relatively 
substantial group in Rasht and other parts of Tajikistan due to the civil 
war and, more recently, labour migration.
The IKRF’s field office in Garm is one of three in the Rasht valley and 
covers the districts of Garm, Tajikabad, 
and Jirgital. It has four employees and 
has a much more discrete profile than 
the MSDSP with which, as far as we 
know, it has no operational contacts. 
Its activities in the area reflect the IKRF 
programme in Tajikistan and have no 
community mobilization or training 
approach. Initially, it provided humani-
tarian assistance to one hundred fami-
lies of war widows, gradually expand-
ing to the present five hundred. The beneficiaries receive bi-monthly 
food and household packages, usually until a son reaches majority age. 
Part of the food and household products which are distributed by the 
IKRF is purchased from local markets, part is imported from Iran. The 
IKRF Garm branch provides similar assistance to some sixty pensioners 
as well as a number of stipends to children from poor households who 
attend school in Garm.
Another IKRF activity is the repair of houses of widows and poor fami-
lies. At the time of research, this was planned for 30 dwellings in the 
Garm branch area. One of the IKRF’s more peculiar activities is the pro-
vision of marriage trousseaus and household sets to girls from needy 
families who plan to marry. According to its data, the IKRF assisted 250 
newlyweds in Tajikistan this way and planned to assist another 750 
in late 2006 and 2007. The IKRF also organizes activities like iftar (fast 
breaking) meals during Ramadan and offers help to widows and pen-
sioners with administrative formalities. To ensure that the funds reach 
In the global periphery and (post-)conflict 
areas, faith-based aid organizations play an 
important role as providers of social services. 
The activities of the Aga Khan Development 
Network and the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation in the former Soviet republic of 
Tajikistan reflect different backgrounds and 
approaches used by Muslim aid organizations. 
They also outline how these organizations 
obtained a foothold and gained legitimacy 
in environments that do not share their 
confessional background.
[H]umanitarian needs … resulted 
in a certain indifference towards the 
origin or “denomination” of aid …
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targeted groups, the foundation’s local staff study the social and finan-
cial situation of applicants. 
Beyond sectarianism
That both the Aga Khan Development Network and the Imam Kho-
meini Relief Foundation are called “Shiite organizations” means that 
they have been founded by, and are linked to, a Shiite establishment. 
In the case of the AKDN, this establishment is the Ismaili Imamate and, 
as such, the wider Ismaili Shiite community which has the peculiarity 
of being a non-territorial diaspora. For the IKRF, in contrast, it is Iran’s 
official-clerical establishment and as such, a state and its interests. This 
does not mean that the bulk of their staff and beneficiaries are Shiite or 
that they have an agenda of spreading the Ismaili or Imami (Twelver) 
brands of Shiite Islam among non-Shiite populations. There are actu-
ally no indicators or anecdotal evidence that either one of the organi-
zations is involved in such activities in Rasht. In terms of staffing, the 
vast majority of both organization’s staff and cadres are from the Rasht 
area and, as such, of Sunni background.
As far as the Rasht goes, the AKDN-MSDSP and the IKRF clearly have 
different beneficiary niches. On the whole, their impact in terms of di-
rect employment and income generation is limited as compared to the 
importance of labour migration and remittances thereof. Nonetheless, 
they are important in the public field, given the gap left by the collapse 
of the Soviet welfare state and the technical-financial incapability of 
the present state to take over its role, especially in more remote areas. 
Programmes like MSDSP’s community mobilization are also instrumen-
tal in breaking off the culture of dependence and help cope with stark 
social changes ranging from the demise of the Soviet state farm sys-
tem to the increase in female-headed households due to civil war and 
migration. More “classical” charity like that offered by the IKRF has a 
certain niche and added value among extremely marginalized parts of 
society and focuses more on short-term needs. Yet, both beneficiary 
groups overlap since part of the IKRF’s beneficiaries are members of 
MSDSP-supported Village Organizations.
The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, being linked to and funded 
by Iranian government-affiliated actors (even though it is registered 
as a non-governmental organization) pretty much operates on its 
own, is not integrated in the wider development community, and fits 
into a wider interest consolidation movement by the Iranian govern-
ment in Tajikistan. This also includes the import of Iranian goods and 
the co-funding and implementation of a number of transport and hy-
droelectric projects. As the IKRF cadres interviewed stressed, the IKRF 
considers itself pan-Islamic and non-sectarian and illustrated this by 
pointing to activities among other needy non-Shiite Muslims, like in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
By contrast, the Aga Khan Development Network and MSDSP co-op-
erate with a number of international donors like the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency and the UK’s Department for International 
Development. Their expansion into non-Shiite areas (and non-Ismaili in 
particular) like Rasht also reflects a rationale. The AKDN is generally a 
vehicle for social advancement and economic power for the Ismaili mi-
nority in Tajikistan as it is in other countries where it operates. A project 
coordinator working on conflict prevention found that Ismailis form a 
large part of the staff of AKDN and MSDSP as compared to their overall 
share in the population, which is normal since they are related to the 
Ismaili leadership and were active in Ismaili areas first. Their expansion 
into non-Ismaili areas over a number of years is strategically motivated: 
first, all Ismaili areas in the country are already covered and have lit-
tle room for expansion; second, if the AKDN would be perceived to 
privilege only one community it might cause sectarian tensions where 
there are none; and third, being non-exclusive is also important to its 
international donors.
Legitimacy in a non-Shiite context 
The AKDN-MSDSP and the IKRF are the only Muslim aid organizations 
that have operated in the Rasht valley since the civil war. The fact that 
they are of Shiite rather than Sunni background like the near-totality of 
the population raises the question of how their presence is perceived 
and how they gained legitimacy with both the authorities and the pop-
ulation for long-term activities. When both the MSDSP and the IKRF 
started to work in Rasht in the late nineties, this was still a conflict area 
largely under UTO control. Major obstacles were the numerous check-
posts set up by governmental and opposition militias and the suspi-
cions and arbitrariness of individual commanders. Much of the access 
and legitimacy building in UTO territory went through ad hoc arrange-
ments with commanders, often on the basis of personal networks. One 
example mentioned during the research is that of an UTO commander 
from Tajikabad who was sympathetic to the “Ismaili” MSDSP because of 
his spouse’s Ismaili origins. 
The post-conflict Tajikistan’s secular regime, for its part, seems more 
comfortable with Shiite aid organizations for these are unlikely to 
propagate militant forms of Sunni Islam—adhered to by part of the 
UTO at the time—among Rasht’s predominantly Sunni population. 
What about the grassroots level? Two factors seem to determine the 
perception of Shiite aid organizations in Rasht: first, the acute humani-
tarian needs, caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy, political 
instability, and economic blockade, which resulted in a certain indiffer-
ence towards the origin or “denomination” of aid (an attitude needing 
to be understood in light of the striking absence at the time of Sunni 
humanitarian actors, in particular, of those from the Gulf ); second, due 
to the suppression of religious practice and clerics among Sunnis, Shi-
ites, as well as Ismailis in the Soviet Union, there is no strong sectar-
ian consciousness among the population. So despite the ambivalent 
attitudes towards religion, aid, and development in former Soviet en-
vironments and the non-Shiite background of their beneficiaries, the 
described organizations have gained legitimacy by partly filling the 
void left by a dysfunctional state and by appealing to a non-sectarian 
Muslim philanthropic discourse.
Bruno De Cordier is with the Conflict Research Group under the Department of Third World 
Studies of Ghent University, and author of Blinde Regen: Centraal-Azië in de frontlinie 
(Academia Press, 2005).
Email: bruno.decordier@ugent.be
Notes
1. Ismaili Shiites form 2.8 percent of Tajikistan’s 
population of some 7 million. Most live in 
the province of Kuhistan-i-Badakhshan and 
in the capital of Dushanbe.
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B E R T R A M  T U R N E R
Global Players & Local 
Agency in Rural Morocco
In large parts of the contemporary Is-
lamic world, the local population is in-
creasingly facing competition between 
different transnational actors for imple-
menting their respective agendas. These 
agendas are often framed as legitimis-
ing legal templates and claim universal 
validity. In these competitive processes 
it is particularly the development or-
ganizations which vulgarize ideals of the 
western way of life and political-legal 
notions such as development, democra-
tization, good governance, sustainability 
and environmental protection. These organisations increasingly encoun-
ter, however, the repercussions of acts by transnationally active Islamic 
movements propagating a return to the roots of Islam in everyday life. 
The socio-legal consequences of the competition between transnational 
actors for control over local contexts have rarely been addressed and 
theorized, however. Legal anthropology is challenged, on the one hand, 
to develop a theoretical framework to address the issue of an increasing 
competition between transnational actors and, on the other, to analyse 
how discrepancies between different and contradictory approaches initi-
ate and inform local discourses on violence, conflict, resistance, and local 
identity. The analysis of a concrete constellation in rural South West Mo-
rocco exemplifies the relevance of the matter.1
The thesis in this article is that focusing on the competition between 
global players for local control reveals that competition accelerates the 
scalar dynamics in transnational-state-local interaction. It is argued that 
the rising degree of legal cross-referencing serves to boost the legal 
agency of local actors. The article suggests a concept of “empowered 
legal agency” achieved by an emphasis on socio-legal identity and local 
culture.
The local setting and its transnational interveners
Before referring to the concrete example, I shall briefly outline the 
situation in the rural Souss in Morocco and the intervening global 
players. The Souss is the area of the unique forestal ecosystem of the 
Argan forest and simultaneously an intensively used agrarian region. 
The majority of the Souss people are 
farmers and peasants and are organ-
ized in village communities. The village 
legal arena contains, under the um-
brella of state law, various constitutive 
legal components including habitual 
and various Islamic legal elements. In 
1998 a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve was 
established while, over recent years, 
agrarian production for the world mar-
ket has continuously been expanding. 
This combination attracts many tran-
snational development agencies and 
donor organizations, which propagate a sustainable development ap-
proach, environmental protection and the formation of civil society 
structures. A strongly antagonistic approach to intervening in local af-
fairs arrived with the Salafiyya, the transnational Islamic movement, in 
1999. The Salafis propagate an adjustment of all spheres of life towards 
their own idea of the one and only correct Islamic lifestyle, which entails 
a rigid perception of the basic religious principles. The thing that both 
types of global players, the secular and the religious, have in common 
is that they can rely on very few experts on the ground. Development 
agents running projects tend to be based at regional centres. They in-
struct and advise local personnel and act as consultants. Development 
agencies recruit most of their local employees among the young un-
employed intellectuals from the region with university diplomas. The 
Salafiyya is headed by a few religious leaders who transmit Salafi ide-
ology via Islamic schools in the towns. They send missionaries to the 
countryside for the mobilization of local adherents and assist with the 
formation of local supporters. The Salafiyya organized a regional char-
ity network of local Salafi cells, while development agencies worked 
towards self-help, organizing production cooperatives and sustainable 
forms of resource management.
Differences between the competing actors become particularly obvi-
ous when looking at their attitudes towards each other and their implicit 
mutual interpretation. Officially, development agencies are indifferent 
towards the religious sphere in Morocco, in general, and towards Islamic 
activism in the region in particular. The Salafiyya, in contrast, address the 
issue of development impacts and openly 
criticize effects they interpret as negative. 
They condemn western influence and warn 
against the destructive forces of transnational 
legal treaties and development cooperation. 
The Salafis characterize their intervention 
as integrated within a general discourse on 
growing tensions between western lifestyle 
and Islam. Thus, they contribute to an already 
ongoing debate in rural Morocco about the 
benefits and disadvantages of concepts of 
sustainable development in the kind of re-
source exploitation propagated by western 
development agencies. In contrast, when 
asked about their opinion on the increase of 
Islamic activism and the Salafi criticisms of 
the pagan neoliberal development agenda, 
the local Moroccan development brokers 
representing the German GTZ and Oxfam 
Canada denied even recognizing the exist-
ence of an Islamic opposition to their agenda. 
How the competitors act in a local context is 
accurately shown by the following ethno-
graphic example.
In Morocco, as elsewhere, Western development 
initiatives face increasing competition from 
transnationally active Islamic movements, 
thereby complicating the dynamics of 
transnational-state-local interaction. The 
author analyses these dynamics by focusing on 
the dilemmas that arose when, in his research 
site, a pious Muslim won a sum of money in 
the “Ramadan lottery” and was engulfed by 
contradictory transnational advice. Ironically, 
this competition between global players 
boosted the legal agency of local actors.
Reception for 
French eco-
experts
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The Ramadan lottery and contradictory transnational 
advice
In the “Ramadan lottery” in autumn 2005, a villager won a small sum 
of money. This became a big issue in the community. The man, a pious 
Muslim, was searching for advice on what to do with this money and 
raised the issue in the village cafe. A public debate was immediately 
sparked. According to local religious ideas, the money is impure be-
cause it comes from a lottery that is haram. For this reason, it would 
not make sense to invest the sum, because one must not benefit 
from haram money. This religious attitude has had a strong impact on 
local practice. The local grocer who had granted a credit to the man 
announced he would accept money for the redemption of the debt 
without hesitation, because that would not mean “investment.” This so-
lution would have been approved by the majority of the villagers. The 
argument was, firstly, that the interpretation of the grocer was convinc-
ing and, secondly, that it is good behaviour and fosters the traditional 
system of the local economy to pay a debt earlier than necessary once 
in a while.
The local model of economic cooperation enjoys a longstanding 
tradition and is perceived as an expression of local solidarity. Custom-
ary regulation has contributed much to the economic development 
of a local moral economy since the 1980s, which has been developed 
within the cash crop sector. The local credit system allowed for the 
reinvention and financial hedging of sharecropping arrangements. 
Thus, sharecropping basically relies on a local legal arrangement 
that includes the informal credit system because the state legal order 
considers it an outmoded form of production, and Islamic law also 
expresses reservations regarding sharecropping. The local peasants 
prefer to raise credit during the period between sowings and harvest 
by a local grocer they trust. The grocers customarily only charge very 
low interest rates and are more interested in committing the debtors 
to their enterprise.
A local development broker completely disregarded all existing res-
ervations and proposed to the winning villager that he use his money 
for granting micro-credits to others, which would be a “good deed.” 
At the same time, the money would generate capital surplus, with 
which one could even increase the number of good deeds. Once fed 
in the circle of benefits, the money would be cleaned and no longer 
remain haram.
The man caused a great deal of consternation by putting forward 
this proposal. Micro-credits, previously introduced by external actors, 
had a poor reputation. They had been introduced as an instrument 
against rural poverty, and in order to strengthen self-help, and were 
widely promoted by development actors. The micro-credits were 
tied to specific small-scale economic enterprises as stipulated by the 
creditors—but the system was not under the control of its initiators 
for long. Alongside Moroccan organizations granting micro-credits 
on behalf of the transnational creditors, some black sheep appeared 
making credits available under extortionate conditions and for highly 
risky economic activities. The debtors realized too late what was hap-
pening and felt they were in serious trouble. Because of this, none 
of the villagers was prepared to act publicly against the prohibition 
on making a profit by exploiting the needs of members of the com-
munity.
The development expert’s further suggestions merely provoked 
the shaking of heads. He proposed investing the money in fencing 
the man’s plot in the forest with cacti lines, a favourite project of the 
environmental protectors. This is, however, against local law, because 
even plots where the holder is exercising exclusive exploitation rights 
must remain openly accessible, because pasture is a common right.
The Salafis, in turn, proposed transforming the haram money into 
halal money by way of the winner surrendering it to them as a charity 
donation (sadaqa). This was cause for common amusement. A sadaqa 
donation is defined as a voluntary pious donation to people in need. 
The act of giving sadaqa protects the giver against possessiveness 
and purifies his soul and his property and is agreeable to God. Ac-
cordingly, there is no need for an intermediary. But there was still a 
more concrete reason for the public reaction. In the village there is 
a Salafi grocer, not the lottery winner’s creditor, who is well known 
as an expert in “ritual transformative transactions.” The line of argu-
ment that he and his co-adherents put forward was not generally 
convincing, because they were perceived as pretending to transform 
all haram money into halal simply by investing it in the movements’ 
charity work. When making such investments, the grocer never shied 
away from cheating people, as he argued that they earned their 
money in a haram way and were, therefore, unable to give a sadaqa, 
which the grocer then offered to organize for them. Thus, the Salafis 
more or less embezzled haram money and invested it in the Salafi-
yya’s charity network in the previous owner’s stead, in order to pro-
vide the involuntary and deceived giver—and themselves—with spir-
itual remuneration. At the same time the grocer benefited from the 
donation itself because of the “financial reflux” from the recipients of 
charity. However, sadaqa brings spiritual benefits for the giver only if 
the donation is consciously made with good intent. As a result, few 
trusted this Salafi grocer, and his clientele was made up exclusively 
of his brothers in belief. In this particular case, when the Salafi grocer 
offered the same service to the lottery winner, the latter preferred 
to redeem the larger part of his debt and to remain loyal to his own 
grocer.
The implicit effect of these debates was that the villagers experi-
enced a growing external challenge to their local model of distribu-
tive obligations, which is based on ties of solidarity within the village 
and on mutuality between people living together. The Salafis criti-
cized the local credit system, while misusing it at the same time. This 
was because the powerful local social work and mutual aid structures, 
including redistributive rules, are deeply rooted in local religiosity 
and are connected with local religious rituals; and for this reason, 
the Islamic activists explicitly refused to contribute to it. The Salafi-
yya accepted only those distributive rules, which were in accordance 
with Islamic law such as zakat. An additional argument the Salafis 
employed was to contend that the local model of mutual material 
support simply balances out the lack of state assistance for social se-
curity. The development agents, on the other hand, emphasized that 
transnational financial support should be kept apart from local dis-
tributive obligations. They explicitly claimed that micro-credits and 
extra money for environmental protection measures should remain 
exempt from these obligations. Furthermore, the development agen-
cies overrode the conventional economic circles of good exchange 
and mutual support based on social and territorial proximity. How 
to profit from the investments all transnational actors are offering 
without causing losses to the local economy and undoing local social 
cohesion remains a matter of considerable debate.
The example reveals that the local legal arena where rules are nego-
tiated is providing an indispensable frame of reference for local iden-
tity interacting with and sometimes integrating or absorbing external 
impulses. The competitive nature of transnational intervention posed 
a challenge for local cohesion that was new in terms of both its qual-
ity and its intensity. Local people acted as members of village-NGOs, 
production cooperatives, or religious movements in order to access 
external resources. This provoked serious misunderstandings regard-
ing the judicial competence and intervention potentialities of these 
new institutions in local areas of conflict. 
The most pressing and challenging task in the discursive process 
turned out to be the re-evaluation of criteria of local identity and 
local belonging—which in turn had consequences for the local con-
figuration of economic power-relations. The informal village councils 
intensively discussed the implications of the various legal repertoires 
for local identity formation. The ability of local actors to canalize 
transnational interventionism and to create sufficient room to play 
transnational actors off against each other has finally led to a social 
process that can be described as “empowering legal agency.“ This re-
action must not necessarily be interpreted as “taming globalization.” 
But identity and social belonging prove to be re-
silient, as well as indispensable, as the basis for 
maintaining trust and legal security in the face 
of external challenges. 
Bertram Turner is Senior Researcher at the research group “Legal Pluralism,” Max Planck 
Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany. He is author of Asyl und Konflikt: 
Rechtsethnologische Untersuchungen (Berlin: Reimer, 2005). 
Email: turner@eth.mpg.de
Note
1. For more details see Bertram Turner, 
“Competing Global Players in Rural Morocco: 
Upgrading Legal Arenas,” in “Dynamics of 
Plural Legal Orders,” ed. F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann, special issue, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism 53/54 (2006): 101–39.
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Exchange of dialogue between the 
Western and Muslim worlds has been 
going on for decades, and has intensi-
fied in the wake of the attacks on the 
United States of America on Septem-
ber 11, 2001. Yet one of the factors that 
has hindered this dialogue process is 
the apparent fear of “radical” Islam, a 
label attached to grassroots Islamist 
movements and parties that struggle 
for an Islamic state, if not an Islamic so-
ciety. Consequently many of the dialogues that have taken place have 
tended to be inter-elite affairs, bringing together Western elites and 
their Muslim counterparts who often share similar educational back-
grounds, cultural affinities, and political viewpoints. Accordingly, many 
of these dialogues have, thus far, tended to take place in the absence 
of those who might be labelled as “real” Islamists.
Yet is has to be noted that, in many Muslim countries today, it is not 
possible to avoid or ignore the reality on the ground, where political 
Islam is often seen as a legitimate and popular force that appeals to the 
masses. The numbers alone testify to the relevance of such groups and 
movements. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS), for instance, counts 
among its numbers around one million members and active support-
ers; the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) has a quarter of a 
million supporters; the Justice and Prosperity party of Indonesia (PKS) 
which began as a campus-based student movement not only contrib-
uted to the fall of President Suharto but is now installed in power as 
one of the key coalition partners in the government of Indonesia.
It was the desire to reach out and engage with such grassroots Islam-
ist movements that prompted a change of approach by the German 
government recently, with the Task Force for Germany’s Dialogue with 
the Muslim World (of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) working 
with the Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) of Berlin to host a two week 
lecture and study tour by Islamists from Malaysia and Indonesia. In a 
landmark project going against the grain, the Task Force was willing 
to invite Islamists from Malaysia’s PAS and ABIM and Indonesia’s PKS 
to Germany to engage in a series of important dialogues with the Ger-
man public, meeting local German political parties, funding agencies, 
foundations, journalists, academics, and students.
Open disagreement
One of the conditions of the dialogue tour was that all discussions 
would be frank and open, with no taboos or restrictions on subjects 
discussed. In several of the discussions this rule was put to the test, as 
the firmly held positions of both sides left no room for agreement or 
compromise. A discussion on the issue of freedom of religion, for in-
stance, witnessed the Islamists of Malaysia and Indonesia insisting that 
freedom to convert to Islam did not entail the freedom to leave Islam; 
while representatives of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung were unable 
to accept the rationale behind this position. In such cases, it became 
clear where the lines of difference and disagreement lay, and it was 
equally important to have these differences stated openly, albeit in a 
civil manner. Other thorny issues discussed included the meaning of 
“secularism” and whether the Islamists were able to accept the notion 
of a secular state that plays the role of honest broker between the dif-
ferent faith communities of a multireligious nation-state. 
Having said this, it is noteworthy that the Islamists of Malaysia and In-
donesia—particularly the representatives of PAS, ABIM and PKS—were 
more interested in questions of political-economic structural reform 
than anything else. During discussions held at the offices of the SPD 
and the Frederik Ebert Stiftung, for instance, much time was spent dis-
cussing the future of the welfare state in Germany and Europe. The Is-
lamists of PAS and PKS were particularly keen to understand the evolu-
tion of the welfare state system in Germany, and whether the economic 
changes brought about by the unification and economic integration 
of the EU meant that the welfare state was doomed. In some ways 
these concerns reflected the Islamists’ own seriousness when dealing 
with questions of economic structural 
reform, and demonstrated their readi-
ness to assume political power. 
Pleasant surprises
All in all, many of the discussions 
were enlightening for those who took 
part. The meeting with the organizers 
of the Berlin demonstrations against 
the invasion of Iraq, for example, was 
instructive in the sense that it showed 
how solidarity between peoples and nations could be generated de-
spite cultural and religious differences. During the discussion with the 
organizers of the demonstrations, the Islamists were interested to learn 
that most of those who took part in them were ordinary Germans of 
non-Muslim background, including a significant representation of Ger-
man Jews and Christians. Such examples provided a healty model to 
contrast with the usual tide of anti-Semitic and anti-Western discourse 
so prevalent among many Islamist movements in the Muslim world 
today.
The Islamists were also pleasantly surprised by the positive reaction 
from the German public who seemed open to the idea of listening to 
the Islamists speak for themselves, even if they did not necessarily 
agree with everything that was said. As Dzulkefly Ahmad of PAS noted: 
“Before arriving in Berlin we were somewhat 
sceptical about the reception we would receive. 
We assumed that there would be much anti-Mus-
lim hysteria and that as Islamists we would be dis-
missed as ‘conservatives’ or ‘fanatics.’ But I have to 
say that we were very impressed by the level of 
understanding of the German students and gen-
eral public, and how they took us seriously and 
listened to what we had to say, even if we did not 
agree on everything. This has made us change 
our earlier viewpoint and assessment of Europe 
and has given us a new perspective on life in the 
West.”
A new realism?
To what extent this project will have a lasting 
impact on the Malaysian and Indonesian Islamists’ 
view of the West is uncertain, though the follow-
up process has already begun with the Malaysian 
Islamic Party requesting the German government 
to send the German academic Dieter Senghass to 
Malaysia for a series of public lectures and semi-
nars to be hosted by PAS. Much of the credit has 
to go to the Task Force for Germany’s Dialogue 
with the Muslim World for taking up the ZMO’s 
project and supporting it wholeheartedly; for this 
venture has opened up new avenues for the inter-religious dialogue 
process to proceed in the near future, and marks a new level of realism 
on the part of the governments of Western Europe who appreciate that 
political Islam is a factor to be taken seriously, albeit with reservations.
Transnational Ties
F A R I S H  A .  N O O R  &  
K AT H A R I N A  Z Ö L L E R
The Islamists Are Coming!
In an effort to counter the unfruitful labelling 
practices that have characterized dialogue 
between Western and Muslim Worlds, the 
German government in cooperation with the 
Zentrum Moderner Orient invited Southeast 
Asian Islamists to Berlin to engage in a more 
fruitful exchange of viewpoints. The authors 
point out that although the discussions did not 
necessary lead to agreement, the encounters 
did create room for nuance and understanding.
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J U L I E  M C B R I E N
Brazilian TV & Muslimness 
in Kyrgyzstan
Delfuza, Zeba, and Mukadas, sisters liv-
ing in a small town in Kyrgyzstan, were 
gathered around the television talking 
while commercials played. Suddenly 
one sister hushed the others and drew 
their attention to the images on the 
screen. The pictures were of beauti-
fully dressed Muslim women, swirling 
strands of DNA, and images from Bra-
zil and Morocco. It was a promotional 
trailer for the new Brazilian soap opera 
Clone. When I asked the girls what the 
new serial was about, they replied they were not sure, but mentioned 
that it had something to do with Brazilians and Muslims. While the im-
ages of the Moroccan Muslims had grabbed their attention, the girls 
said nothing about the rather unique central topic of the soap opera: 
human cloning. The sisters were not the only ones. For many viewers 
around the world, it was the lavishly presented, and highly romanti-
cized, Muslim “Other” that made the soap opera so popular. Indeed, 
one observer noted that Armenia had gone “Arabic over wildly popular 
soap opera.”1 Another reported that, “‘El Clon’ is leaving Latin America 
wide-eyed and drop-jawed for all things Arab.”2 
The sisters’ reactions to the trailer run in January 2004 indicated that 
the responses of residents in the town of Bazaar-Korgon (30,000 inhab-
itants) would be similar. It’s not difficult to understand why. While the 
Soviet Union had long since ended and with it the militant control of 
religion, its secularist legacies—which had vilified pious Muslim behav-
iour and turned Muslim identity into little more than an ethno-national 
marker—continued.3 This precluded any meaningful debate over the 
constitution of Muslimness well into the post-Soviet period. Moreover, 
with nearly all international television broadcast 
coming via Moscow and access to the Internet 
and satellite dishes severely limited, the amount 
of media from other parts of the Muslim world 
was highly curbed. However, the end of the 1990s 
saw a relatively free religious environment in Kyr-
gyzstan and the concomitant development of 
space for religious practice and discussion. It was 
within this environment that Clone was aired. 
As the months went on, and Clone rose to tre-
mendous popularity in the community, public 
discussion showed that what had most piqued 
viewers’ interest was the programme’s portrayal 
of Muslims. Residents said the soap was so fas-
cinating because it was the first serial they had 
seen with (non-Central Asian) Muslims as lead-
ing characters. In short, they explained, watching 
the soap opera was a chance for them to see how 
Muslims really lived. Clone became a part of the community’s daily dis-
cussions over the nature of Islam and Muslimness. Whether this took 
place between family members, friends, colleagues, or acquaintances, 
or as part of the internal dialogue of individual residents, Clone be-
came a source of information, agitation, and encouragement in local 
Kyrgyzstan circles.
In contrasting the “two worlds” of Brazil and Morocco, Clone’s creators 
objectified the places, lifestyles, and communities of the soap opera 
presenting them as fundamentally different from one another. Moreo-
ver, through text and visual imagery, they rendered a highly orientalized 
portrayal of Muslims and Muslim life especially regarding issues of gen-
der and female sequestering. As has already been widely established in 
the anthropological literature on media, viewers actively engage in the 
production of meaning of a given media text or image, productively 
utilizing its material.4 Their interpreta-
tions, opinions, and usages of media 
are often highly divergent from those 
imagined or intended by the produc-
ers. It is with these considerations in 
mind, and within the wider context of 
post-Soviet Muslim life in Central Asia, 
that we can understand how, despite 
such orientalized portrayals, the mate-
rial gathered from viewing Clone wid-
ened community perceptions about 
“other” Muslims, was utilized in individ-
ual self construction, and served as a resource in community debates 
concerning what Islam “truly” was and, thus, what the responsibilities 
of community members as Muslims should be.
Understanding the soap and its imagery 
Clone was produced by the Brazilian media giant TV Globo and aired 
in Brazil in 2001. The programme was then syndicated and shown 
around the world. As previously noted, the seemingly unique theme 
of this soap opera was its use of a cloned human being as one of the 
central characters in the tale. The main story-line revolved around the 
love affair of a Brazilian man, Lucas, and a Brazilian born woman of Mo-
roccan descent, Jade [zha-dee]. The couple, who met in Morocco after 
Jade moved there to live with her mother’s family, began their love af-
fair in the 1980s. The affair, alas, was ill-fated and Jade was married off 
by her family to Said. Lucas married as well and thus began their long 
separation. The soap opera followed the lives of these two lovers as 
they managed to steal away for a night alone every few years. 
All in all, the visual representations of Morocco were of an a-temporal 
place of extreme beauty and sensuality that was fundamentally differ-
ent from “modern” Brazil. The episodes which dealt primarily with Mo-
roccans focused precisely on the subjects where variance with “mod-
ern” life was perceived to be the greatest. These instalments largely 
revolved around issues related to gender: seclusion of women, patri-
archal society, polygamy, and dress. However, Clone did not simply de-
monize the Muslim other. Through complex techniques of mirroring 
typical of the Orientalizing discourses described by Said, the portrayal 
simultaneously romanticized certain “un-lost” portions of the other’s 
culture.5 Though Muslims were depicted as backward and lacking the 
virtues of modernity, the portrayal was a beautiful one that valorized 
certain aspects of the (perceived) Moroccan culture.
Internal dialogues—discussing Clone
Just after her marriage in 2000, Shahista, a resident of Bazaar-Korgon, 
said she and her husband came “closer to religion.” A few years later, at 
age 26, Shahista slowly began to transform her mode of dress and veiling, 
covering more and more of her body. Shahista was an avid fan of Clone, as 
were nearly all the members of her immediate and extended families. 
Shahista said that she learned something new from Clone every time 
she watched it for, as she explained, the characters in the programme 
dealt with the same kinds of problems she faced. Though Shahista lived 
in a nearly all Muslim society, more covered forms of veiling like she had 
come to wear (hijab) were not widespread. She was sometimes stared 
at when walking in public and would often overhear harsh comments 
on her mode of dress while shopping at the bazaar. When she watched 
Clone Shahista said she could relate to the feeling of difference that 
the veiled Moroccans in Brazil encountered. Beyond that she said she 
found validation for her form of dress through them. For Shahista see-
ing beautiful young women veiling in the most fashionable ways con-
firmed her idea that veiling was not a part of an antiquated religion as 
the critics in her town intimated.
Soap operas draw at least part of their success 
from their clever use of platitudes that may or may 
not be taken seriously by viewers. In this article, 
the author focuses on Clone, a Brazilian show in 
which Muslims are depicted in classic, and blunt, 
stereotypical fashion. While travelling from its 
intended audience in Brazil to unanticipated, but 
equally excited, audiences in Kyrgyzstan the soap 
opera obtained interesting new meanings. Ironically, 
the stereotypical images contributed positively to 
local debates on what it means to be Muslim. 
[W]atching the 
soap opera was a 
chance for them to 
see how Muslims 
really lived.
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Shahista was not the only one who relished the fashionable side of 
Clone. New stores took the names of beloved characters and some 
dresses were dubbed “Jade.” Girls in Bazaar-Korgon who were consid-
ering veiling said they dreamed of having a collection of scarves and 
clothes like Jade’s or Latifah’s. Through these characters, girls in Bazaar-
Korgon saw that Islam and veiling were not at war with fashion. Indeed, 
interestingly, even those girls who had not previously considered veil-
ing said that they would now experiment with the veil because of the 
influence of Clone. 
Gulmira, a 20 year-old university student said that although she 
called herself a Muslim she was simply “not doing anything with her 
religion.” Gulmira was also an avid Clone watcher. She recounted that 
sometimes, after viewing Clone, she tried on her mother’s headscarves. 
However, Gulmira did not tie them like her mother did—at the nape 
of the neck. Rather she experimented with the various ways Jade and 
Latifah wore their scarves—styles which all fully covered their hair and 
neck. Gulmira said “I did it because I wanted to know how it would feel 
and whether, if I someday wanted to wear my scarf like this, it would 
suit the shape of my face.” Gulmira said she had never seriously consid-
ered becoming a more devout Muslim and, in light of her friends’ prac-
tices and her respect for them, she sometimes wondered whether she 
should even identify herself as one. Clone did not directly help her with 
her questions, but she remarked that because of the soap opera she 
no longer believed that the veil was always ugly and only for the old. 
It could be a beautiful and fashionable form of dress, she explained, 
albeit one that was worn by Muslims more “devout” than herself.
Is that how Muslims really do it?
In Bazaar-Korgon there is a sense that during the 70 years of social-
ism, Muslims in Central Asia lost the knowledge (and practice) of true 
Islam and proper Muslim behaviour. As a result, many residents of the 
town perceived themselves as least among equals in the global Muslim 
community. This feeling of inferiority was often revealed when resi-
dents discussed Clone. One of the most repeated phrases I heard when 
viewing or discussing the programme with others was the epiphanic 
statement “Oh, so that’s how Muslims really do it.” Many residents thus-
ly attributed educational value to the soap opera and commented on 
how much they were learning from it. 
Though they often uttered this phrase, it was always followed by a 
critical discussion of certain aspects of the programme. Thus, though 
residents often depicted Clone as a course on “Islam for beginners” it 
is better understood as a programme that widened their exposure to 
alternative ways of living and interpreting Islam 
and then, through critical reflection, a resource 
they drew from when constructing their own 
views about Islam and Muslimness. 
Ziyod, Shahista’s husband and a 26 years old 
bazaar merchant, had also become “closer to re-
ligion.” Ziyod watched Clone but said that he did 
not always agree with it. He explained that some 
episodes showed the Moroccans doing things 
that Muslims should not be doing, like dancing 
or publicly kissing at wedding ceremonies. He 
explained that both of these practices were un-
Islamic. Despite this, he said, he still enjoyed the 
programme.
Kadir, a local school teacher age 50, watched 
Clone nightly but he found fault with some of the 
actions of the Moroccan characters. On one occa-
sion, Kadir contrasted various customs shown in 
the programme with those kept in Kyrgyzstan—
such as practices which establish a girl’s virginity 
at marriage—concluding that the former were 
unnecessary components of proper Muslimness. 
The important thing in a Muslim’s life, he said, is 
that one has faith and behaves decently to oth-
ers. 
While Ziyod’s and Kadir’s interpretations and 
applications of scenes from Clone differed—one 
drew on Clone to narrow appropriate Muslim be-
haviour while the other employed the soap to 
widen it—both utilized the soap as a resource 
in renegotiating, and then asserting, their inter-
pretations of Islam and Muslimness. Shahista however, had a different 
reaction. She chose not to make normative claims about the actions of 
the Moroccan Muslims. She said “In Clone they do some Muslim things 
differently. I don’t know if they are wrong, or if the Muslims there are 
just a different type of Muslim. Before, I thought there were only Mus-
lims and Christians. Now I am learning that there are many types of 
Muslims.” 
Shahista’s realization that there were many types of Muslims and 
many ways of doing things is the new reality residents of Bazaar-Ko-
rgon are facing. While Soviet era notions of proper Muslimness still 
abound, the lack of Soviet authorizing structures, the rather weak con-
temporary Kyrgyzstani state, and a relatively open society has provided 
fertile ground for a proliferation of religious views and practices which 
have confronted formally stable, widespread notions about Islam. In 
this environment the material gathered from viewing Clone became a 
resource, and in many cases an emancipating resource, in these indi-
vidual and collective debates of meaning. 
The orientalized portrayal of Muslims in Clone is 
an example of the kind of ill-informed stereotypes 
that still abound concerning “Muslims and moder-
nity” in contemporary media. The uses of its con-
tents by Muslims in Bazaar-Korgon nonetheless 
reveals that not only can popular culture be a site 
for resistance, it can also be a tool for viewers in 
creative processes of alternative societal, and self, 
formation. In reconstructing social life after the 
collapse of socialism, Muslims of Bazaar-Korgon 
are engaged in forming alternative modernities 
that include “religion.” It is intriguing that from 
among the tools and resources they draw from 
are some of the most archaic projections and im-
ages that secular modernity can provide.
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Still from http://oclone.on.neobee.net/, a fansite of Clone
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Meeting, Mating, and 
Cheating Online in Iran
Over the past two years, Iran has seen 
a major technological revolution to 
accompany its sexual and social revo-
lution.1 Today, Farsi is the third (some 
say fourth) most used language in the 
blogosphere2 and young Iranians in-
creasingly use the internet and cyber-
space to explore relationships and en-
gage in forms of cultural consumption 
prohibited by the regime. In 2004 and 
2005 I conducted fieldwork in Teheran 
among (mostly) middle or upper mid-
dle class educated young adults. I used 
ethnographic methods such as partici-
pant observation (in internet cafés and 
in cyberspaces such as chat rooms), in-depth interviews, and group 
discussions, to describe Iranian young people’s uses of the internet in 
three major ways: 1) as a place for cultural consumption and produc-
tion prohibited by the government (including news, movies, music, 
etc.); 2) to create a blogosphere or Weblogistan as a venue for exchang-
ing information and creating a space for the emerging youth sexual 
culture, and perhaps most importantly; 3) as an unregulated means of 
meeting, mating, and cheating with potential partners online. In the 
context of a modernizing Iran, it is important to explore the emergence 
of this new “cyber-sexual culture,” its identity formation, cultural con-
sumption patterns, and sexual and social trends amongst urban Iranian 
young adults. 
The question underlying the study was: how do young adults un-
derstand and enact their erotic and sexual lives within the laws and 
restrictions of the Islamic Republic? Many of the young people in Iran 
see themselves as “children of the revolution” born to a nation in the 
midst of political upheaval. Interestingly, the Islamic Republic’s free ed-
ucation policies have created a highly literate and politically charged 
youth with voting rights (age 16 currently) who are ready and willing 
to express their dissent.3
Sexual revolution and internet usage 
Many young people in Iran describe changes in sexual and social be-
haviour and discourse as a “sexual revolution” (enqelab-e-jensi). Accord-
ing to informants throughout the study, because the current Islamic 
regime seeks to exercise its power through legislation on moral issues, 
young people argue that they are un-
dermining the regime by attacking the 
fabric of morality through which the 
regime seeks to govern. Many of these 
young adults feel that by consuming 
goods prohibited by the regime, and 
engaging in activities deemed immoral 
by the regime (i.e. wearing “revealing” 
Islamic dress, downloading Western 
music online, dancing, drinking, or pre-
marital sex), they are undermining the 
power of the Islamists and enacting a 
quiet revolution. 
For many young Iranians, a large part 
of this quiet revolution is taking place online and in cyberspace. Cur-
rently, the government does censor a number of internet sites (about 
35%), particularly sites that touch upon “red line issues” as defined 
by the government. These issues include, but are not limited to: por-
nography, politically infused blogs, websites talking about women’s 
rights, and certain types of Western media. Sites where users are able 
to maintain anonymity (meaning sites that do not require the user to 
type in an identifying ISP number or 
accurate user name) are also highly 
regulated, as are sites such as “Orkut” 
or “Friendster” which facilitate youth 
encounters. However, young Iranians 
are highly skilled at constructing web-
sites and blogs that do touch upon “red 
line issues,” but which are nevertheless 
hidden from the DCI Smart Filtering 
system that the IRI authorities use to 
find and block sites.4 Young people 
have become adept at hacking into 
sites that have been banned, and cre-
ating alternative sites for expressing 
their views—engaging in online “glo-
balized” youth cultures, and meeting and chatting with other young 
people—which are not “screenable” by the authorities. 
Sites, blogs, and cosmopolitanism 
A large part of the sexual revolution is about participating in an im-
agined “cosmopolitan” and “globalized” culture and consuming certain 
types of goods restricted by the government. The goods most demand-
ed by all of the young people I spoke with were information and cultur-
al products coming from the West—though increasingly young people 
are producing music, films etc. that are banned by the government and 
then sold online (such as the music of the popular underground rack 
band O-Hum)—which fulfill a desire to be part of an online “globalized” 
youth culture. This ideal of an imagined “foreign-ness” is incorporated 
into the ideal of being cosmopolitan and “modern.” The sexual culture 
in Tehran is influenced by global images, tales, and texts. Cheap CDs, 
pirated movies, and internet cafes give young people from a range of 
economic backgrounds access to the global sexual culture. 
The blogs and websites of young Iranians living abroad also play a 
role in this process. Many informants relied on stories and adventures 
from their “online friends,” “web pals,” or popular Iranian bloggers (such 
as the famed Iranian blogger Hoder who now lives in Canada and whose 
travel blog can be found at www.hoder.com) who travel the world and 
keep a “travel blog” for models of the West they seek to emulate. In-
deed, young Iranians who travel or live abroad take pictures of their 
lives, surroundings, and any other novelties they experience. One pop-
ular Iranian blogger who now lives in New York City would go to night 
clubs in New York in between trips to 
Iran, taking pictures of the line outside 
clubs, bouncers, walking through the 
doors, walking onto the dance floors, 
and even the bathrooms in order to 
help create the party scene as she lives 
it outside of Iran. Her site is quite popu-
lar amongst young women in Tehran 
who use the pictures to get ideas about 
fashion, and live vicariously through 
the lives of their friends on the other 
side of the water (oon-taraf-e-ab). 
In addition to providing a connec-
tion to globalizing youth culture and 
the party scene, blogs created by Iranian youth also serve as a space 
for young people to voice their opinions, ask their questions, and vent 
their frustrations about the changes taking place in their social and sex-
ual lives. They also provide a space in which to discuss problems faced 
by Iranian youth in a modernizing Iran. One recent blog created by a 
woman who called herself Asemoun (the sky) focused on the question 
of hymen reconstructions with a forum for discussing where and how 
Urban young Iranians have recently begun 
to use the blogosphere and cyberspace to 
construct new sexual and social discourses. 
This article describes how Iranian youth 
link indigenous discourses of sexuality 
to other discourses of sexuality and how 
they understand their practices as political 
and social statements. For these youths, 
the internet provides important avenues 
to circumvent restrictions on cultural 
consumption and production while allowing 
them to engage in “safe” sexual encounters. As 
such, it fuels the creation of social movements 
that may pose new challenges to the regime.
“By meeting the person online 
first … we can be sure that 
taking the risk of a first date will 
actually be worth it.”
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to get them, and what potential moral 
or social problems may arise from 
choosing to undergo the procedure. 
This suggests that blogs are also turn-
ing into important sources of informa-
tion in a country where sex education 
before marriage is highly restricted. 
Meeting, mating, … and 
cheating online
Since hetero-sociality is heavily regu-
lated in Iran, and an unmarried man 
and woman may be punished for 
simply being in the company of one 
another (let alone having a sexual re-
lationship), internet meeting and mat-
ing takes on new significance. Out of 
the 80 young adults interviewed, more 
than half indicated that they had at one 
time or another engaged in some sort 
of heterosexual relationship through 
the internet.
For some of these young adults, the 
interaction took the form of a court-
ship whereby young men and women 
would meet through a site such as 
“Orkut” and begin exchanging emails 
for a period of time leading up to a 
face-to-face encounter. At least 5 of 
the young people I interviewed noted 
that they had met their current boyfriend, girlfriend, husband, or wife 
through an online site. They recalled exchanging photographs, poetry, 
and engaging in instant messaging or chatting before meeting their 
partner for the first time. Many said that this form of encounter felt 
“safer” and allowed the young people to get to know their partners 
before taking the risk of being seen on a date with them. “Going on a 
date is risky in Iran. I know it’s hard for you to conceptualize that, but for 
us it’s a reality,” said Gohar, a 20 year old university student. “By meet-
ing the person online first, and getting to know him that way, we can 
be sure that taking the risk of a first date will actually be worth it,” she 
added. Several other young women indicated the same feeling about 
online dating as a way to make the risk of an actual encounter “worth 
it.”
Other young people described their use of the internet as a place to 
safely engage in cybersex. Many of my informants noted that cybersex 
was safer than sex because it was not as easy to be caught while engag-
ing in anonymous sexual exchange, which did not involve being in the 
presence of a member of the opposite sex. “My parents don’t let me 
go out that much,” explained Roya, a 19 year old beautician. “But I still 
like to be a part of what my friends are doing, so I just do it online,” she 
said referring to her friends’ engagement in sexual relations. “I love to 
chat online, and I love to have romantic encounters with boys on the 
internet. Half of them probably send me wrong pictures, but I don’t 
care, I just imagine what they look like while we are exchanging hot 
sentiments,” she added. Several young men added that cybersex was a 
socially safe way to learn about sex without the embarrassment of hav-
ing to be in the physical presence of a girl (note that hetero-sociality is 
not allowed and so many young men do not know how to interact with 
young women or how to court them, thus the difficulty and potential 
awkwardness of the first encounter can be a source of extreme anxi-
ety). “I love chatting online and having sexual relations with a cyber-
girlfriend because I’m not as shy or awkward,” described Hooman, a 22 
year old medical student. “It’s hard for me with girls. I get shy and I don’t 
know what to do with them, so this way I can work on my sexual style, 
my sexual courtship before the real thing,” he explained. “Plus, this way, 
my reputation stays intact. No one knows about my cyber-girlfriend, 
not my parents or my friends, so no one can give me a hard time about 
it,” he added quickly.
Still others (especially married women) with whom I spoke, noted 
that the internet provided a “safer” way of cheating on their husbands. 
Some women described cybersex as an outlet for their sexual frus-
trations. Others said that it was a way to pass the long hours of the 
days and weeks when their husbands were away. And many noted 
that “cyber-cheating,” as they called it, was not “real” cheating, and the 
anonymity of the internet made it so that their husbands would never 
find out, and their online partners could never find them or blackmail 
them. 
Because reputations and respect are important in the Iranian context 
where gossip is often rampant, many people rely on the anonymity and 
privacy of the internet, one of the few spheres in which they can enjoy 
any privacy to facilitate what the regime and society view as immoral 
encounters. Because the regime seeks to legislate on people’s bodies, 
their sexualities, and intimacy, and because they have the right to enter 
private homes at any time and arrest all “moral offenders,” young peo-
ple have delved more deeply into the “safer” space of the internet as a 
venue to seek out intimacy.
Urban young Iranians thus use the internet as a way to further their 
social and sexual revolution, indulge their consumptive desires, be 
part of a globalizing youth culture, and to carve out a private sphere 
for themselves. It is true that purchasing illegal goods or engaging in 
cyber-sex may not be seen as an obvious form of resistance; neverthe-
less, it must be looked at as situated resistance. Many key informants 
reminded me that because wearing an Adidas shirt (purchased online) 
or being in an internet café and chatting online with a cyber-lover 
could get them arrested, this shirt was more than a label, and cybersex 
was more than a passing amusement; these behaviours challenge the 
social and moral order of the Islamic Republic, and are part of a so-
cial movement of resistance currently enacted among many of today’s 
young urban Iranians.
Pardis Mahdavi is Assistant Professor at Pomona College.
Email: Pardis.Mahdavi@pomona.edu
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Hymen Repair on 
the Arabic Internet
Connecting to the Modern
B J Ö R N  B E N T L A G E  
&  T H O M A S  E I C H
Hymen repair is a surgical practice in 
which the remains of a purportedly for-
merly intact hymen are tied together. 
The operation was first developed pri-
marily for customers with Muslim back-
grounds, whose hymen had been torn 
and who were about to get married. In 
countries of pre-dominantly Muslim 
populations (among others), the dilation 
of the hymen of an unmarried woman is 
widely regarded as proof of her having 
had premarital sex, and these women 
sometimes fear serious consequences 
once their state is discovered. 
Opposing views
Hymen repair operations are offered in Middle Eastern countries, as 
well as in Europe and North America, where they are used primarily by 
Middle Eastern women who are about to get married. However, in the US, 
women from South American origins, as well as from conservative Chris-
tian milieus where virgin marriages are increasingly valued, are report-
edly making use of this operation in rising numbers.1 
The issue of the permissibility of hymen repair operations was discussed 
for the first time in the 1987 meeting of the Islamic Organization of Medi-
cal Sciences (IOMS) in Kuwait. The Egyptian medical doctor, Kamal Fahmi, 
submitted a short study describing several medical practice situations in 
which doctors might be asked for a hymen repair operation. In response 
to Fahmi’s incentive, two further studies by religious scholars were sub-
mitted. The first by Muhammad Nai‘m Yasin argued for the permissibility 
of the operation, while the second by Izz al-Din al-Tamimi argued against 
it. Both scholars recognized that there are causes for hymen dilation other 
than illicit sexual intercourse (zina), which Middle Eastern society gener-
ally assumes must have taken place. Consequently, girls and women suf-
fer from communal sanctions regardless of the cause of the dilation—a 
problem for which hymen repair could be a possible solution. Both con-
sidered the protection of innocent girls from sanctions to be a form of sitr, 
a legal principle calling to refrain from exposing somebody’s weaknesses 
or faults unless necessary.
Tamimi weighs this benefit of hymen repair, 
namely, the protection of innocent women from 
sanctions, against the negative aspects of the 
operation. First, he considers hymen reconstruc-
tion to be a potential fraud against the future 
husband. Although this is not explicitly stated 
by Tamimi, Yasin’s and rafed.net’s papers (below) 
make clear that the problem at hand is ultimately 
framed as a matter of legal contracts and trans-
actions, with hymen repair harming an implicit or 
even explicit condition of the marriage contract. 
Secondly, Tamimi argues that hymen reconstruc-
tion would lead to an increase of zina now freed 
from the fear of societal sanctions. Similarly he 
sees a slippery slope leading to abortions based 
on the same arguments. Tamimi concludes that 
the expected negative outcomes exceed the ben-
efit, and that hymen reconstruction is not permis-
sible. The harm of false accusations against girls 
and women, as a matter of principle, could not be 
remedied by causing harm to someone else. 
Yasin takes a different approach. He explains that 
Sharia accepts only two kinds of proof for zina, ei-
ther confession or four eyewitnesses, and that it im-
poses harsh punishments for false accu-
sations of zina. Thus, in his view, to con-
clude from a dilated hymen that a girl or 
woman has had illicit sex is against the 
regulations and spirit of Sharia. Con-
temporary Muslim societies have gone 
astray, accordingly, because they make 
judgments and punish without the re-
quired proof. Hymen reconstruction 
is actually a means to protect women 
and girls from false accusation and has 
an educational influence on society. Al-
though only a temporary measure which 
would cease to be of any use in an ideal Muslim society, hymen repair can 
currently help to achieve general goals of Sharia, among which is sexual 
equality. Yasin discusses the positive and negative effects of hymen re-
constructions in various scenarios, deeming it permissible and even advi-
sory in cases where girls did not commit zina or committed zina just once. 
Only for those women commonly known as prostitutes or accused of zina 
by four eyewitnesses, can hymen reconstruction be forbidden.
During the discussion that followed the presentation of all three pa-
pers at the IOMS conference, Yasin’s paper was severely criticized where-
as Tamimi’s presentation received only minor attention. One argument 
stood out rhetorically in this legal discussion, because it introduced per-
sonal and public opinion into a debate of abstract legal rules: would the 
doctor want to marry a girl that had hymen repair without him knowing? 
This argument is based on a hadith laying out the general moral principle 
to not do to others what one does not want done to oneself. Though al-
ready touched upon in Tamimi’s paper, it was only during the discussion 
that it gained a prominent role and incited a rather emotional outburst. 
The final recommendations issued at the end of the meeting stated that 
any alteration of the human body aiming at deceit should be forbidden.
The internet filter
In order to assess the subsequent importance of these texts, we ana-
lyzed the public debate on hymen repair on the internet. The plan at the 
outset was simple: we looked for reference to, or traces of the IOMS texts 
in the internet discussion about hymen repair. To get a sample of this dis-
cussion, we made queries with popular search machines.2 We limited our 
close reading to the first twenty hits on Google, and later compared these 
to the top ten of Yahoo!, looking for overt citations, unmarked quotes, 
or paraphrases and lines of argument. The outcome was surprising: out 
of Google’s top twenty hits for hymen repair, only three texts were inde-
pendent and unrelated to the IOMS texts. The rest were either copying, 
quoting and/or paraphrasing these texts, or drawing heavily from pages 
that did so. For the first ten hits of the Yahoo! query, only a single page 
proved unrelated. As to the degree of relations, the web-pages were 
mostly paraphrases and citations not otherwise indicated or in any other 
way discernible—the only exception being an online version of a pub-
lished book with regular footnotes. Seven of the web-pages were mere 
copies of texts found on other pages listed in our search result. 
Fahmi’s medical study is the most widely used text. Although the many 
references to Fahmi formally makes his treatise the central text in this dis-
cussion, one has to keep in mind that it does not state an opinion—it is 
mainly laying out medical facts and the options doctors have in dealing 
with hymen repair. Opinions, or rather rulings according to the Sharia, are 
the domain of Yasin’s and Tamimi’s texts.
Tamimi clearly dominates the online discussion with four pages relat-
ed to his arguments, among those one finds the important islamonline, 
which is copied and pasted in three other pages. Islamonline is also the 
only page referring to Yasin’s arguments, though it rebukes them outright. 
The text found on rafed.net is a shiite legal discussion quoting Fahmi’s 
The permissability of hymen repair surgery is 
a controversial topic in Islamic contexts, as the 
opposing views of doctors convening at the 
1987 meeting of the Islamic Organization of 
Medical Sciences testified. One would expect 
to find an even more diverse plethora of voices 
on the Internet, but the authors show that 
notwithstanding the image of the net as a 
decentralized medium that spurs pluralism, in 
practice it functions as a filter in which only a 
few dominant voices are heard in tremendous 
duplication. 
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aid/2304/context/archive (accessed 10 April 
2006).
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Backgrounddocuments/MedicalEthicsAr.pdf, 
p52f.
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text, but, despite similarities to the view expressed by Tamimi, presents 
an independent view in its own right.
Given the variety of texts and sites within the search results that con-
tain professionally edited texts, as well as chat-like discussion boards, 
the overall dominance of Tamimi’s view and obvious neglect of Yasin’s, 
are even more surprising. The search results include professional psy-
chological counselling by the Arab Socio-Mental Health Network, a site 
with a regional focus on the Yemenite Hadramaut region, and a bunch of 
multi-topical sites dedicated to women, youth, newlyweds and couples 
planning to marry, etc., which often contain discussion boards in which 
hymen repair is an issue.
To characterize an internet debate, the content of pages and sites alone 
does not suffice. Just as with printed publications, it is important to know 
how many people may have read a given text. For books, newspapers, 
and magazines, this is indicated by circulation, and the number of copies 
sold, etc. For internet texts things are not quite so easy because the abso-
lute number of users visiting a site or page is usually not readily available. 
But there are some other relevant data one might use: the number of links 
referring to a page (back links), sample-based statistics on the users visit-
ing a site (reach), the number of pages the average user views on a site 
(page views), and a ranking of websites based on the latter two values 
(page rank). All of these are so called “off-page” criteria, (i.e. information 
transcending the actual content of a page, which in turn is labelled “on-
page”). In looking at off-page criteria we can, for instance, rule out the 
possibility that the IOMS texts were influential because of the popularity 
of the site hosting them: islamset is a mediocre site at best, standing out 
only by a high number of back links. While islamonline’s popularity and 
importance will hardly surprise, arb3.com’s ranking does: arb3.com, the 
site for newly-weds and couples planning to marry, currently ranks twen-
tieth of all Arabic sites according to Alexa (a provider for the analysis of in-
ternet sites) making it currently even more popular than islamonline. This 
already makes clear that off-page criteria are necessary for understanding 
the structure of a debate.3
For our purposes, off-page criteria and other meta-information illus-
trate how the online-presence of small but specialized organizations can 
shape public discussion: the IOMS usually publishes the conference pro-
ceedings comprising the scholarly studies, their public discussion, and 
the final recommendations in print shortly after the meetings. However, 
these printed publications used primarily to receive attention in highly 
specialized circles. This situation changed when the IOMS registered their 
internet site islamset.com in 2000 and put many parts of their publica-
tions online. Therefore, the material we analyzed comprizes documenta-
tion of an off-line debate (the three studies and their discussion at the 
IOMS-meeting in 1987) as well as online discussions, which interestingly 
came to an almost identical result: the refutation or in most cases the out-
right neglect of Yasin’s ideas. It seems highly unlikely to us that this result 
is pre-ordained by the positions held by Yasin and Tamimi in the “off-line 
world.” Admittedly, Tamimi was the Mufti of Jordan. However, Yasin was 
dean of the Sharia Faculty at the University of Kuwait for many years and 
was able to exert considerably influence in other issues of medical fiqh 
on the national Jordanian level as has been shown elsewhere.4 It seems 
reasonable to assume that Tamimi’s study is much more influential in the 
public debate than Yasin’s, because it represents the predominant view of 
most public opinion makers. In Egypt, for instance, the IOMS recommen-
dations based on Al-Tamimi’s arguments made their way into the doctors’ 
syndicate’s ethical guidelines concerning hymen repair.5 But despite this 
common notion, hymen repair is also often thought of as a usual way to 
cover up for pre-marital sex, with prices for the operation being circulated 
in the media. Therefore, we hypothesize that, first, the demand for hymen 
repair operations will not decline during the next years, because the 
broader patriarchal societal discourse forming their background is not 
questioned in these debates at all. We would further expect that hymen 
repair will stay an illegal and consequently clandestine operation with all 
its negative side-effects.6 
In conclusion, the clear dominance of Tamimi’s view on hymen repair, 
the central role of two IOMS texts in the internet debate, and the neglect 
of Yasin’s considerations, suggest, at least for the topic at hand, that the 
thesis of the internet as a decentralized medium that spurs pluralism, has 
to be reconsidered at least in part. A more detailed analysis of the off-
page criteria could further illuminate the structure of this debate just as 
we hope to gain new insights from comparisons with other public de-
bates on the internet.
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J U L I A  D A Y  H O W E L L
Repackaging Sufism 
in Urban Indonesia
A brochure for a newly upgraded adult 
Islamic studies centre, Padepokan 
Thaha, in central Jakarta’s swank Sen-
opati district appealed to its anticipat-
ed clientele in 2005 by imaginatively 
speaking in their voice, revealing the 
likely concerns that the centre could 
address. Reading the brochure, we lis-
ten in, as it were, on the kinds of rumi-
nations that have led prospective stu-
dents to pick up the brochure. “What’s 
wrong with me?” The brochure’s char-
acter frets. “I pray five times a day with real sincerity, I read all kinds 
of things about how to find spiritual gratification in prayer…but I still 
have trouble getting into that deep, focused feeling (khusyuk)… I want 
to enjoy life [even] in the midst of social conditions that are wracked 
by crises, I want to be able to be happy under all conditions.” As we 
read on, we find that the prospective students 
are the sort of people who actually have a good 
deal of material security and strong bases for 
social respect as well. Thus the brochure’s hypo-
thetical reader confesses that his (or her) worries 
come “despite my everyday needs being fulfilled.” 
“I have a high level of education… [and] I’m also 
respected in society.”1These are the kinds of peo-
ple who ought to be happy and secure if any good 
Muslim could. So what’s missing?
What’s missing, according to the brochure, 
is nothing less than the mystical experience of 
God’s presence, which is accessible with the as-
sistance of Padepokan Thaha. Padepokan Thaha 
offers that assistance through its Programme for 
Guidance of the Self towards “Tawajjuh” (Program 
Pembinaan Diri Menuju Tawajjuh). “Tawajjuh,” 
the brochure explains, is “coming face to face 
with [one’s] True Self” and “knowing the Creator” 
through ma‘rifatullah [the highest stage of eso-
teric spiritual knowing in this rendering of Islam’s 
Sufi heritage]. Initiation into the relevant spiritual 
practices is provided by the spiritual director of 
the foundation, KH Rachmat Hidayat, who also 
offers regular weekly classes at the centre on 
themes from the Quran and Hadith, such as might 
be found in many other well-appointed and for-
malized city pengajian (religious instruction class-
es). Kyai Rachmat himself has initiation from a Sufi 
master whose spiritual genealogy (silsilah) reaches back through the 
legendary Javanese Muslim saint Sunan Kudus, to the Prophet Muham-
mad via his nephew ‘Ali. 
We can see from this that Padepokan Thaha is catering for Jakarta 
urbanities’ niggling spiritual hunger by renovating what was once 
thought to be a dying remnant of rural, peasant society: Sufism (tasaw-
wuf). That is, Padepokan Thaha offers (among other things) tutelage 
in esoteric practices that have been carried by Sufi orders (I. tarekat; 
Ar., tariqa) and in the metaphysics associated with the mystical experi-
ences that may unfold from those practices. However, Kyai Rachmat 
denies that he himself is affiliated with a tariqa and both he and the di-
rectors of the foundation that runs Padepokan Thaha vigorously reject 
any idea that his teaching activities constitute a tariqa. Rather, as the 
foundation’s full name indicates, it is styled as a majelis ta’lim, an Islam 
study group. This addresses the phobia many Muslim modernists (that 
is, in Indonesia, people aligned culturally or organizationally with the 
Muhammadiyah and similar organiza-
tions) have of the supposedly archaic 
and authoritarian tariqa.
Catering to urban 
professionals
Indeed as an institution Padepokan 
Thaha is a thoroughly modern opera-
tion. It is a formally constituted chari-
table foundation, with officers charged 
with specific administrative duties, and 
proper accounting for its funds. The 
approach to teaching is also well suited to the interests and preferred 
learning styles of well-educated, globally “connected” urbanities. This 
is signalled in the brochure we have already sampled: the Tawajjuh 
Programme is delivered by “teachers and facilitators” (pengajar and fa-
silitator). Kiai Rachmat is simply listed as the first of these, although his 
primacy and special role is acknowledged in his title “Pengasuh” (lit., 
one charged with the care of others). Significantly, he is not identified 
by the terms shaykh or murshid, which are more resonant of the author-
ity and hierarchy in the old-time tariqa. 
The modern feel of this majlis ta’lim is also evident in the brochure’s 
description of the Tawajjuh Programme’s instructional methods (me-
tode), namely: “discussion/dialogue (sharing)” (diskusi/dialog [sharing]), 
“lecture” (kuliah), and practice (pengamalan). “Practice” is briefly ex-
plained as performing certain devotional rituals (ibadat), making clear 
the programme is built on a firm religious base, but also alluding to 
notions of self-development and learning through one’s own experi-
ence that are central to modern-style general education. To make it 
clear to prospective participants that the discussions and lectures will 
use best-practice, university-style educational methods, the brochure 
also explains that the facilitator and participants will be “on the same 
level” (sejajar) in “discussions,” and after lectures there will be a ques-
tion and answer period. It is hardly coincidental that so many English 
language loan words are used in the brochure: they signify Padepokan 
Thaha’s positive engagement with an international world of business, 
management and teaching practices, such as patrons employ in their 
professional lives.
The efforts of Padepokan Thaha’s directors to accommodate modern 
urban life-styles and the interests of specifically cosmopolitan urbani-
ties is evident in the range of its programmes, their regular scheduling 
to accommodate the leisure-time planning of busy urbanities, and the 
content of the programmes. Monthly schedules are printed showing 
the topic, times (weekday evenings), and session leaders for its five 
regular programmes, which, in addition to the Tawajjuh Programme (a 
residential course done only once by any given student), include “Rou-
tine Religious Study” (“Pengajian Rutin”), “Book and Film Discussion” 
nights, “Quran Reading Study,” and the “Post Tawajjuh Programme” 
for initiates. While the Quran Reading programme and the “Pengajian 
Rutin” cover core skills and topics common to other majelis ta’lim, albeit 
with some differences in choices of texts and commentary, the book 
and film discussion nights cater to the distinctively broad range of 
“spiritual” interests of Padepokan Thaha’s cosmopolitan clientele. This 
is evident from book club choices like Achmad Chodjim’s best-selling 
study of the legendary (and some would say heretical) Javanese Sufi 
saint Shaykh Siti Jenar, followed by Farry Aprianto’s book Enrich Your 
Everyday Life, and Eknath Easwaran’s Conquest of Mind. Film choices 
like “Little Buddha” and “The Passion” also show that Padepokan Thaha 
programme planners are trying to help students make sense of popu-
lar culture representations of other religions in a way that is consist-
ent with the universalism of Kiai Rachmat’s Unity of Being (wahdat al 
wujud) metaphysics.2
Contrary to the common view that Sufism is 
somehow incompatible with “the modern,” 
emerging new forms of Sufism signify the 
creative adaptation of Islam to the religious 
sensibilities and social demands of modern life. 
This article focuses on the Padepokan Thaha, 
a thriving Islamic studies centre in Indonesia, 
whose integration of esoteric spiritual 
knowledge with modern-style education 
suits the modern sensibilities of affluent and 
educated Muslim cosmopolitans in Indonesia.
[I]n the global 
house-cleaning 
and rebuilding of 
contemporary Islam 
… Sufism has not 
been thrown out; 
instead … it has 
been selectively 
reconfigured.
To judge from the packed audience hall at Padepokan Thaha and the 
traffic jams caused in the street out front by patrons’ late-model sedans 
and four-wheel-drives on evenings when the regular pengajians and 
special lectures are on, this new-style centre for Sufi studies has indeed 
accurately identified a social need and suitably catered for it. The cen-
tre is flourishing. Other “Padepokan” functioning under the guidance of 
Kiai Rachmat and with the same institutional structure and core pro-
grammes have also opened elsewhere in Jakarta (Padepokan Esa in Bin-
taro) and in other parts of Indonesia (in Bogor, Bandung, Batam, Pekan 
Baru, Surabaya, and Bali). Padepokan Thaha directors put the number of 
people in Jakarta who regularly attend functions at around 4,000.
Adaptations to modern life
The “Padepokan” associated with Kiai Rachmat are not unusual in 
teaching some form of Sufism in upmarket quarters of the major In-
donesian cities, except, perhaps, in offering initiations through the 
same city-based charitable foundation that supports Islamic learning 
in an organizationally formalized setting. Most institutionally mod-
ern foundations and businesses offering tasawwuf studies as part of a 
broader programme of Islamic studies for adults in Indonesia do not 
have practicums, much less initiations; but they nonetheless commonly 
acknowledge the value of cultivating deep devotional feeling in one’s 
prayers and the virtues of ethical reflection associated with various Sufi 
disciplines. Such modern Islamic study providers may also help their 
students locate appropriate individual instructors and workshops, and 
some have offered excursions to rural tarekat with introductions to spir-
itual directors there. There are also independent groups with more of a 
practice orientation to Sufism. The variety and articulation of new insti-
tutions through which middle-class and elite Indonesian urbanites are 
now accessing “Sufi” teachings is described in my chapter in the forth-
coming volume Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam.3
The other case studies in that volume (which span the Muslim world 
from Africa to Asia, as well as Muslim migrant communities and univer-
salist movements in Western societies) provide us with a useful cross-
cultural perspective on contemporary adaptations of Sufism in Indone-
sia. Viewed in this broader context, it appears that Indonesian Muslims 
are hardly alone in working changes in the tariqa. Rather, we can see 
the many new forms Sufism is taking there as part of a global panorama 
of creative adaptation of Islam to the religious sensibilities and social 
demands of modern life. 
Surveying this global panorama, it is evident that in the global house-
cleaning and rebuilding of contemporary Islam that we have witnessed 
over the twentieth century, Sufism has not been thrown out; instead, 
like other strands of the Islamic heritage, it has been selectively recon-
figured. In Egypt and West Africa, Muslims enthusiastically patronize 
conventional tariqa but turn them to novel social purposes like interest 
articulation in new democratic polities. Elsewhere, in Turkey, Muslims af-
filiated with the Gümüşhanevi branch of the Naqshbandis find no good 
at all in initiations and esoteric knowledge, but want to save the Sufi 
orders (the tariqa) as vehicles for teaching ethical formation and car-
rying out social service activities. Hamka, a leading twentieth century 
Indonesian Muslim intellectual, considered that all that could be done 
without the tariqa, which should be given up to disencumber modern 
Muslims from dysfunctional traditional attitudes (in his phrase, keep-
ing “tasawuf without tarekat”). Other Muslim scholars in India and the 
Middle East, fired by Salafist zeal for ridding the faith of all heretical in-
ventions, have gone even further than Hamka, rejecting even the word 
tasawuf as a heretical invention; yet the Salafis have been prepared to 
approve particular Sufi practices (purification of the heart [tazkiya] and 
remembrance of God [dhikr]) identified by words found in the Quran.
Just as Sufism around the world now encompasses a range of insti-
tutional forms, spiritual practices and social engagement, and all that 
in diverse combinations, so too do we find in Sufism today a consider-
able variety of stances towards Islamic law. In the Muslim world over the 
course of the twentieth century, spreading religious literacy and Sufi en-
gagement with the Islamic reform movements have generally made for 
increased emphasis on the core obligations of the faith, but universalist 
Sufi movements like the International Sufi Movement, sprung from the 
Chishti order after its founder Hazrat Inayat Khan moved to the West, 
cutting “Sufism” loose entirely from Islamic law and an Islamic identity.
What patterns can we detect in all this variation? For one thing, Sufi 
tradition is being carried forward into the twenty-first century, but we 
can no longer identify it exclusively with the institutional complex of 
the conventional tariqa. While that survives, and such tariqa are even 
vigorously assuming new functions in many parts of the world, here and 
there its structure is being modified to suit modern sensibilities (as ex-
emplified by Padepokan Thaha). It is also being disassembled, as it were, 
with its scholarly teaching functions assumed by the likes of universi-
ties and religious booksellers, its facilitation of group devotions taken 
up by impresarios of dhikr akbar led by celebrity preachers at major 
urban mosques, and its ethical formation and social work agendas as-
suming scripturalist-reformist organizations and a few stripped-down, 
no-mystical-nonsense Neo-Sufi orders. The search 
for mystical union is probably not well catered for 
outside the tariqa, and perhaps not so much even 
in many of those. In any case, it probably repre-
sents only a small niche-market. But if the growth 
of this market in the West in the last few decades 
is anything to go by, the Padepokan Thaha’s of the 
Muslim world will have a secure place in the future 
amongst Muslim cosmopolitans.
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Notes
1. For further details on Padepokan Thaha, 
see, Julia Day Howell, “Urban Heirs of Ibn al- 
‘Arabi and the Defence of Religious Pluralism 
in Contemporary Indonesia,” Australian 
Religious Studies Review 18 no. 2 (2005): 197-
209. See also www.thaha.net.
2. Op. cit. Howell 2005:202.
3. “Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in 
Indonesia’s New Sufi Networks,” in Sufism 
and the “Modern” in Islam, ed. by Martin van 
Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (London: IB 
Tauris, in press).
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E M M A  T A R L O
Hidden Features 
of the Face Veil 
Controversy
Over the past few years a new range 
of Arabic words—hijab, jilbab, niqab—
have become common currency in the 
British media, accompanied by images 
of Muslim women with various degrees 
of covering and culminating, in Octo-
ber 2006, in a veritable orgy of images 
of fully veiled women in response to 
Jack Straw’s newspaper article in the 
Lancashire Telegraph.1 Jack Straw, the 
ex-home secretary, and prominent La-
bour MP for Blackburn, (a constituency 
in the North of England with a large 
Muslim population), had written that he felt uncomfortable talking to 
women in face veils; that for the past year he had been asking them if 
they would not mind lifting their veils when they came to meet him in 
his office; and that he perceived the veil to be a statement of separa-
tion and difference that makes the possibility of good inter-community 
relations more difficult. The following day he added that he considered 
facial expressions an important element of com-
munication and that whilst he would not like to 
be prescriptive, and opposed the French ban on 
hijab, he nonetheless “would rather” British Mus-
lim women did not wear burqas or niqabs.
The media spectacle
Straw’s comments were taken by the British 
media as a cue for unleashing their growing stock 
of sensationalist photos of British Muslim women 
looking at their most alien, swathed in all encom-
passing burqas or reduced and magnified to a 
pair of eyes peeping through the slit of a black 
niqab. Ever since September 11, which had the 
effect of transforming all Muslims into potential 
objects of public paranoia, press photographers 
have been chasing fully veiled women, thrusting 
their extendable zoom lenses into deliberately 
hidden faces. The revelation in July 2005 that four 
British Muslims were prepared to kill fellow citi-
zens “in the name of Islam” served to increase the 
value of such images which are used in the press 
as a visual shorthand for a whole variety of prob-
lems nowadays classified as “Muslim,” whether 
these be arranged marriages, the growth of re-
ligious extremism, anxieties about faith schools, 
and concerns about social segregation. 
Of course the West’s fascination with the veiled 
woman is far from new. It has a long and well documented history and 
has left in its wake a much analyzed trail of Orientalist paintings, lit-
erary fantasies, ethnographic portraits, and exotic post cards, most of 
which suggest the mysterious and erotic qualities of veiled women. 
This desire to look behind and beyond the veil has found contempo-
rary expression in the gigantesque proportions of the photographs in 
our newspapers—whole pages devoted to a woman’s eyes and lashes 
framed in black. There are obvious hints of the old curiosity, eroticism, 
and desire in these images but the form, context, and interpretation are 
radically different. Today’s covered woman wears not sensuous gauzes 
and embroidered silks but austere 
plain black accompanied by reminders 
of her Western identity—a pair of train-
ers, a carton of iced coffee, a Union 
Jack mug. She represents not Eastern 
promise in a timeless far off place but 
the apparent refusal of British Muslims 
to abide by “Western norms” in the 
here and now.
No less dramatic than recent images 
were the headlines. Overnight Straw’s 
hesitant and context-specific reflec-
tions were transformed by every paper 
from the Guardian to the Sun into the generalized command “Take 
off the Veil!” Columns immediately filled not so much with debate on 
the issues raised as with a familiar set of identities and positions: the 
outraged liberal, the offended and defiant Muslim, the knowing femi-
nist, and the self-satisfied racist. Some papers framed the issue in the 
format of a “Muslim problem page” in which a diverse range of stories 
involving Muslims were cobbled together and where even violent anti-
Muslim attacks somehow featured as further evidence that “they” were 
causing trouble. Others filled with personal declarations by Muslim 
women about why they choose to cover and fears that Straw’s com-
ments would serve as a justification for racism—fears which soon ap-
peared justified when a group of white youths tried to pull the veil off 
a woman in Liverpool. If the key themes of the Sunday papers were 
multicultural angst, the frustration and demands of Muslims, and femi-
nist frustration; by Monday the focus had switched to security (news 
that a British terrorist had escaped under a burqa); by Tuesday, it was 
talk of bans (should other institutions follow Imperial College’s lead in 
prohibiting students from wearing face veils?); and by the following 
Saturday, it was concerns about education and employment law (was 
it right that a teaching assistant had been sacked for wearing niqab in 
the classroom?). Suddenly the small minority practice of face veiling 
had become a carrier for the nation’s ills.
Debate about the niqab among Muslims
But it is worth considering what is omitted from this barrage of 
media representations. By framing the debate as a sensationalist po-
lemic between “us” (the reasonable Brits) and “them” (“trouble-making 
Muslims” or “victimized Muslims”), the media not only failed to engage 
adequately with the issues raised by Straw, but also failed to acknowl-
edge that the niqab and burqa have long been a matter of considerable 
debate amongst Muslims themselves, both in Britain and elsewhere in 
the world. A brief glimpse into this internal debate about niqab might 
enable us to disentangle the recent controversy from the politically 
charged media hype that surrounds it. 
Firstly, there is the perspective of the small minority of British Muslim 
women who cover their faces in public. Not surprisingly, they were large-
ly defensive, emphasizing that they wear the niqab as a matter of choice 
and that this should be respected in a society that claims “freedom ” as 
a basic value and human right. In my own conversations with niqabis in 
London about why they cover—conversations that took place prior to 
the Straw controversy—the issue of personal freedom was sometimes 
raised, but on the whole, women were far more pre-occupied with issues 
of modesty and religious devotion. They felt the niqab was not a religious 
obligation, but that it represented an extra step in their own personal 
Face veil controversies have become a common 
feature of public debates across Europe. 
Analysing a controversy unintentionally ignited 
by British Labour Party politician Jack Straw, 
the author shows that the characteristics of 
fervent debate do not only reproduce familiar 
stereotypes, but also obliterate the discussion 
about veiling within Muslim communities in 
Britain. What is left unseen is that reservations 
about the veil are not about British versus 
Muslim values but about different perspectives 
of British citizens.
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spiritual development. It acted as a constant material reminder of their 
relationship with God and as a physical screen by which they were pro-
tected both from the male gaze and from other unnecessary interactions 
and distractions. As one woman put it in response to my question as to 
whether she felt the niqab created a barrier between herself and others: 
“Yes. In a way that is the reason why we are wearing it. It is to avoid any 
type of contact with men. Wearing it has also made me more restrained 
and less extrovert which is good because that is what I wanted.”
Women recognized that the niqab could attract negative attention but 
many saw this as one of the sacrifices that strict religious devotion en-
tailed. It was a test of the strength of their faith. Most were familiar with 
verbal insults such as “ninja” and “Bin Laden’s sister,” which they attrib-
uted to the ignorance of those who “know nothing about Islam.” At the 
same time they felt that the niqab and jilbab (full length outer garment) 
to some extent “protected” them from insults, physically screening them 
both from verbal abuse and from what many perceived to be the increas-
ingly immoral culture of the British streets. 
The screening effects of niqab were counterbalanced for these women 
by the strong feelings of community and solidarity they felt with their 
“niqabi sisters.” Niqab wearing was an act, which attracted like-minded 
people who shared the same set of values and who, they felt, elicited 
greater respect from men. Many argued that it was the “courage” of other 
niqabis that had inspired them to adopt it, even though this often went 
against the wishes of other family members. 
These women were far more flexible in their clothing practices and 
attitudes than they looked. For example, one woman who was doing a 
teacher training course uncovered her face at college because she felt 
the niqab might make the teacher “feel uncomfortable” and because she 
felt the visibility of the mouth was important in a language course. Ex-
posing her face in the classroom was a pragmatic decision she had taken 
without any prompting from the college. Similarly, when discussing the 
case of Shebina Begum, the Luton pupil, who had taken her school to 
court for not allowing her to wear a jilbab, I was surprised to find a group 
of niqab-wearing women arguing in defence of the school, saying that 
it was up to pupils to accept the uniform rules, and that the girl in ques-
tion could always wear the jilbab when she left the building at the end 
of the day. As one woman put it, “We can’t unscramble the world to get 
what we want. It is up to us to find a way of fitting in whilst not compro-
mising our beliefs.” She gave the example of her daughter who did not 
want to take off the niqab (in spite of her parents’ suggestion that this 
might be a good idea) but felt awkward at the prospect of wearing it 
to college, and had therefore chosen an Open University degree course 
that she could follow from home. This way, women acknowledged the 
constraints that the niqab placed upon them but they also showed ways 
of navigating around them. Contrary to common perceptions of women 
wearing niqab, the women concerned were not particularly interested in 
politics. Their views were conservative rather than radical; their motiva-
tions, predominantly moral and religious. They shared more in common 
with Christian nuns than “Islamic terrorists” or “extremists.”
However, as mentioned earlier, niqab-wearers are a minority within 
a minority and their views represent only a small proportion of Brit-
ish Muslim opinion. Whilst most Muslims interviewed in the press last 
week felt duty bound to rise to the “defence” of niqab, the reality is 
that many British Muslims are highly ambivalent about face veiling, 
particularly when practiced in a Western context. Many have told me 
they consider niqab-wearing an archaic practice that has no place in 
the modern world. They object on political and feminist grounds, often 
expressing both irritation and pity towards veiled women. 
British Muslim objections to niqab can be summarized as material, 
social, religious, associative, interactive, and political though these 
categories are not mutually exclusive. Material and social objections 
focus on the notion that the niqab creates a physical barrier which 
makes communication difficult, and recognition impossible. This, it is 
argued, has the effect of denying women their individuality, barring 
them from participation in mainstream society, and preventing them 
from obtaining jobs, which in turn makes them dependent on men and 
is regressive. There is also fear that the niqab encourages the formation 
of ghettos by “stimulating prejudice” in others, which only serves to re-
enforce alienation and social exclusion. This links to the question of the 
image of niqab which many Muslims feel is justifiably associated with 
extremism which, they argue, reflects badly on the whole community. 
Some felt the niqab de-humanized women, reducing them to “alien” or 
“ghost-like” cloth forms. One participant in a particularly heated online 
debate objected that, as a Muslim man, he was having to constantly 
fight off the assumption made “by Westerners” that it was he and men 
like him who “forced” women into veils—something he found particu-
larly galling given his personal opposition to niqab. Religious objec-
tions revolved not only around the common assertion that the niqab is 
unnecessary, but also that it actually works against Islam by acting as 
“an obstacle to da'wah,” scaring unbelievers away from the faith rather 
than drawing them towards it. There are also gender-based objections 
concerning how the niqab affects relations between men and women. 
Whilst many women stress that there is no equivalent burden placed 
on men, some men complain that the niqab is fundamentally insulting 
for it suggests men are incapable of self-control. These objections are 
voiced with passion in a number of contexts from casual conversations 
to chat rooms and discussion forums on Islamic websites.
Using the veil politically
This pre-existing internal Muslim debate provides an interesting 
counter-point to the largely monolithic “Muslim perspective” found in 
the British newspapers where, with the exception of a few prominent 
Muslim figures renowned for their liberal views, the main perspective 
expressed was one of “stunned outrage” at Jack Straw’s comments. What 
these debates reveal is that many of Straw’s concerns were in fact under 
discussion amongst British Muslims before he made his opinion public. 
Viewed in this light his reservations about the niqab are not about British 
versus Muslim values at all but about the different perspectives of British 
citizens, a category to which many Muslims belong. Meanwhile his asser-
tions that the niqab makes others feel uncomfortable, is a statement of 
separation and difference and a physical barrier to communication can 
hardly be interpreted as revelatory. 
None of this, however, alleviates the fact in the current political climate 
there is a very real risk of Straw’s comments (soon supported by Tony 
Blair) being exploited both by the far right and by radical religious ex-
tremists and there is evidence of this process occurring on both sides. In 
view of this inevitability, was it inappropriate for a politician of his stature 
to raise the issue, or does the onus lie more with the British media for 
stifling reflection on an issue of public concern by simply feeding the 
current national appetite for sensationalist polemics about Muslims and 
Islam?
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website aims to stimulate discussions on 
current public issues and problems.
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Ham, Mozart, & Limits to 
Freedom of Expression
Frictions in Europe
A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O  
&  F R A N K  P E T E R
In September 2006 a distressed French 
high school teacher Robert Redeker 
wrote, in a leading newspaper, a viru-
lent article about the “Islamic Threat” 
to the “Free World” (presumably Eu-
rope and North America). There the 
author maintained that Muhammad 
was a “merciless war lord, a plunderer, 
Jew-massacrer, and polygamous man,” 
and the Quran a book of “unparalleled 
violence” insidiously shaping the mindset of all Muslims.1 
The anxiety
The invective led to the swift prohibition of the newspaper in Tuni-
sia and Egypt and attracted immediate criticism on Al-Jazira. The un-
fortunate French teacher later received death threats, forcing him to 
quit his job and change domicile. The unoriginal link postulated by 
the author between Islam and violence thus seemed to constitute a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In the following debate, the newspaper editors 
condemned—as they should have—the threats, and justified publish-
ing the article on grounds that it contributed to “an in-depth under-
standing of current realities.” The initial shock on hearing about the 
threats was followed by collective outrage, and passions ran high in 
the Republic. A cartoon, appeared in Le Monde, perhaps best expressed 
the angst of large sections of French society: in a depressing and som-
bre modern city populated by menacing women covered in black, a 
white Frenchman gesticulates anxiously to a friend about to eat a sand-
wich: “What? Ham? Are you crazy or what?” (See image, published in Le 
Monde, dated 5 October 2006). 
Pork may not be quite as important to contemporary (white) French 
identity as the cartoon suggests, but the feeling of ever diminishing 
freedoms in order to pre-empt Muslim anger cer-
tainly is. Although this particular example was set 
in France, debates across Europe increasingly share 
the psychological and emotional anxiety underlying 
the Redeker affair—an anxiety linked to the social 
uncertainty brought about by those globalization 
trends which have left culture as the last remaining 
domain wherein “fantasies of purity, authenticity, 
borders, and security can be enacted.”2
The holistic threat
Voices across the continent—of politicians, in-
tellectuals, artists, and Churchmen—are rising to 
demand an urgent reconsideration of Europe’s 
position regarding Islam and Muslims. They refer 
to a series of recent events which have been 
widely interpreted as evidence of a fundamental 
and holistic threat posed by Muslims to European 
freedoms—including the violence unleashed by 
the publication of the Danish cartoons, the protests 
against Pope Benedict XVI’s lecture in Regensburg 
last year, and the Berlin cancellation (contempora-
neous to the French affair) of a staging of Mozart’s 
Idomeneo in September. Together these events are 
glossed under the topical issues of freedom of ex-
pression, possibilities of criticism of Islam, and self-
censorship, contributing largely, as the formula goes, to the social, and 
therefore very real, construction of a clash of civilizations. 
The aforementioned events are important and the threats posed to 
the well-being and life of those targeted cannot be tolerated under 
any circumstance. This makes it all the more necessary to think about 
the nature of this threat. Looking at the 
writings of those who call our attention 
to this threat, one finds that it is less 
its precise origin (a speculation about 
possible Muslim reactions; a tiny group 
of cyber jihadists; a handful of Mus-
lim activists) than its scope which are 
emphasized, leading some observers 
to compare the present situation with 
that of the 1930s when appeasement 
policies paved the way for a global tragedy. 
The appeasement analogy needs to be recognized as a discursive 
stratagem that participates in the construction of a global and decon-
textualized Islamic threat. It gives added resonance to those calls for 
showing “strength” and “resisting”3—the kind of emotional language 
and politics of fear that are mobilized today in order to defend the leg-
acy of the “Enlightenment.” Whenever conflicts do erupt, they seem to 
take on a heightened symbolism or, to put it differently, an “excessive 
religiosity.”4 This is unhelpful, as it ultimately serves only to delegitimize 
those voices which point to the mostly local and circumscribed char-
acter of conflicts about Islam in Europe, as well as to the sheer variety 
of Islamic ways of life—a variety which escapes easy categorization or 
predictions on future developments. 
Block thinking
The recent cancellation of Hans Neuenfels’s production of Idome-
neo—a staging of a Mozart opera which controversially included a 
display of the decapitated heads of Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, and 
Poseidon—provides an instructive case. The controversy was sparked 
by an act of miscommunication between the security agencies, Berlin 
authorities, and the Opera’s director. The fact that the Deutsche Oper 
grossly “misunderstood” the security threat was 
symptomatically dismissed in the following de-
bates, with commentators focusing instead on 
the act of “self-censorship” to which it supposedly 
led. Clearly, however, both the causes of the affair 
and the course of the ensuing discussion were the 
result of “block-thinking”: fusing “a varied reality 
into a single indissoluble unity,”5 the perception 
of German Muslims is now primarily determined 
by terrorist violence occurring outside of Ger-
many. The possibility that Muslims in Germany 
might blow up a public building in reaction to 
a perceived insult to the Prophet Muhammad 
suddenly acquired great political significance, 
notwithstanding its unprecedented and, accord-
ing to German security agencies, rather unlikely 
nature. 
There is an urgent need to debate why this type 
of unwarranted assumptions about European 
Muslims has become so widespread. Block think-
ing is seriously putting at risk the capacity to dis-
cern differences inside Muslim communities and, 
ultimately, to speak and engage with Muslims. 
It is rendering the political management of reli-
gious diversity in Europe a mere rhetorical device: 
one cannot seriously claim to work for the “inte-
gration” of Muslims or expect to engage in meaningful dialogue when 
one’s basic view on Islam is so laden; it would be more accurate to 
speak of a process of forceful assimilation as the sole policy aim. Once 
one starts reasoning with reference to entities as broad and vague as 
“Islam” or “Europe,” one disconnects from the world one lives in.
Focusing on two recent controversies—the 
cancellation of Mozart’s Idomeneo in Berlin and 
the death threats against a French teacher for 
criticizing Islam—this article revisits the flawed 
construction of a clash between Islam and 
freedom of expression, and seeks to show how 
the debates are connected to a problematic 
vision of Europe which necessarily excludes 
Muslims. 
Whenever conflicts 
do erupt, they 
seem to take on 
a heightened 
symbolism or, to put 
it differently, an 
“excessive 
religiosity.”
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Both the French and German examples mentioned here 
highlight a number of structural features of debates 
about Islam in/and Europe. They include a distortion of 
the social and political realities of Europe, an unashamed 
anti-intellectualism that seeks to stifle debate, and a 
problematic vision of the place of Muslims in the Old 
Continent. 
When the Deutsche Oper reversed its decision and 
decided to stage Idomeneo in December, the event was 
conspicuously attended by Germany’s elite. Although 
they had opposed the cancellation of the opera, rep-
resentatives of two of the main Muslim federations in 
Germany (Islamrat and Zentralrat der Muslime) did not 
attend the performance, but neither did several leaders 
of Christian churches as to do so would—in the words 
of the president of Germany’s Central Council of Catho-
lics—express a “lack of self-esteem,” rather than an act of 
tolerance.6 While this view may not be shared by all Ger-
man Christians, it demonstrates that these debates are 
largely internal to Europe. They point less to an Islamic 
threat than to the often unacknowledged but neverthe-
less constant need to renegotiate secular and political ar-
rangements in democratic contexts. 
The attempt to construe, as matter of principle, Muslim 
dissent illegitimate was particularly clear in the French 
case. There, in a high-profile petition “in favour” of Re-
deker, a number of prominent intellectuals made sur-
reptitious links between the death threats and various 
other forms of Muslim protest against “provocations” to 
what were simply characterized as “foreign sensitivities.”7 
The mobilization of deceptive self-evidences (such as the 
myth of an absolute right to free speech, when in practice it is regu-
lated by a multitude of social, legal, and political considerations) is re-
quired in order to project a vision where Muslims as such can only be 
foreign and external to Europe.
While Muslims in both countries condemned the death threats and 
criticized the cancellation of the opera due to security concerns, the 
media construction of these debates as civilizational clashes necessarily 
marginalizes these voices—independently of their actual media pres-
ence, which, more often than not, is limited. Setting the terms of the 
debates in this way evacuates in turn any question about the function-
ing of media institutions and their role in the dissemination of Islamo-
phobia (for example through the publication of Redeker’s diatribe) and 
allows intellectuals to discursively enact the exclusion of Muslims from 
Europe in guise of “defending the continent.” The politics of intolerance 
that is articulated here works through the current deadlock of integra-
tion policies, where an increasing gap has opened up between social 
and political visions bent on promoting illiberal attitudes and actions 
(concerning the headscarf, transnational marriages, even the use of 
foreign languages) in the name of a culturally homogenous nation-
state on one hand, and the legal and constitutional order, which often 
obstructs these projects, on the other. 
Brushing over differences in the policies of incorporation of Islam in 
Europe—policies that, incidentally, can hardly be described as “soft”—
these writers misleadingly depict past approaches towards Islam in Eu-
rope as the result of “cowardice” or lacking political determination. The 
caricature of Islam, which is so central to these writings, is thus paired 
by an equally distorted presentation of Europe’s modes of engagement 
with Islam and European Muslims in the past decades. While this type 
of binary thinking is insufficient for understanding positions towards 
Islam, it is a necessary means for establishing as proper intellectuals a 
group of writers whose media fortune both enables and is enabled by 
the current orientation of policies towards Islam in Europe. 
Such intellectuals typically construct a world where criticism of Islam 
becomes an act of heroism—as if these are lone voices railing against 
the odds.8 Such claims are surprising, not least because today in Eu-
rope on the topic of Islam and Muslims one can precisely say almost 
everything—and, more often than not, turn it to one’s advantage. In 
France, Claude Imbert, a prominent intellectual and member of the 
very official Haut conseil à l’intégration, recently declared himself to be 
“a little islamophobe” since “Islam, not Islamism, carries a certain debil-
ity”—a sentiment he perhaps not incorrectly asserted to be shared by 
many of his contemporaries. The fact that his intellectual reputation 
was left untarnished speaks eloquently of the banalization of Islamo-
phobia in France. Elsewhere, the case of the late Oriana Fallaci—whose 
pamphlets became bestsellers in French, German, and other European 
languages—is only the most notorious case of what has become a pro-
liferating literary genre.9 The content of such books is sometimes so 
excessive as to render the call for reasonable debate ludicrous; their 
success—as gauged for example by market sales, prizes, and other in-
tellectual distinctions—rendering hollow ideas of a European “political 
correctness” in the face of Islam. Given the ubiquity of radical critics 
of Islam in media and public debates—and the regular exclusion of 
alternative voices of experts, not to mention those of Muslims them-
selves—one should inquire instead about the ways through which Is-
lamophobic discourses contribute, along with the death threats, the 
libel cases, as well as the assaults on Muslim persons and institutions, 
to a vicious circle of violence not-always-symbol-
ic, thus partly producing the hostility which they 
seek to denounce. 
It seems more fruitful in this context to reflect 
about what the constant reference to self-inflict-
ed restrictions tells us about the power distribu-
tion between Muslims and other Europeans. It 
is of course ironic that only those who have free 
access to public media bother to engage in long 
debates on “self-censorship.” What is most prob-
lematic here is not the inequality itself, but the 
fact that it has effectively led to a situation where 
debates on Islam all too often turn into a mono-
logue and any real or imagined demand by Mus-
lims is automatically considered a threat or an act 
of censorship. Whether interaction in the public 
sphere should function along these lines or can 
be understood in such terms is a question which 
begs an urgent answer.
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Danish Muslims
Catalysts of National 
Identity?
New Muslim converts represent new 
configurations of national and reli-
gious identity.1 They can be seen as 
border crossers and cultural media-
tors between Muslim and non-Muslim 
identities. This, in turn, gives rise to an 
important question: to what extent can 
these converts be perceived as figures 
with the potential to transform official 
identity models, and as carriers of new 
forms of national identity? Answers to 
this question are explored through a 
focus provided by what Gerd Baumann 
calls “grammars of identity,” models for identity-making based on pat-
terns of relations between “us” and “them.”2
In Denmark, the notion of equality in the sense of “sameness” is 
vital for an understanding of the ways the relationship between “us” 
and “them” is addressed in the public debate. Implicit in the notion of 
“sameness” is agreement and consensus, indicating uneasiness with 
what is “different”; a reluctance to acknowledge “difference”; and a ten-
dency to suppress disagreement.3 In the public debate on immigrants 
of Muslim background, two grammars of identity appear to be preva-
lent. First, an Orientalizing grammar indicating distance and opposi-
tion, which is found in the public discourse that provides a framework 
of polarization between “Danish values” and “Islam,” and, thus, between 
“us Danes” and “them Muslims.” The 
second prevalent grammar is that 
of “encompassment,” or hierarchi-
cal subsumption, a concept which 
is related to the idea of assimila-
tion: “They” (the immigrants) should 
become like us in order to be per-
ceived as “real” Danes. 
The dominant discourse partly ex-
presses the idea of Danish culture as 
permeated by Lutheran-Protestant-
ism, which explains why it is per-
ceived as “un-Danish” to be Muslim, 
and, at the same time, partly the 
idea that it is “un-Danish” to exhibit 
your religiosity in public. But de-
spite the apparent reluctance to ex-
hibit personal religious convictions, 
the Evangelical-Lutheran church is forming the Danish national church 
and as such is supported by the state. The irony consists in the fact that 
while secularism is used in the debate against Islam, this takes place in 
a context in which there are strong ties between state and church. 
Positions on “Danishness” and “Muslimness”
During the last four decades, between 2,100 and 2,800 Danes have 
converted to Islam. The majority of Danish converts grew up in urban 
milieous and is young (between the ages of twenty and thirty), but oth-
erwise they make out a heterogeneous group, cutting across different 
social backgrounds, age groups, and genders.
Mediated by the prevalent grammars of identity in the relationship 
between a Danish “us” and a Muslim “them,” ethnic Danes who convert 
to Islam are generally seen as having become “the other” (the immi-
grant), a national traitor, or simply a 
contradictory person. Converts partly 
incorporate this polarization between 
being “Danish” and “Muslim,” but they 
also challenge it by presenting them-
selves as “Danish Muslim.” First and 
foremost, this polarization is present in 
conversion narratives, and in converts’ 
displays of religiosity. In narrating their 
conversion, converts speak about how 
they are suddenly perceived as too “dif-
ferent” to be Danish by their non-Mus-
lim family. The family’s common stere-
otypical conjecture about the incompatibility between Muslim identity 
and Danish identity, or Muslim identity as “not Danish,” has a clear effect 
on the way that converts perceive themselves as having become “dif-
ferent.” This is expressed in the general tendency to refer to the group 
as “us Muslims” in opposition to “the Danes.” Furthermore, converts 
who formulate their conversion as a “rupture,” speak of Danish culture 
and society as something they exclude themselves from by designat-
ing themselves as “immigrants” (indvandrere). Others, however, empha-
size a sense of continuity with their Danish identity, pointing out that 
they do not identify with the culture of immigrants just because they 
have become Muslim. Yet, “rupture” and “continuity” do not represent 
fixed choices, but positions, that converts tend to waver between dur-
ing their conversion processes. This wavering first and foremost mirrors 
different degrees of acting on and submitting to the external categori-
zation of them as “Muslim,” which includes an incompatibility between 
Danish and Muslim identities.
In converts’ verbal and ritual expressions, the polarized and discrimi-
natory construction of a Danish “self” and a Muslim “other” is often 
questioned. This indicates a potential to reinterpret and negotiate 
identities, which reflects a subversion of stereotypic and discrimina-
tory constructions.4
Transformation of national identity? 
Converts to Islam are often described as “mediators,” “bridge-build-
ers,” and “cultural translators” between the majority and the minority 
society.5 Roald has thus maintained that converts in Scandinavia play 
an important part in the representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
media, and in the organization of unions. Converts have thus been rel-
egated a certain agency due to their symbolic capital in the form of 
language and education. Thomas Gerholm has furthermore pointed 
to the difficulty of being a cultural mediator, especially in relation to 
the problem of neutrality implied in this role, of being “in the middle,” 
translating between two dimensions. 
In my own findings, I have seen converts in the role of “mediators” at 
different levels in Danish public life. At one level, converts volunteer at 
the local authorities as interpreters between immigrant clients and social 
workers, by which they tend to play an important part in the translation of 
cultures and social practices related to being a Danish citizen. This, how-
ever, takes place at a highly informal level. Converts have less success in 
the political field. Indeed, the Danish public perceives those converts who 
appear in the political debate as somewhat bizarre human beings. Con-
verts are in most cases excluded from the political field as Muslims gener-
ally are. Simultaneously, some representatives in the Muslim field criticize 
them for attempting to participate in the political process at all. 
In the Danish public debate a familiar pattern 
of polarization has emerged. Danes who 
become Muslim by conversion need to respond 
to prevalent identity grammars that contrast 
Danish and Muslim identities. In carving a 
space as Danish Muslims, converts create new 
and hybrid identities that favour openness and 
equality in the public domain. Yet although 
these new Muslims embody the potential to 
transform identity models, the controversial 
nature of conversion means that their societal 
impact remains uncertain.
[W]hen “they” converge to 
“our” domain, it is perceived 
as successful integration; in 
the opposite case, it is seen 
as problematic.
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This leads, however, to another subtle identity implied in the role of 
being a mediator: The trickster as an ambiguous figure, sometimes 
good, sometimes bad, a dangerous being—but also a figure of trans-
formation. The conversion to a minority religion has often been per-
ceived as a means of cultural critique, a revolt against the national 
community, and thus “a dissent that unsettles the boundaries by which 
selfhood, citizenship, nationhood, and community are defined, expos-
ing these as permeable borders.”6 It is a factor that not only represents 
a tendency to erase racial identity, but also to nullify the community 
that breeds this racial identity. This perspective, then, indicates another 
role often associated with the mediator—the role of creating new and 
hybrid identities. 
Convergence and hybridity
The last decade has witnessed an appearance of new Muslim or-
ganizations. The founders and participants are primarily second-gen-
eration immigrants of different ethnic backgrounds, and converts to 
Islam. What they share is their conscious choice for Islam, in the sense 
of conversion and religious awakening respectively. Both groups can 
be seen as representing a break with their respective families’ biogra-
phies and religiosities, and in the case of born (-again) Muslims, from 
a national/traditional Islam to a Danish and global Islam. Furthermore, 
they all share the same age group: young, between 20 and 30 years 
of age, and either students or academics. In other words, they are the 
elite of the new Danish Muslims, representing new identities in rela-
tion to being both “Danish” and “Muslim.” These new organizations 
arrange study classes on Islam, debate evenings, and in various ways 
try to forge an impact on the public debate. This phenomenon can be 
seen especially amongst the so-called second-generation immigrants 
who act as commentators to current debates (e.g., the cartoon-affair), 
thereby performing a role of mediation in which they strive for the art 
of being “in-the middle,” often with more success than converts. This, 
however, also stands as an ironic example that there are limits to where 
“hybridity” works; when “they” converge to “our” domain, it is perceived 
as successful integration; whereas in the opposite case, it is seen as 
problematic. 
The everyday-interactions between Danes of different ethnic back-
grounds that take place at these new organizations are often rife with 
discussions and reciprocal prejudices on one’s own and others’ “cul-
ture.” People perform mock relationships by addressing each other in 
raw and seemingly offensive, but also playful, tones of voice, which 
exemplify a parody and a simultaneous subversion of racial meanings. 
At the same time, there is a latent Orientalized desire in these interac-
tions, in which “the Arab” becomes an object of imitation.7 These new 
Danish Muslims hint at the mixed relations that develop where people 
of so-called different ethnic backgrounds hang out with each other. 
In the urban spaces of Denmark—in the streets, super markets, and 
social housing estates, as well as, in places dominated by immigrants 
of Muslim background such as mosques and sport centres where Eid 
celebrations take place—young Danes of different ethnic backgrounds 
“pop up” together. To the outside spectator, they are an image of dis-
socialization of the objective reality. But they are also an image of 
coevality, sharing time and space. They constitute alternative public 
spaces, or liminal spaces, in which transformation of meaning, negotia-
tion, and creation of identity takes place. By constituting alternative 
and liminal spaces they make connection between issues, which in the 
public debate are constructed as having no relation to each other (e.g. 
being “Danish” and “Muslim”). In contrast to the official public sphere 
as authoritative and representative, these public spaces make out “fun 
spaces,”8 autonomous social spaces that incite a privileged form of 
knowledge or cultural practice that break down boundaries and chal-
lenge fixed definitions of collective identities and subjectivities. 
In the interactions among so-called “new Muslims,” we witness new 
communities, life-styles, and fractures that contradict the prevalent 
grammar of identity based on distance, separation, and exclusion. 
Whereas the grammars of identity put into play in the Danish everyday 
discourse on the relationship between “us” and “them” veer between 
“Orientalization” (through the discourse of polarization) and “encom-
passment” (through the discourse of assimilation), the alternative 
spaces indicate a grammar of “segmentation.” In the latter instance, 
the discourse involves fission yet equality and neutralization of con-
flict. Here, the notion of otherness is still present, though as a matter 
of context. In this respect, the grammars in relation to a Danish model 
of identity seem to be changing. The question remains: at which level 
does this pertain to? If converts can be perceived as figures with the 
potential to transform official identity models, 
and as carriers of new forms of national identity, 
it is perhaps not so much vis-a-vis their identity as 
sole “cultural mediators.” In fact, converts seem to 
have more success in forming new Muslim organ-
izations and thus new Muslim identities, than in 
influencing the authoritative and representative 
public spheres. Conversely, second-generations 
immigrants’ success in performing a mediating 
role relies heavily on the fact that they have ac-
quired a certain capital, in the form of language 
and education, this is vital for succeeding in Dan-
ish society. This also shows the limits of hybrid-
ity: whereas “they” are allowed to mix with “us” on 
our premises, “we” should not mix with them. In 
this way, “Encompassment” through assimilation 
persists. While “hybridity” indicates a potential to 
overthrow cultural truths, the challenge is to point 
out whether it transcends ephemeral creativity. 
When considering the question of transformation 
of identities and the power of social agency, it is 
vital to distinguish between spaces and spheres 
that are private and public, as well as the various 
meanings of the “public” according to interests, 
ability, and power. 
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Religious Symbols
Made in Italy
During the last Italian electoral cam-
paign, in March 2006, then Prime Min-
ister Berlusconi declared that “we do 
not want Italy to become a multiethnic, 
multicultural country; we are proud of 
our culture and of our tradition.”1 This 
article addresses the context, implica-
tions and social counterparts of such 
increasingly heard statements. Italy is 
currently the country with the high-
est rate of migrant population increase 
after the U.S. It has a regolare (docu-
mented) migrant population of at least 
3 million (5.2 percent of the total popu-
lation), including both EU and non-EU citizens. Of this, “Muslims” con-
stitute 33.2 percent, while “Christians” (Catholic, Orthodox, and other) 
49.1 percent.2 
Migration and the nation 
With one of the lowest birth rates in the world, Italy will face a se-
vere crisis in its pension system unless it manages to attract signifi-
cant numbers of migrant workers.3 And while thousands of potential 
workers have to risk their lives to arrive in Italy—given the paucity of 
legal channels of migration and asylum—Italian entrepreneurs con-
stantly argue with the national government because the regionally al-
lotted quotas of migrant workers are inadequate 
to satisfy their demand of cheap labour. Thus, a 
focus on empirical data and everyday encoun-
ters shows a very ambiguous picture. On the one 
hand, this picture is not necessarily as gloomy as 
the decontextualized “cultural war” analyses and 
normative statements à la Berlusconi would sug-
gest. At the same time, class solidarity and critical 
citizenship wither vis-à-vis national construction 
and identitarian, cultural, and religious concerns. 
And migrants, increasingly “becoming” “Muslims” 
(that is, talked about, represented, and perhaps 
seeing themselves as such) conveniently function 
as racialized, gendered, surveyed, and exploitable 
subjects and workers.
Locating national controversies
When right-wing Italian politicians abstractly use 
the improbable rhetoric of the Crusades or draw 
arbitrary connections between the Ottomans’ brief 
conquest of Otranto in southeastern Italy (1480–1) 
and contemporary migration influxes, they en-
counter very scarce popular resistance. More disturbingly, in the last few 
years Italy has started witnessing pervasive controversies stemming from 
the concern with religion and migration. But are Muslim communities 
or representatives the igniters and active protagonists of these contro-
versies? In November 2006, when Swedish IKEA and other Italian and 
multinational corporations announced that presepi (nativity sets) would 
be taken off the shelves due to low sales, centre-right political repre-
sentatives organized a short-lived boycott and denounced the episode 
as one more example of relativism “paving the way to Islamic extrem-
ism.”4 Similarly, 2004 saw the explosion (and rapid eclipse) of a presepe 
controversy involving Italian schoolteachers and parents (rather than mi-
grant or “Muslim” ones) concerned with the display of religious symbols 
in a specific public school in northern Italy. The issue was assigned a pri-
mary role in the national media, arguably because of the emotional and 
commercial appeal of interreligious controversies in the first place. The 
problem was championed by the 9 De-
cember 2004 TV talk show Porta a Porta. 
With the controversy posed as an attack 
to the presepe tradition by Muslims, self-
anointed secular “defenders” of presepe 
could emerge in the show, advocating 
the “rights of Italians” and the incontest-
ability of the traditionally unchallenged 
display of nativity sets in public schools. 
They performed the familiar discourse 
of the preservation vis-à-vis newcomers 
of identity, culture, and tradition, em-
bodied in public presepe. On the other 
hand, eminent Cardinal Ersilio Tonini, 
paradoxically known for his moderately conservative standpoints, se-
verely attacked his fellow TV guests. He chastised these national govern-
ment politicians for destroying the country’s future with their radically 
anti-Islamic viewpoints and statements. Later during the 2004 Christmas 
season I visited a poster session on migration in a socially engaged parish 
in Bari, southern Italy. A banner hanging over dozens of fair-trade nativ-
ity sets from around the world provided a “Catholic” counterpoint to the 
self-proclaimed “secularist” anti-immigration and anti-Islamic arguments 
of the public defenders of presepe: “Christmas is the holiday of an immi-
grant. Jesus too would be an immigrant today, with his family. There is a 
deep connection between the holy family and the innocent families of all 
times enduring trials and suffering.” 
Similarly, it is well known that the Catholic crucifix is customarily dis-
played in Italian public spaces such as schools and tribunals. Yet, the fact 
that “even among those who are extremely open to immigrants and to 
other religions the rate of consent to the presence of the Christian sym-
bol is 78%”5 does not imply that these people automatically agree on the 
“meaning” of the crucifix prior to its representation, legal enforcement, 
and cultural understanding. Every “meaning,” including that of presepe 
and of the crucifix, must be investigated, dissected, and analyzed as a so-
cially located and enforced one.6 Historically, the crucifix is the ultimately 
open-ended object of vibrant theological debate and two millennia of 
varied religious practice. At present, redundant statements on its display, 
ultimate meaning, and essential nature increasingly reduce it to a limited 
symbol. In short, it is now conscripted as an icon of “Italian liberal-demo-
cratic and Republican values,” “national identity,” “universal compassion,” 
“the West,” and, ironically, “secular tolerance.” As such, it is deployed, most 
often by non-religious pundits and politicians, in marked contrast to mi-
gration and, in particular, the alleged patriarchy, intolerance, and illiberal-
ism ascribed to Islam. In this usage, the crucifix evidently contradicts con-
temporary Catholic social teachings and becomes an exclusionary tool 
directed against “atheists,” “minorities,” “Jews,” “Muslims,” and others—mi-
grants and Italians alike. 
Making “others” and “selves”
Shallow controversies, rather than pluralistic and constructive debates, 
monopolize news-making and public intellectuals’ knowledge produc-
tion for a short time, until their commercial and ideological expiration. 
The media present such controversies as matters directly impacting Ital-
ians’ physicality, rights, identity, and religious and cultural traditions, now 
to be “defended.” Television talk shows, in particular, function as arenas 
for starlets, opinion-makers, and politicians vying for visibility. Here, skir-
mishes on issues of immigration and religion among a half-dozen guests, 
such as in the above-mentioned presepe case, become proxies for “public 
debates,” through which a national public and the Muslim disruptive ex-
ception are simultaneously produced. And yet, often local governments 
at the regional, provincial, and municipal levels are establishing their own 
policies and understandings of migration and Muslim practice, with “cul-
While Italian pundits and politicians purport a 
world of cultural-religious friction, systematic 
monitoring of the Italian mediascape and 
extensive ethnographic fieldwork illuminate 
a far more complex picture. Ambiguous 
everyday encounters coexist with structural 
inequality and exclusionary discourses. The 
periodic controversies dominating the popular 
media—over religious symbols, migration, and 
“Islam”—chart moral (and even theologically 
laden) political visions that function to 
inculcate new mechanisms of social control and 
boundary making in Italy.
[Through] television 
talk shows … 
a national public 
and the Muslim 
disruptive exception 
are simultaneously 
produced.
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tural” exchanges, contingent agreements on specific practical problems, 
and discursive and pragmatic contrasts vis-à-vis national discourses and 
policies of immigration. Non-governmental organizations participating 
in the management of migration show a variety of political referents and 
agendas. Similarly, in Italian Catholic venues I have encountered extreme 
variation of opinions and convictions about migration and “Islam,” not 
reflected in sketchy cultural clash arguments. At a conference, for exam-
ple, Father Mimmo reminded his audience of lay secondary school teach-
ers that “there is goodness inherent in Islam” and that John Paul II once 
kissed a copy of the Quran.7 In contrast, another priest, the director of an 
extremely efficient Caritas facility of primary assistance and sheltering of 
migrants, told me in an interview that Muslim guests are not allowed to 
pray in any room of the facility. In fact, he said, that would entitle them 
potentially later to claim that space of prayer as Islamic.
Despite such doses of scepticism, “first-hand,” socially embedded rela-
tionships with Muslims have the potential to work as a framework against 
which knowledge produced about Muslims through the mass media and 
other desocialized discourses may be appraised and verified. And diverse 
socio-cultural relations do happen, between persons who might or might 
not be interested in abstract “interreligious dialogue,” but who neverthe-
less pragmatically interact in the workplace, the parish, the classroom, or 
the neighbourhood. For many other Italians instead, especially in non-
metropolitan and remote areas, the knowledge of “Muslims” acquired 
through the media constitutes the background informing potential fu-
ture relationships with Muslim individuals or groups, as the “veil” example 
below suggests. 
Ms. Beba, the director of a Caritas parish centre in Lecce matching job 
offers with migrant availability, admitted that local elderly people (or 
relatives on their behalf ) sometimes ask explicitly for Christian domes-
tic caregivers, because they would feel embarrassed about “passeggiare 
[going for a walk] and being seen with somebody with a veil on their 
head.” This example is indicative of the bundled characteristics that are 
being naturally and superficially associated with Islam and that make it 
“known” to many Italians through the mass media: the veil is one of them, 
arguably also as a consequence of widely publicized French debates on 
the subject. The example also suggests the lack of significance of these 
characteristics: as elsewhere in other regions of southern Europe, many 
older Catholic women in Lecce cover their head with black or coloured 
foulards, in church as in everyday life outside the house. Finally, this ex-
ample illustrates the essentially social and relational nature of the con-
cern about the appropriateness of “religious” symbols and practices. It is 
not that clients are uncomfortable with veiled women per se. Rather, they 
are “ashamed” to be seen with veiled women during the social ritual of 
passeggiata [promenade], taking for granted a collective stigma on the 
veil that, while pervading dominant discourses, might or might not be 
empirically accurate. 
Drawing and resisting conclusions
Both “migration” and “religion” (read: “Islam”) are often politically and 
analytically tackled as challenges to the nation-state and the EU. In this 
view they challenge sovereignty, church-state separation, and amicable 
relationships and the postulated cultural, religious, identitarian, and de-
mographic balance of Italy, the EU and, in general, of secular liberal de-
mocracies. Interesting research questions emerge when such essentially 
governmental concerns centred on “challenge” are turned inside out. 
Thus, how is the liberal-democratic, secular, Western national body con-
structed vis-à-vis “religious” migrants? How is national and supranational 
sovereignty performed and reinforced vis-à-vis migrants’ transgression? 
In this perspective, then, controversies over “religious symbols,” male and 
female genital modification, dhabiha (ritual slaughter), mosque building, 
and the public display of Catholic crucifixes should prompt analyses of 
underlying ethnocentric concerns, imperial gazes, and governmental 
stakes.
In particular, if what is crucial for governments at various levels is not 
“homogeneity versus difference as such” but the authority and preroga-
tive to define crucial homogeneities and differences,8 then “religion” is 
not the object of impossible exclusion, but rather of governmental inter-
vention. Entering and often engendering morally charged controversies 
on the meaning of the crucifix, the religious normativity of the veil, the 
appropriateness of the Prophet’s depiction and other such complex is-
sues, secular governmental actors increasingly produce a pervasive 
“knowledge” about such tropes and about the (Muslim) people, beliefs, 
and religious practices supposedly igniting related problems. Support-
ing a pervasive moral construction and evaluation 
of “difference,” they also draw boundaries defining 
“the nation,” “the public,” “Italian civilization,” and 
“Judeo-Christian Europe.” Normative, ethical, and 
even theological arguments are increasingly articu-
lated and disseminated by “secular” governmen-
tal actors. In contrast, I contend, social scientists 
should focus not on the retrieval of the supposed 
“meaning” or nature of certain “religious” symbols 
and tropes. Rather, they should engage the social, 
cultural, and political implications that such contro-
versies and governmental knowledge production 
have in constituting and reproducing dominant 
ideas about the liberal-democratic individual, the 
resulting national community, the feminized mi-
grant, the religious fundamentalist, and so forth. 
For it seems that these controversies increasingly 
function as virtual “monuments,” admonitions, and 
warnings on what the nation, civilization, Chris-
tendom, and Europe should be. In particular, the 
ongoing quest for a solution to what being Euro-
pean (or Italian, German, etc.) means is not only an 
unsolved problem, but ideally an unsolvable one as 
well. Any final solution would result in further in-
stitutionalization of an exclusionary, ethnocentric, 
and necessarily undemocratic regime of citizenship 
and membership. 
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Being a Pious French 
Muslim Woman
J E A N E T T E  S .  J O U I L I the staircase, outside the building. But 
to bother us, the secretaries walked 
their dogs there to dirty the place. My 
brother told me that they prayed in 
a room in the cave of his university. 
But when the janitors found out, they 
closed the room. The students decided 
to pray in the hall in front of everyone. 
Finally, the administrators preferred to 
reopen the room. There are a lot of sto-
ries like that.” 
Religious practices such as salat and 
hijab, which render oneself visible 
within public spheres, mark and claim 
ones presence—something which is one of the more general objec-
tives of contemporary Islamic movements.3 The search for recognition 
through visibility—a visibility which is also articulated in terms of “Is-
lamic self-confidence”—equally reflects the desire of Islamic revival 
movements to reject the inferior image of Muslims and to claim, with 
the same act, pride for a consciously appropriated identity. Therefore, 
from a “public deficit,” the Islamic identity becomes a “subcultural ad-
vantage.”4 This hints at a typical feature of the struggle for recognition 
by minority and stigmatized groups: visibility is considered a source 
of power whereas its opposite, invisibility, becomes a sign of oppres-
sion.5 
The struggle for recognition is however not always articulated 
through the principle of public visibility and can, at times, be articu-
lated in quite different terms, as for example by referring to da‘wa. 
While this term is also used by the women in its classical meaning, that 
is “calling” to the righteous path of Islam, here it denotes the strug-
gle of representing “Islam” positively to the non-Muslim other, thereby 
countering its negative image. Since this “representative” da‘wa is now 
perceived to be the precondition for the (social, political, and spiritual) 
well-being of the Muslim umma in the West it has thereby been el-
evated to the status of religious obligation. 
While this form of da‘wa can equally be practiced in different do-
mains of social interaction and everyday politics, pious Muslim women 
often feel that they have a particular role to play in counteracting the 
negative images of Islam, which prevail in French majority society. One 
of the most effective means to counter these images is, according to 
these women, to participate actively and successfully in society—es-
pecially by pursuing a professional career and thereby embodying the 
image of a “modern” Muslim woman.
However, the wearing of hijab as well as the punctual performance 
of the ritual prayer is difficult to accomplish in the workplace. Not 
only because, in the French understanding, the hijab constitutes an 
illegitimate intrusion of a private practice into the public sphere, but 
also because of the general public perception of these practices in 
France. In this perception, the headscarf, as the successive debates of 
the “headscarf affairs” have shown, is almost unanimously dismissed 
as a symbol of female oppression. Correspondingly, praying regularly 
(i.e. visibly) is considered either as a sign of lack of integration or of 
holding radical views.6
In this context, pious women face two seemingly irreconcilable 
Islamic duties: the honouring of (socially stigmatized) religious obli-
gations and the promotion of da‘wa in the sense of well represent-
ing Islam. And while both duties are inscribed into the overall goal 
of constructing a morally strong and flourishing community, they are 
grounded on completely different logics: Islamic dress and prayer are 
considered to be part of the Sharia, the clearly defined norms at the 
level of ‘ibadat and mu‘amalat that function as crucial self-practices 
for the constitution and consolidation of the pious subject one aspires 
There has been much recent discussion 
about the challenges that French laïcité 
poses to the integration of Islam. Ac-
cording to the notion of French laïcité, 
a particularly strict version of seculari-
ty, public spheres are defined in a more 
normative way than in other European 
societies; equally, the demand on the 
individual to conform to those norms is 
also much stronger. It requires, among 
other things, to respect the “obligation 
of restraint,” which means to refrain 
from displaying any signs of religious 
or other particularistic allegiance.1 
From this follows that the Islamic code of modesty that pious Muslim 
women adopt—most visibly embodied through the headscarf—implic-
itly denotes a questioning of the definition of the laïque public sphere 
and therefore significantly endangers their successful participation in 
these places. Another matter which, though less likely to attract pub-
lic attention, also involves a physical commitment to one’s faith is the 
performance of salat, the prayer ritual performed 
routinely by pious Muslims. 
In this context, upholding one’s religious 
practice cannot be taken for granted and pious 
women generally have to consider whether or 
not, and how, to introduce these practices. Practi-
cally, this means to reflect on the degree of vis-
ibility, which might be accompanied by either a 
claim for expressing one’s religiosity or by an ac-
commodative stance in regard to the demand for 
restraint in public.
While Islamic rituals and bodily (hence visible) 
practices are first and foremost ethical self-disci-
plines crucial for fashioning the pious self,2 in a 
secular context they are generally understood as 
“symbols,” by which these acts become “texts” to 
be deciphered by others. In a context of migra-
tion and minority, they are potentially deciphered 
with negative connotations. None epitomizes this 
better than the hijab. Pious women are highly 
aware that they have to engage with this nega-
tive reading by the majority society. This is where 
identity politics comes into play. 
Struggling for recognition
One of the central considerations for many 
pious Muslims in France is the question of gain-
ing recognition from the majority society both as 
pious and modern Muslim women. This struggle 
for recognition is regularly framed in terms of 
claiming rights, i.e. the right to live as a practicing 
Muslim in the French society. It is by referring to 
rights that many women frequently issue statements like the follow-
ing: “We have to demand our rights. We should go to work with our 
veils, if we are qualified. We have to show that we exist.”
Not only does the much-discussed question of the headscarf, but 
also the less-debated question of praying, gives rise to such demands. 
And as much as the hijab has done, salat has the potential to give rise 
to a struggle over the definition of secular space. The following ac-
count given by one woman about the situation at university clearly 
reflects the tensions which arise from these claims; tensions which can 
be played out in an almost theatrical fashion: “We used to pray under 
In secular France visible religious practice is 
socially discouraged within public spheres. 
For pious Muslims, in particular pious 
Muslim women, who actively participate 
in these spheres, piety cannot be lived out 
without encountering certain problems. 
The negotiations that these women engage 
in, favouring at times visibility, at times 
invisibility, not only allow the living of virtuous 
lives under often difficult circumstances, but 
more importantly are part of a process by which 
ethical Muslim selves are constituted in secular, 
non-Islamic contexts.
The search for 
recognition through 
visibility … reflects 
the desire … to 
reject the inferior 
image of Muslims 
and [claim] pride 
for a consciously 
appropriated 
identity.
to be.7 Da‘wa addressed at the non-Muslim majority society—through 
women’s successful social participation—has to take into account def-
initions of modernity, progressiveness, or female emancipation domi-
nant in the majority society. Therefore, both duties potentially require 
the performance of a different kind of public self. 
Evidently, these two types of “Islamic” duties built on different logics 
are difficult to combine and require a continual, self-reflexive nego-
tiation. When the importance of da‘wa is stressed, strategies, which 
render the accomplishment of these religious obligations less visible, 
become for some women a viable option. This becomes particularly 
clear in regard to the issue of veiling. Many pious Muslim women who 
do not veil, do so for especially this reason (while they uphold at the 
same time strict norms for their dress style: clothes covering arms and 
legs and hiding one’s forms); some will unveil only during work. Oth-
ers will wear a “discrete” headgear, a hat, or a “bandana” (a practice 
which has however become increasingly difficult in the aftermath of 
the 2004 law banning “conspicuous” religious symbols from public 
schools). When discussing these different choices inspired by the idea 
of da‘wa, the women always express an awareness that their choices 
have to be justified (and justifiable) towards God, considered to be the 
ultimate judge. Accordingly, those women frequently reflect, in a self-
critical fashion, on whether the idea of representing Islam bears with 
it the risk of a too easy legitimization of conforming oneself to social 
pressures from the secular society. 
Enduring rejection
The different choices regarding visibility reflect aspirations such as 
recognition, participation, and justice; aspirations which are usually 
considered to be constitutive of agency. However, these women also 
take into account other considerations that seem to be antithetical to 
the former. Apart from claiming rights and recognition, pious Muslim 
women also frequently appeal to God as the just and supreme agent in 
whom one should place all of ones trust. An outright “claim of rights” 
would in this sense even be counterproductive for the ultimate goal of 
leading a pious life. As a woman who teaches in an Islamic 
organization explained: “If I claim my rights but do not also 
ask for Allah’s help, my approach is wrong. If I put … my 
hope in human beings instead of in Allah, my approach is 
wrong. Of course, you have to claim your rights, although 
this is pretty hopeless these days, but I do not lose hope in 
Allah’s help in this situation.” 
Without actually doubting the usefulness of claiming 
rights, many women regularly insist on the importance of 
attributing the first “agency” to the divine rather than to the 
human. This idea needs to prevail in the believer’s conscience 
and should never be forgotten whenever claims, such as the 
right to wear the headscarf at work or the right for a prayer 
space, are articulated in opposition to the wishes of the ma-
jority society. By placing one’s “hopes in Allah” rather than “in 
men,” the idea of an autonomous subject, determining alone 
its acts, is clearly rejected. 
Closely linked to confidence in God is the duty of patience 
(sabr) in the face of hardship. When talking about the dif-
ficulties they faced in regard to the headscarf, either by not 
finding employment because of the veil or by being obliged 
not to veil (whether out of considerations of da‘wa or out of 
necessity), many pious women refer concretely to sabr. One 
woman, for example, who unveils for work and for whom 
this act is not unproblematic, addresses the idea of trust in 
God and sabr: “Insha’allah, times will change. I have confi-
dence in Allah and one day, we will be accepted with our 
headscarf. We have to be patient right now.” The statements 
of these pious women invoke somehow a divine interven-
tion at the same time as they insist on the necessity of re-
sisting and combating actively pressures and prejudices in 
regard to the headscarf. While the latter appears to be af-
firming agency, the former appears to abandon the concept 
altogether. To better apprehend the apparent contradiction, 
Asad’s reflections on the concept of agency are helpful. He 
shows that notions like suffering and endurance are not syn-
onymous with “passivity,” but that, in certain traditions, they 
may “create a space for moral action.”8 That is to say, they 
render certain modalities of engagement with the world 
possible and constitute a form of agency, albeit one that is different 
from the dominant secular, progressive understanding. 
Between visibility and invisibility: a pious 
negotiation
The choices pious women make in regard to their Islamic practice 
within French secular public spheres differ significantly (the concrete 
social consequences of their choices vary even more). These different 
choices are the result of the individual and subjective evaluations and 
interpretations of the different ethical requirements the women are 
faced with. Accordingly, da‘wa is understood as representing Islam or 
as the cultivation and practice of Islamic virtues, 
such as placing trust in God and endurance of 
hardships; requirements which have to be pur-
sued in regard to the overall goal of leading a 
God-pleasing life.
By analyzing how these particular pious nego-
tiations in the context of French secularity result 
in concrete choices of visibility and invisibility, it 
becomes evident how much the constitution of 
Muslim subjectivities depends on concrete social 
conditions (here strict secularity and minority 
condition) out of which new moral requirements 
ensue. The pious negotiation undertaken by 
pious Muslim women should be considered one 
of the contextual practices shaping ethical Mus-
lim selves in a secular, non-Islamic environment.
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Rituals in Motion
The first time I stumbled upon a Sufi ritual, some forty 
years ago in Cairo, I did not realize I had discovered the 
tip of an iceberg. It was unclear to me what was hap-
pening, in any case. My studies of Arabic, Turkish, and 
Islam at the University of Leiden had not prepared me 
for popular mysticism.
There may have been a dozen men in that alley mov-
ing to music with a pulsating rhythm. They gave me tea 
and some explanation. I was taken by the music, and 
hoped I would be lucky enought to hear it again.
Over time, I found Sufis all over the country, all 
around the year. The mystical orders, the turuq (sing. 
tariqa), boast a membership of some six million, and 
they manifest themselves at hundreds of saints’ festi-
vals (mawlids) great and small.1 When there is no such 
festival, the “dervishes” still perform their rituals once 
or twice a week at their saha, called tekke or semahane 
in the Balkans, or at someone’s home. Most Sufi orders 
function at a modest social level. This may be the rea-
son why they are unknown to most foreign residents 
and ignored or despised by the Egyptian elites. The 
Islamists hate both their doctrine and their practices. 
The turuq, which are proportionally as numerous in a 
number of other Islamic countries as they are in Egypt, 
form an often under-estimated barrier against funda-
mentalism.
The broad current of Sufism presents a large variety in 
ritual from region to region and from order to order, but 
there are a number of common characteristics. Apart 
from the ubiquitous cult of the saints, and whether in 
Macedonia, Egypt, or elsewhere, Sufis share one main 
objective: the love of God, the supreme Friend or Belov-
ed, and ultimately, union with Him. The principal tech-
nique for establishing a closer relationship with God is 
dhikr (generally pronounced as zikr), or “remembrance.” 
It consists of repeating some of God’s “most beautiful 
names” and related formulas (called esma, i.e., “names,” 
in the Balkans) with sincerity and concentration. This can 
be done either alone or in a group and, depending on 
each order’s custom, sitting, standing, or dancing, with 
or without music. This is the basis of the Sufi ritual, which 
can be augmented with litanies (awrad) and hymns (ila-
his) and carried out with varying degrees of visible pas-
sion.
In the course of a prolonged stay in Skopje, Macedo-
nia, between 2002 and 2004, I befriended Erol Baba, 
a Rifa‘i shaykh of Turkish origin and his dervishes. The 
Rifa‘i tariqa in Macedonia had experienced a tumultu-
ous history. Established around 1820 as a predominantly 
Turkish order, its numbers declined substantially during 
the Turkish emigration that started in 1912 and peaked 
The Rifa‘i tariqa in Macedonia was 
founded in the early nineteenth 
century as a predominantly 
Turkish order. Following waves of 
emigration, the brotherhood only 
continued to exist because of the 
massive interest of the Roma, who 
now dominate its ranks. In word 
and image, this article aims to 
capture the tumultuous history and 
dynamic rituals that characterize 
Sufism in Macedonia.
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in the 1950s. Had it not been for the Roma’s sudden, 
massive interest in the tariqa, the Macedonian Rifa‘iyya 
might have disappeared altogether. By the time I arrived 
Erol Baba’s dervishes were mostly Roma, and their num-
bers were steadily increasing. The Skopje region count-
ed no less than thirteen or fourteen semahanas, notably 
in the Roma township of Shutka, and ten in other parts 
of the country. Erol Baba authorized their establishment 
and remained their shaykh, but rarely intruded upon 
their daily activities. According to his estimate, each se-
mahana could count up to fifty dervishes. This means 
there might be over a thousand Rifa‘is in Macedonia, 
possibly as many as there ever were. 
In the Balkans and Egypt, and no doubt elsewhere 
as well, the followers of the Rifa‘iyya have always been 
drawn from the lower and lower middle classes. The 
tariqa’s unbridled practices hold little appeal for the 
Muslim bourgeoisie. Even so, the Rifa‘is are respected 
by the other turuq including the very disciplined Hal-
vetis of Struga, who follow Sunni doctrine but pursue 
the same objective as diligently as the Rifa‘is. Erol Baba 
was deeply aware of his status as one of the few promi-
nent ethnic Turks remaining in the capital. He too had 
considered leaving for Turkey, but had decided not to do 
so. He appeared not to mind that the vast majority of his 
dervishes were Roma now. Ethnicity is not an issue in the 
tariqa, he used to say.
The Skopje dervishes sing their hymns in Turkish, 
Serbian/Bosnian, and Romany. The esma are recited in 
Arabic.2 The Rifa‘iyya is one of the rare Sufi orders that 
include groups practicing ijrah or darb silah: the piercing 
of the body with iron pins of various sizes “when (God’s) 
love seizes them.” In Skopje this is done from time to 
time. But even without the piercing these zikrs are im-
pressive and often deafening, brimming with movement 
and feeling. The esma and ilahis are recited, sung, and 
shouted at full voice, accompanied on hand-held per-
cussion instruments. At the end the dervishes stand up 
for a special prayer directed towards the tomb of Hazna-
dar Baba, the founder of the tekke.
The pictures I include here could never have been 
taken without the full support of Shaykh Erol, who im-
posed no restrictions on me during dozens of sessions 
and gave me valuable information, during the last year 
of his life in particular. Since his death in 2005 his son 
Murtezen has been in charge of the tekke and its der-
vishes. Erol Baba has now joined the ranks of the saints. 
He has a tomb in the tekke and appears to the dervishes 
in their dreams. He tells them that he is doing fine, and 
that he can see them though they cannot see him. His 
help is solicited by visitors.
Notes
1. About popular Sufism in Egypt, see Nicolaas 
Biegman, Egypt: Moulids, Saints, Sufis (SDU / 
Kegan Paul, 1990).
2. A CD with zikr and ilahis of the Skopje Rifa‘is 
has been released by Pan Records, Leiden.
 
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 N
IE
K
 B
IE
G
M
A
N
, 
2
1
 J
U
N
E
 2
0
0
3
 
 Loving God
 in Macedonia
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 N
IE
K
 B
IE
G
M
A
N
, 
3
1
 M
A
Y
 2
0
0
3
Nicolaas (Niek) Biegman is a former Dutch diplomat 
and author of a number of photo books, latest 
among which is God’s Lovers, a Sufi community in 
Macedonia (London: Kegan Paul, 2007). 
The photos on these pages are among more 
than fifty contained in this book.
Email: nbiegman@lycos.com
3 6  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Rituals in Motion
A M B E R  G E M M E K E
Women Reconfiguring 
Esoteric Economies
Meissa Ndiaye and Coumba Keita, two 
female marabouts, live in the northern 
suburbs of Dakar. For their practice 
they use Quranic verses in amulets and 
eaux bénites [potions], and employ Ara-
bic geomancy (ramalu), astrology, and 
numerology. They conduct divination 
sessions (of the khatt ar-raml type), 
perform interpretation of dreams (is-
tikhara), and arrange prayer sessions 
(khalwah). The women have a large cli-
entele of both men and women. Meissa 
and Coumba’s success is a surprising 
exception: Islamic esoteric knowledge 
is a domain dominated by men. Marabout women are considered a 
rare exception at best and a contradiction in terms at worst.1 This paper 
discusses the ways in which women can gain, nonetheless, authority 
in this domain and—in doing so—answers to the call for research on 
women’s activities within West African Islam. 
Meissa 
Meissa is Wolof. She is a small, slim lady of about fifty-five years old. 
She lives in a villa containing seven bedrooms, an office, and a salon 
with several of her brother’s and sister’s children and some of their 
children. Her only daughter is married elsewhere. Meissa offers khatt 
ar-raml divination sessions, khalwah and istikhara sessions, and pre-
pares amulets and potions in which she combines Quranic verses with 
ground plants. 
On the day that Meissa tells me about her arrival in Dakar, she sits on 
the floor of her office, working during the entire interview. She folds 
pages with turabu and green powder into small bundles that she wraps 
in white cotton.2 Meissa explained that she had learned this technique 
from her father, a marabout. In most marabout families, Meissa said, 
girls receive less education than their brothers. In her family, however, 
things were different:
“My father taught me the Quran until I was about fifteen years and 
then, until I was thirty years, I learned the mystical secrets of the 
Quran. I left Dokhoba when I was about forty years old and had 
divorced my husband.3 My father told me to go to Dakar, because 
Dakar is where money can be found. He blessed me and gave me a 
big silver ring with a turabu that I always wear. He also gave me one 
of his jinni. Because of this ring and because of my inherited jinn, all 
that I do for clients works. I first lived in Yarakh [a suburb of Dakar] 
with a family member of mine. The difference between the first days 
that I worked as a marabout and now, fifteen years later, is enormous. 
In the beginning, I had no clients at all. But the first people that came 
brought along other people, and that is how my clientele grew. It 
is like a chain reaction. After a while, I had many clients, especially 
in Cambérène, so the caliph of the Layenne brotherhood gave me a 
piece of land [to construct the villa on].” 
Besides her activities in Dakar, Meissa says she travels internationally: 
she visits clients in the Gambia and in Mauritania. Furthermore, Meis-
sa’s clients who immigrated to Europe and the United States regularly 
call her for consultation. 
Coumba 
Coumba is a Bamana, Dakar-born woman of forty-four years old. With 
her light skin, her round face, and curvaceous body, she is an attractive 
woman. Coumba started to work as a marabout after she had had vi-
sions of Seydina Issa Laye.4 She said: 
“I started to work as a secretary when I 
was seventeen years old. I travelled the 
whole world, working as a secretary for 
the PNUD [Programme National des Na-
tions Unies pour le Développement], 
then for UNESCO, then for the Em-
bassy of France. I lived in Niger, Congo, 
Cameroon, Namibia, and two years in 
Paris. In Niger, when I was thirty-three 
years old, I started to have visions. I 
was chosen to work as a marabout. I 
left my first husband and came back 
with my children to Parcelles Assainies 
[a suburb of Dakar]. I became famous 
through a group of students that wanted to immigrate to Spain. That 
worked.” 
Like Meissa, Coumba is popular: whenever I visited her, up to five clients, 
both men and women, would be waiting for her in her living room. She 
also has several clients who migrated to Europe and the United States, 
who continue to call her for advice. 
Being a successful female marabout 
The situations of Meissa and Coumba differ considerably, but they 
also show striking parallels. The most apparent difference is how 
they acquired knowledge: lessons in a teacher-student setting versus 
dreams and visions. However, their physical and verbal presence (dress, 
attitude), their start in suburban Dakar, the way they built up their cli-
entele, and their affiliation with the Layenne brotherhood are all re-
markably alike. The differences between Meissa and Coumba show that 
there is room for variation to legitimate Islamic knowledge for women 
in Dakar. The similarities, discussed below, illustrate how Meissa and 
Coumba adapt themselves to the same dominant, male, discourse. 
Meissa and Coumba both frequently wear a white scarf around their 
head and a grand boubou. They speak in remarkably soft voices and 
often wear glasses. This dress and use of voice and gestures underline 
their wisdom and self-control, as well as their attachment to Islamic 
values. Most other middle aged Dakaroises take fashion seriously and 
wear vibrant colours, sometimes in tight-fitting taille basses outfits or 
synthetic fabric, and headscarves in a turban-type way. Meissa’s and 
Coumba’s attitude certainly adds to their image as charismatic, stable, 
wise and mature ladies, who do not have time to keep up with the 
trivial fashions of the day. Rather, their dress imitates the style of the 
leading ladies of the Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal. 
While Meissa and Coumba thus emphasize an “Islamic” femininity in 
dress and posture, they downplay other aspects of femininity. Men-
struation is an important factor in this de-feminization. Meissa and 
Coumba explained that their “secret” for using the Quran is their lack 
of menstruation, thus indicating purity, and, as this state is generally 
associated with older women, wisdom. Meissa indicated: “The problem 
with women is their impurity. How can a woman do khalwah, which 
sometimes lasts a month, when she dirties herself? But in my case, the 
time that my only child was born was the only time I saw blood.” Cou-
mba similarly explained how it was possible to retain her purity even 
though she gave birth to children while working as a marabout: “Before 
I got pregnant with the first child of my second husband, I bled for forty 
days. I went to a doctor. He said that I had all my bleeding in one period, 
and that after these forty days I would never menstruate again.” Meissa 
and Coumba thus explained how they, as women, can use the Quran in 
a pure way at all times. 
Besides dress, behaviour, and an overt claim to continual purity, an-
other remarkable resemblance between Meissa and Coumba is the 
This article examines the ways in which women 
construct expert status and gain authority as 
marabouts among a largely sceptical suburban 
population. The experiences of two female 
marabouts in surburban Dakar highlight how 
expertise is negotiated, legitimated, and 
publicly recognized. The author suggests 
that the women’s success can be explained 
by migration and urbanization: the suburban 
environment, filled with migrants looking for 
their livelihood in an insecure place, creates 
opportunities for women to engage actively in 
esoteric Islamic practices.
two women’s affiliation with the Layenne brotherhood. Both Meissa 
and Coumba were born as members of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, but 
changed to the Layenne brotherhood at the start of their career as ma-
rabouts. The visible proof of Meissa’s and Coumba’s affiliation with the 
Layenne is apparent in both of their homes. An enormous portrait of 
Seydina Issa Laye is painted on the outer wall of Meissa’s house. On the 
inner wall of the patio, a smaller copy of the same portrait is painted. 
As another visible sign of support, besides the portraits of her Layenne 
tutor, Meissa frequently draws attention to her father’s huge silver 
ring. 
Coumba, for her part, has placed pictures of Seydina Issa Laye in 
every room of her house. In the hallway, a composition photo of Seydi-
na Issa Laye and Coumba decorates the entrance. In her office a portrait 
of Issa and a calendar portraying all the important figures within the 
Layenne brotherhood are placed. In the living room, a huge portrait of 
Seydina Issa Laye hangs over the sofa. Coumba explains her abundant 
use of these portraits, and, in fact, her work as a marabout, by the vi-
sions she had of Seydina Issa Laye and the Virgin Mary. She told me 
she had, when she was thirty-three years old, a vision in which Mary 
put her hand in the right hand of Jesus. The next night, she dreamt of 
Seydina Issa Laye who said: “It is me, Jesus, but in Issa’s form.” Coumba 
said she recognized Seydina Issa Laye because he looked exactly like 
his picture, which is widely distributed in Senegal. The following night, 
Seydina Issa Laye told her in another dream to go back to Senegal and 
work as a marabout. Still today, Coumba says, Issa tells her in dreams 
how she can best treat her clients. 
Coumba is not unique in having had visions of Seydina Issa Laye. Fol-
lowers of various backgrounds, especially women, have converted to 
the Layenne order after having seen Issa in dreams or visions. Coumba, 
however, seems to be unique in attributing her knowledge of esoteric 
Islamic knowledge to visions of Issa. None of the male marabouts I met 
in suburban Dakar laid such (visible) emphasis on the support of the 
leaders of their brotherhood or on the support of their fathers. Appar-
ently, marabout women use male authoritarian figures to legitimate 
their work.
Gendered authority
Yet another resemblance in the two women’s behaviour is apparent. 
Meissa and Coumba clearly have different strategies in attracting a cli-
entele than their male colleagues. Most male marabouts I met in sub-
urban Dakar talk openly about the downsides of their profession. One 
openly admitted he is not very good in his work, others told me that 
they go regularly to other marabouts for advice on how to help their 
clients, and some marabouts say they would rather have had a French 
education and start a business instead of working according to family 
traditions. The two women are not that open. Meissa is very reluctant 
to give any answers and Coumba often tells incredible stories in which 
she frequently contradicts herself. In my experience, this elusiveness 
can be related to the relative isolation in which these women work. 
Meissa and Coumba built up their clientele individually. They both 
started to work as a marabout after they had divorced and moved to 
suburban Dakar. To attract clients, they could not rely on a family net-
work, as their male colleagues do. Instead, they used other weapons: 
inapproachability and self-glorification. Meissa referred to the Prophet 
Mohammed by emphasizing that she started to work as a marabout at 
the age of forty years. Coumba refers even more abundantly to influen-
tial people and events. Perhaps her lack of a marabout family inspired 
her to do so. Coumba is certainly not unique in telling fantastic sto-
ries—for example that she traded gold and diamonds in Central Africa 
or that her youngest son is born with Quranic verses on his leg. “Words 
louder than actions,” to paraphrase Villalón (1995), form an unalienable 
part of the profession of a marabout.
As a result of their exceptional position, Meissa and Coumba face 
specific problems in legitimating their work. They not only need to 
convince their sceptical clients that they are powerful, well educated, 
gifted, pious, and reliable—challenges every marabout faces in subur-
ban Dakar—but also that they, as women, possess 
qualities associated with men. This paper showed 
the careful image building with which Meissa and 
Coumba negotiate their position towards their 
different clients. The women claim authority, visu-
ally and verbally, mainly by dressing like leading 
female religious figures, by stressing their ritual 
and moral purity, their cosmopolitan travels, and 
by emphasizing their relationship with male au-
thoritative figures. 
Interestingly, once female marabouts have es-
tablished a reputation, their exceptional position 
actually seems to work in their favour. Once fe-
male marabouts are successful, they are far more 
remarkable than most of their male colleagues, 
and thus ensured of a clientele. As an inhabitant 
of a Dakarois suburb said: “A successful female 
marabout must have both an exceptionally strong 
character as well as strong powers.” 
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Notes
1. Among others Geert Mommersteeg, Het 
domein van de marabout: koranleraren en 
religieus- magische specialisten in Djenné, 
Mali (Amsterdam, 1996), and Donal Cruise 
O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: the Political 
and Economic organization of an Islamic 
Brotherhood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
2. Turabu: quadrants with Arabic texts and 
numbers, based upon classic Arabic 
geomancy. 
3. The idea that the Prophet Mohammed 
started to preach at the age of forty is 
commonly held in Senegal.
4. Seydina Issa Laye is the son of the founder of 
the Layenne brotherhood, Seydina Limamou 
Laye. Limamou, born Libasse Thiaw, was a 
forty-year old fisherman when he declared 
he was the reincarnation of the Prophet 
Mohammed, in 1883. After his death in 
1909, his son Issa succeeded him until he 
died in 1949. Layenne believe that Issa is the 
reincarnation of Jesus Christ. 
Meissa’s villa 
in Cambérène, 
a Dakarois 
outskirt
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Post-Apartheid Sufi 
Resurgence
As the reality of apartheid finally 
crumbled in South Africa in 1994, 
many prominent Sufi shaykhs visited 
the country in an attempt to recruit 
new disciples into their particular Sufi 
brotherhoods. Among others, these 
included: Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani 
and Shaykh Hisham Kabbani of the 
Naqshbandi Order, the late Shaykh 
Alawi al-Maliki of the Alawi Order, and 
Shaykh Hasan Cisse of the Tijani Order 
(who was officially received by President Thabo Mbeki). During their 
visits, the Shaykhs appointed local followers to be representatives of 
their Sufi brotherhood in Southern Africa. The Shaykhs spoke at local 
mosques where big crowds turned up to join in prayer and listen to 
their messages. The large numbers in attendance were indicative of 
the growing appeal of Sufism in the 1990s to the Muslim community 
of South Africa. 
The warmth with which these Shaykhs were received can be partly 
explained by the historical trajectory of Islam in South Africa. For cen-
turies since the mid-1600s, when the first Muslims arrived at the Cape 
from the Malay Archipelago and surrounding area as prisoners and po-
litical exiles, the public practice of Islam had been forbidden and viola-
tion was punishable by death. Covert Sufi rituals provided an impor-
tant substitute at a time when Islam could not be publicly practised. 
Though these restrictions had long since been lifted, and normative 
Islam had become the dominant expression of Islam, the collective 
memory of these historical roots had produced the popular idea that 
the “founding fathers” of Islam in South Africa had been highly trained 
in Islamic mysticism and this, in turn, had instilled a favourable attitude 
toward Sufism among many present-day South African Muslims.
More importantly still the local Sufi leaders who had held a rather 
peripheral position in the Muslim community during apartheid, found 
themselves directly juxtaposed to the incumbent ulama. The author-
ity of these ulama had been in decline for some 
decades. Reasons for this included their rather 
ambivalent—critics would say collaborationist—
positions towards apartheid. Many imams had 
favoured the preservation of Islamic institutions 
over the need to stand up for justice, arguing that 
the apartheid regime had not outlawed Islam and 
that mosques had been allowed to function—had 
this not been the case, they insist, they would have 
been first to resist the regime, even at the cost of 
death.1 Another issue that had recently shaken 
their credibility in the eyes of many Muslims was 
that most of the current imams had obtained 
their training in the finer points of Islamic juris-
prudence and theology in the Middle East. Right-
ly or wrongly, this contributed to them being seen 
by the community to be either Salafi or Wahhabi 
orientated. Moreover, many Muslims saw this allegation confirmed in 
what they felt to be a neglect of the spiritual needs of the local commu-
nity by the graduates of Middle Eastern religious institutes. Ironically, in 
this atmosphere the foreign Sufi Shaykhs who visited South Africa were 
seen as more credible than the local Muslim ulama.
Ulama response to Sufi resurgence
The Sufi resurgence has been particularly prevalent in the Western 
Cape Province, which is where the majority of the Muslim community 
in South Africa live. While Muslims make up only 1.5 percent of the na-
tionwide population of 45 million, in the Western Cape Province they 
form around 10 percent of its popula-
tion. Muslims in South Africa are mostly 
concentrated in urban areas and con-
stitute a cosmopolitan group consist-
ing of a variety of ethnicities, language 
groups, and social classes. The Group 
Areas Act of 1950 also displaced large 
numbers of non-whites, including 
Muslims, to racially segregated neigh-
bourhoods where Muslims established 
mosques and madrasas.
While the above shows that Islam is a more “visible” religion in these 
areas than crude statistics would indicate,2 the fact that 47 percent 
of the Muslims live in and around Cape Town bespeaks the discur-
sive and ideological power that religious bodies there can potentially 
exert over the entire Muslim community of South Africa. The most 
influential Islamic institution is the Muslim Judicial Council (herein-
after MJC) of Cape Town. It was established in 1945 by a few Middle 
Eastern and locally trained theologians in order to deal with legal ju-
risprudential matters.3 Most imams of the almost 150 mosques in the 
Western Cape Province align themselves to the MJC. The majority of 
these imams are not associated with a Sufi order, but they often dem-
onstrate a relaxed attitude to Sufism. This can, for example, be seen 
in the fact that the two Cape Town Muslim community radio stations, 
the Voice of the Cape and Radio 786,4 regularly air programmes on 
Sufism that are hosted by local Sufi personalities, such as Professor 
Yusuf da Costa, and local shaykhs of the Naqshbandi and Darqawi-
yyah brotherhoods.
The incumbent imams are well acquainted with the appeal Sufism 
exercises in Cape Town. Their complacent attitude over the past few 
years stands in stark contrast to their previous attitudes towards Sufi 
practices during the 1960s and later when members of the MJC came 
out strongly against certain ideas expressed by the Sufis. In one such 
incident, leaders of the MJC called Sufism a “Barelwi Menace” and in 
another, Sufi practices were labelled superficial and the behaviour of 
certain disciples unacceptable.5 In 2001 a well-known imam aligned 
to the MJC accused the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis of being “shaykh-” and 
“grave- worshippers.” The pro-Sufis, led by Professor da Costa, in turn 
accused him of being “small minded,” “intolerant,” and not least of all, 
a “Wahhabi.” The “Sufi-Wahhabi” debate, as these disputes were later 
known, played itself out in columns of widely read Cape newspapers 
with letters being written back and forth by the two groups and their 
respective supporters accusing each other of being outside the fold 
of Islam. 
Nevertheless, this debate was more than an ideological struggle 
in which each camp tried to vilify the ideas of the other. It was also 
about winning over the loyalties and the hearts of the Cape Muslim 
community and an attempt to be seen as the legitimate authority 
and representative of South African Muslims at the Cape. Predict-
ably, the Sufi camp tried to popularize the idea that they represented 
the old familiar good (Sufism) versus the foreign evil (Wahhabism). 
These two traditions were portrayed as incompatible and mutually 
opposed interpretations of Islam. The pro-Sufi group accused the 
Wahhabi group, as they had labelled them, of embarking on a “cam-
paign of misinformation” that projects a “wrong perception of Islam.” 
These blunt attacks had benefitted the pro-Sufis; and as long as the 
“other” could be depicted as anti-Sufi, the Wahhabi cloak would fit 
their opponent just fine. In so doing, the pro-Sufi group had hoped to 
win the loyalties of a Muslim community that was aware of the recent 
appeal Sufism had because of its Islamic roots. Also, no organization 
perceived as sympathetic to Wahhabi ideas could ever hope to enjoy 
majority support from the local Muslim community.
The Sufi tradition in South Africa—with roots 
going back to the seventeenth century—
regained momentum in the 1990s. Capitalizing 
on the reduced authority of the ulama, the 
new Sufi leaders could claim to represent a 
normative South African version of Islam. 
Moreover, their focus on the grassroots has 
increased their visibility in many townships and 
allowed them to provide spiritual solutions to 
everyday social issues.
[T]he Naqshbandi-
Haqqanis took their 
Sufi ritual sessions 
on a “road show” to 
the community.
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The Naqshbandi-Haqqani 
brotherhood in Cape Town
Discursive struggles about the authenticity of 
Sufism, centred on historically evolved ideas about 
foreignness and authenticity, are important to un-
derstand the Sufi resurgence in this South African 
context; they also visibly and audibly underline 
the renewed importance of Sufi brotherhoods. It 
is equally vital to look into the everyday practices 
of specific brotherhoods. The Naqshbandi-Haqqa-
ni Order in Cape Town is an apt example of how 
the Sufi success is sustained through its activities.
In 1998, Professor da Costa, a retired Geography 
Didactics university lecturer from the University of 
the Western Cape in Cape Town, was both initiated 
and made khalifa (vicegerent) of the Naqshbandi 
brotherhood in Southern Africa by Shaykh Hisham 
Kabbani when he visited Cape Town.6 Unlike other 
Sufi shaykhs who withdrew from communal ac-
tivity, he has continued to be active through his 
teaching, his writings, community radio appear-
ances, and talks in mosques at Friday congrega-
tional prayers on matters relating to spirituality 
and the superiority of the divine law. The roles 
of the shaykh and of his appointed vicegerents 
are central to the brotherhood. Some scholars 
even go so far as to assert that the shaykh is the 
brotherhood, his disciples being seen as more at-
tached to him, than to the teachings of the brotherhood. Speaking of 
Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani, Professor da Costa mentions that when he 
is in his company, he feels humble and constantly reminded of Allah. 
Partly due to the Shaykh’s spiritual magnetism, da Costa and some of 
his local disciples travel at least once a year to Shaykh Nazim’s zawiya 
(ritual lodge) in Lefke, Cyprus, where they attend talks given by the 
Shaykh. Even though this is where Professor da Costa was instructed to 
work amongst the poor people in South Africa, he concedes that there 
is no structural links between the local Naqshbandi-Haqqani branch 
and Naqshbandi-Haqqani International. Shaykh Nazim gives him, like 
his vicegerents elsewhere, leverage in aspects relating to local politics 
and organization.
In August 2005, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani claimed to have over 300 
registered disciples. These disciples, known as “the workers,” a term 
that could also denote their subservient relationship to Professor da 
Costa, constitute the brotherhood’s sub-structures. These “workers” are 
responsible for tasks ranging from fund-raising, erecting structures in 
informal and impoverished townships that would serve as madrasas, 
and to also leading the Sufi rituals with the ijaza (permission) granted 
to them by Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqanni. The brotherhood’s sub-struc-
ture is dominated by middle-class professionals in the fields of educa-
tion, law, and finance. This membership provides the brotherhood with 
a strong and professional social base.
Rituals on the move
As is the case with Sufi orders elsewhere, the dhikr (remembrance of 
Allah) plays a central role. It leads them from the world of separation and 
externality to that of union and interiority, ultimately becoming unified 
with Allah. However, unlike Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in other parts of the 
world, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in Cape Town do not hold their dhikr 
in a zawiya. In 2002 Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani instructed Professor da 
Costa to work amongst the poor people. To obtain financial resources 
they sold their zawiya, located in a middle class residential suburb, 
and used the money for the upgrading and construction of informal 
religious facilities in predominantly black working-class areas around 
Cape Town. Thus, instead of attracting the community to the dhikr at 
their Sufi centre, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis took their Sufi ritual ses-
sions on a “road show” to the community.
Two female-only dhikr groups and the organization An-Nisa (“the 
women” translated from Arabic) cater for the needs of women in the 
order. The ladies dhikr groups hold their sessions at mosques on Sat-
urday afternoons. An-Nisa’s primary objective is to empower women 
through various spiritual and educational programmes. It holds quar-
terly workshops on current issues affecting women. These range from 
the rights of women in marriage, to abortion, breast cancer, and HIV/
Naqshbandi 
disciples, 
Cape Town
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AIDS. As such, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis in South Africa provide room 
for active female agency within the brotherhood. This has never been 
commonplace, but is slowly becoming acceptable.
The past decade has also witnessed an increase of da‘wah-related 
work in the black townships amongst which is the establishment of 
Sufi centres in Cape Town. In 2004, the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis were in-
vited to upgrade an existing shack into a facility that would serve as a 
mosque and madrasa to Muslims in Khayelitsha (a township south of 
Cape Town that houses more than half a million black residents). Since 
then they have established a few similar structures in the area, serving 
as a base for their da‘wah activities. Such activities, as well as their will-
ingness to address a variety of social problems, have been the source 
of their apparent success among black South Africans. 
From at least the latter half of the previous century, the Muslim Ju-
dicial Council has tried to establish an ideological hegemony amongst 
Muslims. Their interpretation of Islam was based more on their invo-
cation of the Arabic texts and jurisprudence, rather than on providing 
and teaching an Islam that also included elements of spirituality. The 
post-Apartheid era has seen an influx of international Sufi personalities, 
which has shifted the place of Sufism from the periphery to be juxta-
posed alongside, even surpassing at times, the authority of the mosque 
imams. In the South-African context, neo-Sufism 
entails certainly more than a personal quest for 
the divine. It is also an ideological phenomenon 
that is challenging the very establishment of the 
national Muslim religious leadership. In the words 
of Professor da Costa: “Sufism and its Sufi shaykhs 
are providing the local Muslims with a spiritual 
freshness that the local religious leadership has 
… not been able to provide the people with.”
Notes
1. See F. Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism: 
An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious 
Solidarity Against Oppression (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 1997).
2. A. K. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South 
Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape 
Town: UCT Press, 1995).
3. See MJC’s website: http://www.mjc.org.za/
aboutus.htm.
4. The Voice of the Cape is managed by the 
MJC and started broadcasting in Ramadan 
of 1996. Radio 786, managed by another 
Muslim organization, started broadcasting a 
few years later.
5. F. De Jong, and B. Radtke, Islamic Mysticism 
Contested. Thirteen Centuries of Controversies 
and Polemics (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 386–415.
6. M. Haron, “Dawah Movements and Sufi 
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Ritual Weapons
Islamist Purity Practices 
in Cairo
My interest in the purity practices of 
Cairo’s “Islamist” community was first 
sparked in June 2005, during a conver-
sation with Amr, a young bank employ-
ee from one of Cairo’s poorer southern 
suburbs.1Amr told me that before lis-
tening to his cassette sermons he often 
liked to perform a minor ritual ablution 
(wudu’). At the time, this seemed rather 
strange. According to Sunni purity law 
(fiqh al-taharah), Muslims should only 
perform wudu' if they wish to pray (or 
touch their Qurans or perform Hajj) but 
have incurred a minor ritual impurity 
(hadath)—a state precipitated through 
any number of morally neutral, biologi-
cally inevitable acts, such as falling asleep or visit-
ing the toilet. When I pointed this out to Amr, he 
admitted knowing that his extra purification was 
not legally obligatory, but added that he liked to 
perform wudu'whenever he felt the need “to get 
close to God.” By the same logic, he explained, 
whenever certain emotional and/or moral states, 
such as sexual desire, made him feel like he was 
“straying away from God,” he would perform 
wudu' to close the gap. 
Intrigued by Amr’s somewhat unorthodox ap-
proach, during the following twelve months I 
conducted interviews with 32 male Islamists on 
matters of ritual (and moral) purity. Generally 
speaking, most were like Amr: middle-class pro-
fessionals living in and around Cairo’s busy sub-
urbs.2 This paper briefly summarizes my findings 
and makes some tentative observations on the 
reasons behind the Islamists’ purity practices. 
Methodologically, I begin with the assumption 
that some of these practices uphold key aspects 
of the Islamists’ ideology. In so doing, however, 
these actors merge the categories of ritual and 
moral purity in a fashion that the early Sunni ju-
rists would not have anticipated. Further, unlike 
those of the jurists, who generally disconnected 
ritual practice from all social factors, the Islamists’ 
purity practices clearly reflect profound anxieties 
regarding their three main opponents: the cor-
rupt Egyptian state, sexually aggressive females, 
and villainous Jews. 
“Dirty lies”
Some Islamists perform wudu' if they have knowingly deceived oth-
ers. Of those I interviewed, 15 admitted that they sometimes repeated 
their wudu' after lying. Two brothers who work as salesmen for a large 
company were particularly diligent in this regard. While correctly not-
ing that deceit is not a legal form of hadath, and that it is not manda-
tory for them to perform wudu' after deceiving someone, they went on 
to explain (with no shortage of humour) that the nature of their work 
nevertheless compels them to do this: “it’s part of our job not to tell 
customers the entire truth about our 
product, we wouldn’t be able to sell if 
we did!” 
If they know that purification from 
deceit is not legally necessary, why do 
some Islamists choose to do this any-
way? The following reason suggests 
itself. With government spies skulking 
on the peripheries of their groups, a 
certain amount of deception—to po-
lice, even to family and friends—is 
often advisable for Islamists. Yet, as 
several lamented, while such constant 
deception is not a sin per se, it is mor-
ally and psychologically draining. It is 
in light of such feelings that their need 
to repeat wudu' after lying should be understood. Echoing Amr, my 
interviewees explained to me that through wudu’, they endeavour to 
shrug off the corrupt and defiling political reality that suffocates them 
and move closer to God. At the same time, I would add, the same prac-
tice consolidates their commitment to their own (ritually and morally 
pure) group. 
“Filthy looks”
Cairenes in general attribute a great deal of importance to matters of 
sexual ethics and gender. A different survey shows that, after becoming 
sexually aroused, most Cairene Muslims repeat their wudu' for prayer. 
This is significant: by attributing danger to sexual arousal in a ritual con-
text—directly connecting hadath with lust (shahwah)—Cairenes signal 
their wish that traditional gender norms and values not be forgotten. 
Not surprisingly, such concerns are even more prevalent in the highly 
gender conscious domains of Islamist discourse and practice. Indeed, 
while most Cairenes believe that their own lust may affect their readi-
ness for prayer, to the Islamists, other people’s lust appears to be a great-
er source of worry. Representing the extreme, nine of my interviewees 
admitted to repeating their ablutions when looked at by a woman they 
suspected to be permissive (haiga). Because most live and work in areas 
where foreign women rarely go, they conceded that defiling encoun-
ters like this are unusual. When they do happen, however, they acknowl-
edged that a foreign (and specifically Western) woman—deemed more 
likely to dress and behave provocatively than an Egyptian woman—is 
likely to be involved. In fact, virtually all the Islamists (and not merely 
this purity-minded minority) agreed that Western women are known to 
be sexually promiscuous and thus to be avoided at all costs. 
Once again, the idea that a promiscuous gaze can defile a Muslim 
runs counter to anything one finds in the Islamic legal texts. (It may 
be, of course, that the Islamist purifies himself because of the lust he 
experiences at the sight of such women; yet, this was not what was said.) 
As in the previous example, the Islamists’ unusual application of ritual 
purity ideas directly reflects a social theme that is of fundamental impor-
tance to them. Wary of the power sexual desire holds over most people, in 
Islamist communities, unmarried or unrelated males and females occupy 
very different social spheres. When they do meet, a chaperone (mahrim) 
must be present. For my interviewees, the need for renewed ritual pu-
rification after being looked at by a “dirty woman” (weskha) stems from 
their conviction that only gender segregation, and not (Western-style) 
integration, brings societal harmony and moral decency. 
Sunni purity law outlines conditions under 
which a minor ritual ablution (wudu’) before 
prayer, should be performed. Though these 
conditions are usually understood to be 
biologically inevitable acts, Islamists in Cairo 
have reinterpreted the ritual into one that 
stresses moral purity. The author explains this 
innovation by exploring the mindset of the 
Islamists, who perceive themselves to live in a 
morally corrupt society and under attack from 
a variety of enemies. Ritual ablution thereby 
becomes a tool through which the Islamists 
can maintain moral superiority and draw 
boundaries between themselves and their 
opponents.
While most 
Cairenes believe 
that their own lust 
may affect their 
readiness for prayer, 
to the Islamists, 
other people’s lust 
appears to be a 
greater source of 
worry. 
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“Rotten Jews”
While foreign females present perhaps the most significant threat to 
a male Islamist’s purity (and peace of mind), several of my respondents 
claimed that they would also perform wudu' if they came into physical 
contact with a Jew. Indeed, as unlikely as it would be while walking 
down a Cairene high street to find oneself hailed by someone iden-
tifiably Jewish, 21 of the Islamists agreed that, were this to occur and 
physical contact be made, they would repeat their purifications before 
prayers. One young man captured the general feeling: “Jews may not 
be impure like blood or excrement, but they are morally filthy and we 
know that they don’t look after themselves [in terms of personal hy-
giene]. They cannot be trusted and they hate Muslims. If I touched one, 
I would probably perform wudu' just in case I lost my purity (ehtyati fi 
halit low faqadt taharti).”
For this individual, that Jews may not be substantively impure (najis) 
is irrelevant. The combination of moral filthiness and poor standards of 
hygiene render them ritually defiling. Here, once again, the Islamists 
challenge standard Muslim readings of the law: the overwhelming 
majority of the Sunni jurists reject the idea that any human being, 
regardless of religion, race or gender, is in essence defiling. The notion 
that a Jewish person—a member of the ahl al-kitab who has his own 
stringent purity laws—is capable of polluting a Muslim seems to be 
particularly unusual and recent.3 
Not surprisingly, current political circumstances help considerably 
to explain the Islamists’ suspicions regarding the Jew’s ritual purity 
status. In their view, Israel (with the support of the West) has already 
inflicted a series of emasculating blows to the pride of the Muslim 
Umma and is constantly seeking an opening for further attack. In the 
standard Islamic account, enmity between the two peoples stretches 
back to the beginning of Islam, when the Jews ravished Muslim 
women and persecuted the Prophet and he, in retaliation, expelled 
them from Medina. In light of the Israeli invasion of Sinai (1967) and 
ongoing treatment of the Palestinians, the Egyptian Islamists are 
convinced that a second expulsion of the Jews is now necessary. 
Emerging from Islamist discussions as a cartoon-villain, the Jew is 
thoroughly deceitful and promiscuous—doubly impure according to 
the logic of purity at work here—and intent on the destruction of 
Muslims in all places and at all times. The preoccupation of Islamists 
with such matters has been well documented. Here, it remains only 
to note that certain Islamists move beyond the confines of the Sunni 
Islamic legal code to articulate their fears of Jews in terms of ritual 
purity. 
Final observations
Cairo’s Islamists perceive themselves as under attack from a variety 
of enemies. As the cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas notes, when 
a community perceives itself to be under attack, the physical body is 
often treated as a canvass upon which “the powers and dangers cred-
ited to social structure” may be reproduced.4 Given Douglas’ insight, it 
should not come as a complete surprise that some Islamists think in 
these ways. Indeed, in a politically corrupt environment, one in which 
men and women are increasingly likely to mix (in schools, cinemas, 
work places, even mosques), and where Israel is allowed to continue 
trampling on Muslim honour, it makes perfect sense to many of these 
men that a lie, a lascivious look, and contact with the enemy should be 
so dangerous as to require some form of physical “purification.” 
Key to their reading of purity is the Islamists’ peculiar and poetic vi-
sion of wudu’. In these circles, the minor ablution is far more than a 
mere gateway allowing Muslims to move back and forth between the 
states of readiness and unreadiness for prayer; rather, it is the first step 
in a journey made five times daily towards God. The symbolism of the 
ritual wash is especially potent: my interviewees invariably emphasiz-
ing how, as the water slid from their bodies, their sins were also trans-
ported away. If a Muslim performs wudu' properly, they agreed, he feels 
at peace and ready to meet his God. As numerous Hadith illustrate, the 
spiritual and symbolic richness of Islam’s purifications was well under-
stood by the early Muslims (who made the same observations).5 By 
granting wudu' the power to expunge sins, however, Egypt’s modern 
Islamists expand the legal category of hadath to include the moral sins 
of lying and promiscuity therein. In so doing, they transform the nature 
of Sunni Islam’s ritual purity system, rendering it a ritual mechanism for 
defence (and potentially attack). This sets an interesting, though con-
ceivably problematic precedent.6 
In most other respects, the ritual purity practices of Egypt’s Islamists 
are no different from those of other Muslims in the city. Outside the 
ritual sphere, however, ideas of purity and impurity seem to occur far 
more often during the conversations of Egypt’s Islamists than those of 
average Egyptians. Time and again, “dirty politi-
cians,” “polluting behaviour,” and “filthy Jews” are 
contrasted with the “pure hearts,” “pure women,” 
and “pure believers” of the Islamist community. 
Residing in a heretical state, surrounded by sym-
bols of the perverse Western/Jewish culture, Amr 
and his friends feel as if they occupy a commu-
nity within a community. Their purity practices 
and beliefs bolster and protect Cairo’s Islamists 
against their numerous enemies.
Richard Gauvain is Lecturer in Humanities and Islamic Studies at 
the British University in Egypt.
Email: rgauvain@bue.edu.eg
Notes
1. The term “Islamist” is open to a variety of 
interpretations. Here, I follow Muhammad 
Hafez’s general definition: “Islamists are 
individuals, groups, organizations, and 
parties that see in Islam a guiding political 
doctrine that justifies and motivates 
collective action on behalf of the doctrine,” 
M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression 
and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 4. 
2. I spoke to doctors, engineers, computer 
scientists, teachers, two students, and two 
un-employed. 
3. In contrast, the Quran describes the 
polytheist as “impure” (najisun) (9:28), a verse 
which only the Shia interpret literally. 
4. M. Douglas, Natural Symbols (London: 
Penguin, 1970), 93. 
5. See e.g. Malik, Al-Muwatta’, trans. Aisha 
Abdurrahman Bewley (London: Kegan Paul, 
1989), “Taharah” 6:31. Not surprisingly, this 
idea is most developed within Sufi tradition.
6. Occasionally made by some early figures, 
the connection between ritual purity and 
sin was systematically rejected by the Sunni 
jurists, see R. Gauvain, “Ritual Rewards: A 
Consideration of Three Recent Approaches 
to Sunni Purity Law” Islamic Law and Society 
12, no. 3 (2005): 384–86. 
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R O B B E R T  W O LT E R I N G
Egyptian Public 
Intellectuals and 
their “Wests”
Western (European and North-Ameri-
can) constructions of the West tend 
to identify human rights, democracy, 
and freedom as key Western values. 
Were we to take these premises to 
be the characteristics of the West, we 
would find that the West is highly ap-
preciated throughout the Arab and 
wider Muslim world: recent opinion 
polls have shown that the majority of 
respondents from Morocco to Indo-
nesia also value human rights, prefer 
democracy to dictatorship, and favour freedom over repression.1 
It is clear that there is something spurious in the above postulation. 
The mistake lies not so much in the opinion polls, as much as it lies 
in the premise: while Western publics may generally identify the West 
with human rights and other lofty ideals, “non-Western” publics may 
hold different opinions. To further investigate this difference of opin-
ion we could again turn to opinion polls, yet for a more thorough un-
derstanding of the ideological meaning of the West in the country of 
my particular interest—Egypt—I will zoom in on the public debate as 
shaped by popular intellectuals of various ideological trends. 
The intellectual landscape in the Arab world today resists a straight-
forward categorization. The long established lack of political and press 
freedoms smothers the display of intellectual debates which otherwise 
could be monitored freely. A conventional division employed both 
within and outside the Arab world is between “Islamist” and “secular” 
discourses. Others have opted for a more comprehensive categoriza-
tion comprising Islamic, Marxist/leftwing, nationalist, and liberal intel-
lectuals trends.2 In this contribution I discuss three recent publications 
of authors belonging to various trends. Galal Amin, Muhammad Imara, 
and Rida Hilal are all prolific authors of 
carefully published books, and have 
been regular contributors to the coun-
try’s major newspapers for at least a 
decade. While the economist Galal 
Amin and the jurist Muhammad Imara 
continue to be quite productive, the 
journalist Rida Hilal has not been heard 
of since he mysteriously disappeared 
in August 2003. The three publica-
tions fall loosely within certain broad 
trends: “left-wing nationalist,” “Islamic,” 
and “liberal” respectively. The following exposé highlights a number of 
common strategies in Arab appreciations and representations of Eu-
rope and the West. I argue that the way in which the West is portrayed 
is to a large extent determined by ideology, and that none of the three 
ideological trends hold the West to be unequivocally identifiable with 
the aforementioned lofty ideals. 
Galal Amin: unabated Western imperialism
In 2002 the first Arab Human Development Report was published. This 
UNDP-sponsored report, drafted by a team of prominent Arab scholars 
and intellectuals, described with great candour the major problems in 
the contemporary Arab world. While the report was praised by many, 
some vehemently opposed the report for serving Western interests. 
Rather than elaborating on what was wrong with the Arab world, the 
authors had better focused on the oppressive role of external actors. 
One of the more prominent Arab intellectuals to attack the Report 
was the Egyptian economist Galal Amin of the American University in 
Cairo. To Amin, the Report almost constituted treason, since it played 
perfectly in the hands of the West. Amin was not alone in this assess-
ment. Various nationalist and leftist 
newspapers and intellectuals criticized 
the report for the same reason. In one 
of Amin’s recent publications we can 
see how strongly he feels about the 
importance of the West, and how he 
identifies it as an imperialist entity. In 
“The Era of Arab- and Muslim-bashing: 
We and the World after September 11,“3 
Amin argues that the Arab and Muslim 
world is suffering from a global smear 
campaign. For instance, the “events” 
of September 11 are thought by many 
to have been organized by Muslims, 
while in reality this was not the case. 
Amin does not elaborate as to who 
was behind the attacks if not Al-Qaeda, 
though he hints at the likelihood of an 
“inside-job.” His main aim however, lies 
in alerting Arabs and Muslims to the 
smear campaign against them and “re-
minding them of the justness of their 
case.”4 In The Era of Muslim-bashing, 
Amin rejects everything that does not 
fit the image of a noble, well-to-do 
Arab world. To him, the images of plun-
Gradually, the term “occidentalism” is gaining 
ground. Since the end of the Cold War and 
the consequent loss of a West that could be 
defined in terms of (and against) its Communist 
nemesis in the East, the process of imaging the 
West is steadily acquiring students. This article 
reviews how popular writers in Egypt imagine 
the West, showing that while their views on 
the West are shaped differently by particular 
ideologies, they converge in condemning the 
policies emerging from the West.
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der in Baghdad that followed the American invasion must have been 
part of the greater ploy to defame Arabs, for the footage of looting 
Iraqis fitted the profile of the “barbaric Arab” all too well. The image of 
the West as presented by Amin remains rather vague, which is perhaps 
necessary if it is to be blamed for the wide range of wrongs in the world 
that Amin perceives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since he is an economist, 
the West is defined by Amin primarily in economic terms: capitalism 
and imperialism are the hallmarks of the West. The end of the Cold War 
has left the world with a new situation, Amin argues, in which capital-
ism has re-emerged in its original, crude form. While during the Cold 
War capitalism was diluted, our present era is characterized by the kind 
of capitalism that was prevalent when Karl Marx lived.5 Amin is far from 
alone in levelling his critique against the West in economic terms. With 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the communist alternative to lib-
eral capitalism it would seem that capitalism is no longer ideologically 
challenged and that, thus, anti-Westernism is a mainly culturally in-
formed antagonism. But Amin and other leftwing Egyptians show the 
continued relevance of ideologically informed economic criticisms of 
the “capitalist West.” 
Muhammad Imara: incompatible civilizations
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to so-called “mod-
erate Islamists” or “Islamic reformers,” sometimes also referred to as Is-
lamists of “the middle way,” as distinguished from “fundamentalists.”6 
It has been suggested that this trend has emerged from within Islamic 
fundamentalism, and that contrary to their radical progenitor, the Is-
lamists of the middle way are willing and able to compete in a liberal 
democratic setting. Although some have challenged the description, 
Muhammad Imara is one of those Islamic thinkers commonly catego-
rized as “moderate Islamist” (in Arabic the word used is mu‘tadil, mean-
ing “balanced” rather than “moderate”). Through his various weekly col-
umns and appearances on television, he is an important contributor to 
Arab public opinion. In a recent publication he focuses on the relations 
between Islam and the West.7 Imara takes it as a matter of fact that the 
relations between the two have always been at best problematic, and 
at worst, bloody. Much like some Western authors who present Islam as 
a civilization that, since its inception, has opposed the West (or Europe, 
Christianity, or the “Judeo-Christian civilization”), Imara portrays the 
West as a civilization that has never really changed in its position to-
wards the Orient (or Islam, or the Arabs). The West, according to Imara, 
has always been imperialist: it oppressed “the Orient and the Oriental 
peoples for ten centuries, from Alexander the Great … to the seventh 
century [Byzantine emperor] Herakleos.”8 All this only ended, Imara ex-
plains, when Islam came on the scene and liberated the Orient from 
Western oppression. From that moment on, the West had been at odds 
with Islam. This historical narrative serves two purposes. Firstly, it pro-
vides the reader with an image of the West as imperialist per se. The 
West is imperialist simply because imperialism is what Western civiliza-
tion happens to produce. Secondly, and partly as a consequence of the 
first lesson, there is nothing Muslims can do to alter the bad image that 
the West has of Islam. The West has exercised its oppression over the 
Orient before Islam emerged, which is seen as proof that the West will 
be aggressive towards the Orient regardless of Islam. This point is made 
elsewhere in the book, when Imara again stresses that the West cam-
paigned against Islam long before 2001, and that clearly September 11 
cannot be seen as the justification for Western attacks upon Islam. Ima-
ra’s portrayal of the West is different from that of Amin in that Imara fo-
cuses more on the idea of a religious conflict, in which the West stands 
opposed to Islam as a revolutionary religion and as an alternative to 
Western secular political systems. Though Imara does have economic 
grievances against the West, he stresses the cultural and civilizational 
differences between the Western and the Islamic worlds. In this sense 
his discourse echoes Huntington’s theory of a “clash of civilizations” as 
well as Bernard Lewis’s representation of East-West relations as charac-
terized by perennial conflict.
Rida Hilal: the West’s double speak
While “the West” has conventionally denoted Europe and North 
America, ever since the end of World War II it is the United States that 
has commonly been viewed as its primary component. The liberal in-
tellectual Rida Hilal goes further and tends not to speak of the West 
or Westernization, but of America and Americanization. In his recent 
book Americanization and Islamization,9 Hilal calls for a marriage of 
Islam and democracy to take the place of the current situation in which 
rigid Salafi Islamization is coupled with American consumerism. Inter-
estingly, Hilal contrasts the current process of Americanization with the 
pre-World War II process of Europeanization. He argues that whereas 
the Arab world today is taking but the foam of America, leaving aside 
its true riches, i.e. its values, the previous age of Europeanization was 
much more constructive: “Egyptians took from the Europeans the rule 
of law, constitutionalism, parliament, journalism, theatre, and cin-
ema.”10 The result was that Egypt could vie with the most progressive 
of the world’s nations, and Cairo could face up to Paris or London. This 
so-called renaissance-period, Hilal argues, was eventually frustrated 
both by British imperialism and by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
This nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Egypt, when Cairo was known by 
many as “Paris along the Nile,” is common to many liberals in Egypt. A 
common understanding, not limited to liberals, is that Europe or the 
West in general contains certain highly commendable qualities with 
regard to governance and personal freedoms, but that Westerners be-
tray these qualities in their foreign policy towards the Arab and Muslim 
world. Hilal claims that for a solution to “the Middle Eastern crisis” to be 
reached it is merely necessary “that America should honour the Ameri-
can values, most prominently the value of democracy.”11 This is reminis-
cent of the way in which Arab nationalists from before WWII attacked 
European colonialism without rejecting the project of cultural and po-
litical Europeanization. As Hourani wrote of this disposition: “while the 
nationalists condemned British or French policy, the conclusion they 
drew was not that England or France were intrinsically bad but that 
they were being untrue to themselves.”12 
Policies emerging from the “real West” 
The study of occidentalism in Egypt yields images of the West as di-
verse as the various competing ideological trends among the Egyptian 
intelligentsia. There appears to be little agreement on the meaning of 
the West, especially when compared to the often-lamented uniformity 
and consistency of Western images of the “Orient.” The three authors 
disagree in particular about the background to detrimental Western 
foreign policy. While Amin views unwelcome policies as the logical 
outcome of a malicious economic philosophy dominant in the West, 
Imara sees the West acting according to a supposed deeply-rooted 
anti-Islamic nature. Hilal, however, believes the West is acting in a man-
ner unbecoming of its “real” values, and evokes the notion of an ideal, 
universally desired West. 
There are, however, also striking convergences 
in these occidentalisms. In all three accounts, the 
West is perceived to be of paramount importance 
for Egypt and the wider Arab world. While only 
Hilal seeks the solution to the region’s problems 
in an assertion of the “true West,” all three authors 
agree that the main source of the region’s prob-
lems lies in policies adopted by the “real West.” 
This distinction between the ideal and the actual 
may also help us to understand the discrepancy 
between Western self-identifications and the 
image of the West elsewhere in the world.
Robbert Woltering is Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM. He studies images of 
the West in post-Cold War Egyptian cultural discourse. 
Email: R.Woltering@isim.nl
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S A N A A  M A K H L O U F It is perhaps not surprising that the cho-
rus of voices bemoaning recent develop-
ments among Muslim peoples has been 
growing in strength. What is surprising, 
however, is how many of these concerns 
have been conflated and expressed 
in a single question, repeated like a 
magic mantra: “what went wrong?” In-
deed, the same question seems to have 
been asked for so long by observers of 
Islam and the Middle East that its valid-
ity is not often seriously doubted. Thus, 
when Bernard Lewis published his What 
Went Wrong with Islam? shortly after the 
events of September 2001, few people wondered about the adequacy of 
the question to assess the causes of these events. Rather, where there was 
opposition and criticism, it referred to the answers Lewis proposed, never 
to to the question itself. In a sense, one might say, the “historical events“ 
themselves arose only in order to confirm the validity of the question.
Introducing the question
Intrigued by the power of conviction that carries this way of think-
ing, and wondering how the problems of Muslims and “Islam” are really 
served by it, I suggest that we turn the tables round to ask (and ask with 
urgency): what really happens when the question “What went wrong 
with Islam?” is asked? Wherein lies the attraction 
of the simple (and simplistic) line of thinking that 
runs: something is not right, but it used to be right, 
so something must have gone wrong, yet if some-
thing went wrong, what was it?
A further look at the (long) history of the ques-
tion and at those who ask it reveals that this expres-
sion of concern is not solely found in Western (and 
Westernized) eyes, but is equally central to both the 
Islamic Renaissance, heralded in the works of the 
late nineteenth century Arab reformers, and to the 
rhetoric of contemporary Islamists.
One of the first times the question “what went 
wrong with Islam?” was asked was in the semi-
biographical novel, Ummu ’l-Qura: Proceedings of 
the first Conference on Islamic Renaissance 1316 H 
(1899), by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855–1902). 
Al Kawakibi was a young Syrian journalist who 
joined the circle of the architects of Salafism led by 
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, 
after secretly moving to Cairo in 1899. The novel, 
written and narrated under the pseudonym of al-
Sayyid al-Furati, was presented to Khedive Abbas II, 
who approved its publication and extended his pa-
tronage to al-Kawakibi.1 Though better known for 
his influential work, Taba’i‘ al-istibdad [The Nature 
of Despotism], it is Ummu ’l-Qurra that can be seen 
as one of the earliest examples of what would later 
emerge as a particular and recognizable type of dis-
course: the rhetoric of an Islamism that feeds (sym-
biotically) on the question of “what went wrong?”
Al-Furati records the secret meetings of the So-
ciety of Mecca, which uses the hajj season as a cover for its clandestine 
activities. He leads representatives of Muslim communities, Ikhwan al-
tawhid, in discussions around the most pertinent question of their day: 
“What went wrong with Muslims?” Though it is striking to which extent 
the organization mirrored the “Western” model of conferences, with the 
appointment of a chair, secretary, com-
mittees, etc., the Ikhwan never doubt 
the religious and cultural authenticity of 
their enterprise. 
They embark on this endeavour with a 
sense of history in the making. The mo-
ment is now ripe, al-Kawakibi claims, to 
change the tide in favour of the Muslim 
nations. He heralds the rise of a “van-
guard of free and noble men” which will 
wake the ummah from its slumber.2 His 
Ikhwan profess allegiance to the forth-
coming jihad and vow secrecy to the 
brotherhood. Their war cry, “Zealous 
guardianship of religion over compassion for Muslims,”3 indicates the be-
ginning of a rift that will henceforth ever widen: the rift between loyalty 
for Islam and loyalty to Muslims.
Looking in from the outside
Each speaker offers in turn his analysis of what ails the ummah, trying 
to locate within its traditional structures the sources of the infection. 
Curiously, none stops to question the validity of the diagnosis itself: 
the lowliness of the Muslims is all too evident. They all agree that the 
decline started “more than a 1000 years ago” when the Arab Umayyad 
dynasty lost its powers to “non-Arab elements.” However, after Western 
nations had reversed their fortunes (through their “successful” Refor-
mation and Enlightenment) and gained the upper hand over the Mus-
lims, the latter’s decline has become discernable. Thus, the regression 
that supposedly had begun long ago and had made its way largely 
unnoticed could now be identified precisely because of being able to 
be seen from the “outside.” And the question of “what went wrong?” 
could be asked, and more importantly, answered by those who were 
willing and daring to step “out.” By so doing these concerned activists 
would leave behind their “inherited means of comprehension” and do 
for Islam what “Luther and Voltaire had done for the West.”4 
The extent to which this vision from “the outside” is taken to be the 
model for the comprehension of Islam’s ailments and for the choice 
of their remedies, appears clearly when Al-Kawakibi reports a meeting 
between the Mufti of Kazan and a newly converted Russian Muslim Ori-
entalist. Their cross-cultural dialogue shows that Orientalism can serve 
not only to expose the inadequacy of the traditional ulama but also to 
celebrate, by contrast, the virtues of the original Islam as rediscovered 
by the scientific tools of western scholarship. Al-Kawakibi is totally un-
fazed by the irony that a non-Arab West would be partner to an Arab-
centred Muslim awakening.
The combined efforts of the Ikhwan and the Orientalists centres on 
one “urgent” finding: what must be resisted by all means is the claim 
of the Ottomans to be the legitimate representatives of the Caliphate 
and sovereigns over the Arabian Peninsula. In order to remove them 
from their position at the head of the umma a formulation is needed to 
effectively keep them out of the fold of Islam. According to al-Kawakibi 
and his circle, such a formulation must be both theological and political 
at the same time. The Ikhwan find the required justification of their aims 
in the reformist Wahhabi theology, which excludes Muslims who do not 
adhere to their particular doctrine from the faith altogether and grants 
legitimacy to the fight against them. Accordingly, the Ikhwan hold that 
it is only the Arab muwahiddun (i.e. the Wahhabis), from the “heartland” 
of Islam, who preserve the religion from the corrupting forces that had 
assailed the rest of the Muslim world and which have allowed it to re-
turn again to a benighted state of jahiliya (ignorance).5 These Arabs, with 
their “salafi” orientation, Arabic language proficiency, “pure racial stock,” 
“tribal solidarity,” “aversion to frivolous intellectualism,” and rejection of 
The morally laden question “What went wrong 
with Islam” is usually associated with Bernard 
Lewis and has gained seeming relevance in 
the wake of 9/11. Interestingly however, the 
question has a fairly long tradition in the 
Muslim world as well. This article dissects 
the question’s rhetorical qualities through a 
discussion of its invocation by late nineteenth 
century Arab reformers. The analysis reveals 
that, both then and now, asking the question 
functions to preclude further inquiries, to 
silence disagreeing voices, and to strategically 
boost the agendas of the questioner.
Estranged 
from their own 
tradition … they 
find comfort in 
mirroring each 
other as “concerned” 
modern Muslims, 
looking at their 
tradition from 
the outside.
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“exotic forms of Islam like Sufism,” represent the “most authentic” ver-
sion of Islam, al-Islamiyyah. “The religion has originated from amongst 
them and in their tongue,” al-Kawakibi argues, “they are its people, car-
riers, protectors, and its defenders, […] we should not feel reluctant to 
give in to their superior understanding of their religion” and join them 
in thwarting the threat to the “heart” of Islamdom.6 
Best jihad: Silencing the tradition
Whatever the particular form this “threat” to the heart of Islam, be it 
foreign Islam (non-Arab Muslims), false Islam (Sufism), or dead Islam 
(traditional ulama), they are all identified by the same name-tag, 
namely, as “causes of what went wrong” and therefore, as figures of 
“resistance to modernization.”7 Consequently, the main culprits are the 
representatives of “traditional” (pre-modern) Islam, irrespective of their 
particular origin. Moreover, the term “traditional” was not so much the 
result of an in-depth analysis of religion as a foil for political action. 
Correspondingly, the causes for “backwardness” and, thus, the targets 
of reform, were located in the traditional institutions and repositories 
of knowledge that had for centuries informed and shaped the plural-
istic diversity of the Islamic self. Namely, they targeted the ulama and 
jurists, keepers of the “outward” knowledge of the law, and the sufis, 
keepers of the “inward” knowledge of the heart. All of these had to be 
changed, silenced, or sacrificed in the relentless march toward reform.
In response to the inner evils of Islam so perceived, the Ikhwan al-
Tawhid commit themselves to jihad against the enemies of true Islam 
hoping, thereby, to regain the former glory and power of their “pure” 
Arabian heritage. Accordingly, they declare that the best jihad for the 
times consists in humiliating the “hypocrite” ulama.8
In cooperation with the institutions provided by the nation state, the 
Ikhwan propose to use all rhetorical, political, and educational means 
to wage the battle against the existing institutions of the ulama and 
sufi tariqas and help to monitor their activities and public functions. 
One of their recommendations is to place “dissenting” ulama “under 
quarantine,” if they were to teach, give fatwa or counsel outside of the 
official line. Reformed ulamas would then help educate the common-
ers in the basics of tawhid and zealously guard public morality. Sufis 
would be persuaded to return to orthodoxy and guide their disciples to 
gainful employment. Reformed orders would provide social networks 
to serve the community and carry on roles of civic philanthropy like 
running orphanages and social services.
Under the auspices of Khedive Abbas II, identified as the best can-
didate for leading the reawakened ummah, the Society of Ummu’l-
Qurra—a modern elite composed of intellectuals, politicians, activ-
ists—would help establish Arab dominance over a Muslim Reformation 
free of shirk (idolatry) and bid‘a (innovation) based on a return to the 
unadulterated sources: the Quran, and a “cleansed” corpus of authenti-
cated hadith. The doors of ijtihad, now declared open, would yield ra-
tionally controlled pragmatic rulings that could be easily codified. Only 
this time around, ijtihad would not be left to the specialized faqihs but 
rather handed over to the intellectuals to reinterpret and reformulate 
Islamic normativity while at the same time dismantling the classical 
representations of Islamic law.
Many of these recommendations materialized within a short span 
after the publication of the novel. Khedive Abbas, under the influence 
of Lord Cromer, the British Resident, appointed Muhammad ‘Abduh in 
1899 to the position of Mufti, the highest judicial post of Egypt. The “ar-
chitect of Salafism,” and al-Kawakibi’s mentor, was now in charge of re-
forming—along western lines—the administration and curricula of al-
Azhar, shaping generations of intellectual scholars of Islam. Amongst 
his “innovative” fatwas stands out one on the permissibility of accept-
ing interest paid on loans, necessary to advance capitalism and West-
ern commercial dominance in the Muslim world. During the last years 
of his life al-Kawakibi travelled near and far to spread the message of 
Islamiya and nationhood. And, fulfilling their share of the best jihad, 
the ‘Abduh circle routinely targeted the ulamas and sufis, lampooning 
and engraving them in the popular memory as the culprits for “what 
had gone wrong.”
Al-Kawakibi’s writings quickly became staple food for the Egyptian-in-
fluenced awakening and dissemination of Islamism in the Islamic world. 
Although ‘Abduh’s reform circle has not found much favour with present-
day Islamists, the common genealogy and rampant suspicion of tradi-
tional Islam can even be heard through their vociferous antagonism to 
the reformist agenda as well as their variants of “what went wrong.” 
More concerns
The question of “what went wrong?” clearly serves to determine the 
direction of the reform and to empower those who ask it. But who are 
those who are qualified to pass judgement on others? Who analyzes 
their diagnosis, puts it to the test, verifies it, and against which criteria? 
What vested interest do the askers have in the answer? So many more 
questions could be asked. They are rarely asked, though. Seemingly, 
the rhetorical power and dynamics of “What went wrong?,” for instance 
with Islam, is particularly effective at precluding further questions. For 
al-Kawakibi and his intellectual descendents, both sympathetic and 
antagonistic to his ideas, such ruminations are re-
dundant. For him and for them the qualification 
required for asking the question lies in the very 
act of asking it. Nothing more is needed.
His young men are propelled forward through 
the seeming rationality of the question. Estranged 
from their own tradition—“the problem is that 
our religion is not our ancestor’s original reli-
gion”9—they find comfort in mirroring each other 
as “concerned” modern Muslims, looking at their 
tradition from the outside. The question helps 
them construct an echo-chamber where they can 
hear each other and confirm themselves in their 
shared (and quite often ambivalent) world-views, 
mission, goals, and common enemies.
For over a century traditional Islam is sealed and 
not allowed to speak for itself. To say something 
about it, one has to stand outside of it.
Notes
1. First published in Port Said in 1899 
by Muhammad Rashid Rida, a revised 
version appeared in Rida’s (and ‘Abduh’s) 
mouthpiece al-Manar. Citations will be 
from the reprint edition of Mohamed 
Tahhan, ed., Al-A‘mal al-kamila lil-Kawakibi 
[The Complete Works of al-Kawakibi] (Beirut, 
1995). 
2. Ibid., 283. 
3. Ibid., 380.
4. Ibid., 373–74.
5. A concept utilized by Sayyid Qutb, 
ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, half 
a century later in order to justify breaking 
away from the mainstream umma.
6. Ibid., 280–81.
7. Ibid., 360–74.
8. Ibid., 308.
9. Ibid., 310.
Sanaa Makhlouf is Instructor at the American University in Cairo.
Email: sanaly@aucegypt.edu 
���������������
��������������������
�������������������
����� ����������
��������������� ��������
������� �����������
���������������
�������
�
�����
��
��������
��
�
�
����
�
�
� �����
�����
�
���
���
�
�
�������
�
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
4 6  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Thoughts & Perceptions
M O H A M M A D  N A F I S S I
Before and Beyond 
the Clash of Civilizations 
Although China and the “Sinic civiliza-
tion” may pose the greatest challenge 
to Western hegemony, the Clash thesis 
would not have achieved its tremen-
dous resonance without the spectre of 
a perceived Islamic threat. However seri-
ous some of the analytical flaws of The 
Clash of Civilization, its author cannot be 
faulted for hiding the original source of 
the central concept and title of his influ-
ential book. Not only does Huntington 
refer to Bernard Lewis’s “The Roots of 
Muslim Rage,”1 but also quotes its telling conclusion: “It should now be 
clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the 
level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is 
no less than a clash of civilizations—that perhaps irrational but surely his-
toric reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”2 In the years since 
Lewis wrote these lines and elaborated on them in several best-selling 
books of his own on Islam and the Middle East, the public perception of 
the two authors has become increasingly entwined, especially as the twin 
ideological gurus of the Bush administration’s Middle East policy. In this 
brief discussion I show that the two authors make diametrically opposite 
theoretical and political uses of their common understanding of Islam 
and thereby produce sharply contrasting variants of the clash thesis. Thus 
understood, each may serve as a platform for the critical evaluation of the 
other and the development of a more defensible account of Islam in the 
contemporary world. To clear the ground for such a move, however, we 
need to first reconsider their shared conception of Islam.
Put in simple comparative terms, for Lewis Islamdom’s fundamental 
historical problem has been that Islam was not Christianity. To make mat-
ters worse, for over a thousand years this original and ultimate failure was 
preached and indeed experienced as a blessing. But now, Lewis asserts, 
“it may be that the Muslims, having contracted a Christian illness, will con-
sider a Christian remedy, that is to say, the separation of religion and the 
state.” This would entail addressing the challenges overcome by Refor-
mation and Enlightenment, albeit “in their own way.” But, Lewis despairs, 
“there is little sign” that Muslims are so interested.3 He thus considers it 
more reasonable if all parties faced the fact that the real choice in the 
Middle East is between a fundamentalism that attributes “all evil to the 
abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam … [and] secular democracy, 
best embodied in the Turkish Republic founded by Kemal Ataturk.”4 Lewis 
does not claim “that the movement nowadays called Fundamentalism is 
… the only Islamic tradition” or that “Islam as such” should be blamed for 
the decline of Muslim states.5 He does, however, cancel the significance 
of the diversity of claimants to Islam by asserting the overriding continu-
ity of hegemonic Islam and the “great institution of caliphate” until the 
Kemalist revolution.6 There is thus, in his view, a clear causal connection 
between militant fundamentalism’s current ascendancy and its authen-
ticity. Under Islam “the state was the church and church was the state and 
God was head of both.”7 This theocratic legacy and ideal evidently clashes 
with modernity. Put in Huntington’s pithy formulation: “the underlying 
problem for the west is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam.”8
The clash of the clashists
Beyond this central point, however, Lewis and Huntington part ways. 
Whereas Huntington’s version of the Clash requires the sustainability of 
such an “anti-western” trajectory and thus distinguishes “westernization” 
from “modernization,” for Lewis the two are identical manifestations of a 
universal civilization whose incompatibility with Islam ensures that Mus-
lim societies fall “further back in the lengthening line of eager and more 
successful Westernizers, notably in East Asia.”9 This reinforces Lewis’s com-
mitment to support “freedom seekers” 
in the Middle East to the point of risk-
ing “the hazards of regime change”10 to 
complete the Kemalist Westernization. 
In contrast, for Huntington, Kemalism 
engenders “torn countries” doomed to 
failure. Echoing Lewis’s old nemesis, Ed-
ward Said and his third worldist associ-
ates, Huntington finds that “Western be-
lief in the universality of Western culture 
suffers three problems: it is false … im-
moral, and … dangerous … Imperialism 
is the necessary logical consequence of universalism.”11 This underpins 
the “most important” element of his general policy blueprint for Western 
states: “Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is prob-
ably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global 
conflict.”12
It may now be clearer why both of these otherwise opposed agendas 
are dependent on Islam’s theocratic continuity. The spread of a universal-
ist Islam committed to a “neutral” public space in which it may compete or 
co-operate with other religious and ideological agendas, including other 
varieties of Islam, undermines the viability of an international “multicul-
tural” order built around Huntington’s competitive “mono-cultural” civili-
zations. It would also extend the choices facing the Middle East beyond 
Lewis’s favoured Kemalism and feared fundamentalism.
The deleted re-formations
In line with the Islamic orthodoxy’s official discourse, Lewis’s seamless 
theocratic anti-Judeo-Christian-modern account of Islam, ignores at least 
four major re-formations: first, Mohammad’s resolution of the Judeo-
Christian limbo; second, the proto democratic fusion of state-community 
in the era of the rightly-guided caliphs; third, the rise of dynastic caliphate 
and separation of the state-community; fourth, the still unfolding and 
contested reformation triggered by Western modernity.13 Together, these 
intra-Islamic re-formations fuel the current confluences and clashes with-
in Islamdom as much as between “Islam” and the “West.” 
Rather than an alternative to Judaism and Christianity, Islam claimed to 
restore them to their original purity. In this “final” re-formation of the Ab-
rahamic tradition, Mohammad anticipated Protestantism in some areas 
and went beyond it in others. The fusion of temporal and spiritual author-
ity in Islam’s sacred age realized the millenarian Jewish longing for the 
age when Israelites were united under a single prophet-king. Judaism, 
as Weber observed, “never in theory rejected the state and its coercion 
but, on the contrary, expected in the Messiah their own masterful politi-
cal ruler.”14 Mohammad, however, fulfilled this expectation by extending, 
in line with Christian universalism, Yahweh’s immediate constituency to 
humanity as a whole. This infusion of mundane politics with sacred en-
ergy and mission paralleled Puritanism’s transformation of economic re-
lations. By promising worldly achievement as well as other-worldly salva-
tion, Islam, too, invites Muslims (and non-Muslims) to judge the record 
of its dominion and set right what may seem wrong and, in the process, 
change or abandon the actually existing Islam.
The primary authority for reformism necessarily lies in Islam’s sacred age. 
Lewis underlines the political character of that age, but ignores that it had 
two distinct, essentially theocratic and democratic phases, each respec-
tively associated with the rule of Mohammad and his first four successors. 
Dependent on direct revelation and the “seal of prophets,” Mohammad’s 
theocracy was unique and irreproducible. In contrast, its nascent demo-
cratic successor represented a “human” order and was therefore in prin-
ciple sustainable or reproducible. Ironically, however, the participatory 
polity of the early caliphs soon became historically unsustainable; first, 
because it lacked the institutional mechanisms for channelling its own 
Although Bernard Lewis and Samuel 
Huntington are often lumped together 
as the twin ideological gurus of the Bush 
administration, they make diametrically 
opposite theoretical and political uses of 
their common understanding of Islam. In this 
contribution Nafissi analyzes these sharply 
contrasting “clash theses” to critically evaluate 
the other and to sketch an agenda on the basis 
of which a more defensible account of Islam in 
the contemporary world could be based.
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political vitality and multiple sources of conflict; and, secondly, because 
it nevertheless succeeded in turning itself into an expansive empire, and 
no empire has yet been run along democratic lines. If Christianity had to 
adapt itself to an initially impenetrable empire, Islam was thus compelled 
to accommodate the empire of its own making and consequently revert-
ed to a new variant of the same historical trajectory. 
After the rule of the “rightly guided” caliphs, all the notable branches 
of Islam were consolidated in response to the question posed by the 
Umayyad’s forcible seizure and transformation of caliphate into a he-
reditary institution: how to reconcile the separation of the sword and 
the word with their self-appointed role as the trustees of the sacred era’s 
unity of the sword and the word. The Sharia and the politico-theological 
agenda that shaped it proved the winning solution following the victory 
of Ibn Hanbal, the “seal of the jurists,” over the rationalist theologians in 
Islam’s third century. By sanctifying and drawing on the prophet’s largely 
fabricated words and deeds (tradition/sunna), the “traditionist” scholars 
that developed the Sharia created a new divine source on par with the 
Quran which enabled them to (a) extend and resolve Quran’s limited and 
ambiguous legal content and (b) trump all living claimants to Islam with 
the legacy of the dead prophet and (c) guarantee their own role as guard-
ians of what became a well-guarded but mummified Islam. Ideologically 
thus armed, the men of the word in effect struck a “second best” bargain 
with the wielders of the sword that both recognized the separation of po-
litical and religious realms and masked it in line with the legacy of the sa-
cred era. Accordingly, the caliphs, whilst retaining the title of “commander 
of the faithful,” had very little to do with matters of faith, and the Sharia 
whilst projecting a comprehensive and binding reach, in fact stopped 
short of regulating the political sphere. 
It is the uncritical (or politically driven) adoption of the normative quasi-
totalitarian layer of the orthodoxy’s complex agenda that allows Lewis to 
imagine a Sharia anchored in “what we in the West would call constitu-
tional law and political philosophy,”15 when a glance at any actual ver-
sion of Sharia confirms that “it said virtually nothing about ‘constitutional’ 
or administrative law.”16 The same applies to his similarly plausible but 
equally misleading claim about the continuity of the caliphate between 
the rightly-guided Abu Bakr and the Ottoman Abd al-Majid.17As Lewis 
fails to note, the caliphate was punctured by the rise of Umayyads, sub-
sequently marginalized by various Sultanates, and abolished by the Mon-
gols. The Ottomans eventually reclaimed the title, but, as Hamid Enayat 
explains, only in the late eighteenth century and “in order to equip … [the 
Ottoman ruler] with a spiritual authority” commensurate with that of “Em-
press of Russia as patroness of orthodox Christianity.”18
Islam and modernity
Because generally unacknowledged or unpursued, the historically una-
voidable unravelling of Mohammad’s political reform of the Abrahamic 
tradition could not be accompanied by the legitimate rationalization of 
the patrimonial state or the reactivation of the self-paralyzed religious 
establishment. Thus Islam’s emerging multi-actor society could not be 
consolidated. This in turn helps explain the transformation of Islam from 
being at birth “remarkably modern”19 to entering the modern world belat-
edly, in greatest need of renewal and pregnant with several latent, theo-
cratic, democratic, and “privatized” reform agendas with no authoritative 
midwife(s) in place to nurture and deliver an evolved “rightly-guided” pol-
ity that could flourish in the new context. 
Contrary to its materialist and “anti-orientalist” critics, Lewis’s “oriental-
ism” is not to be faulted with asking Muslims to ask themselves “What 
went wrong?” or with stressing the need for an Islamic reformation and 
yet despairing of the difficulties of achieving it, thereby turning to the 
seemingly straighter secular-democratic path. His chief failure as an histo-
rian, political advisor, and self-proclaimed democrat lies in his obliterating 
the cause of democratic reform. He does so, first, by promoting ortho-
dox Islam’s normative claim to theocratic continuity and thus buttress-
ing the fundamentalists’ case for theocracy, and, secondly, by ignoring 
the reformist tendencies that have variously questioned this claim. Lewis 
thus buries or reburies all those Muslims, from the eponymous founders 
of the orthodox Sunni schools of law and the Shia Imams, to Sayyid Jamal, 
Abduh, Naini, Iqbal, and their contemporary followers in the democratic 
or democratically evolving Islamist organizations, that have also asked 
“what went wrong?” Lewis even avoids the point in his own lifetime when 
the hegemony of an Islam at once “enlightened” and “authentic” seemed 
assured in view of the evolutionary renewal of Islam’s aborted democratic 
and rationalist tendencies. Consider the following observation:
“The most remarkable phenomenon of the modern history is … the 
enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving 
towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for Eu-
ropean culture … is only a further development of some of the most 
important phases of the culture of Islam.”20 
This is Iqbal speaking in 1928. To understand the rising fundamentalist 
tide that has now submerged his Islamic world, the questions Huntington 
raises about Kemalism and the imperialist face of Western universalism 
are essential. However, he does not pursue them beyond the limits set by 
the clash thesis, and Lewis’s theocratic view of Islam. Lewis himself looks 
the wrong way, not only by writing off the costs of Ataturk’s authoritarian-
ism, but also by underestimating his hero’s exceptional achievement and 
assuming that it could be replicated by the likes of an Ahmad Chalabi in 
Iraq or elsewhere, arriving at the forefront of invading armies. As the only 
pro-Western Muslim leader to have defeated Western armies, Ataturk 
achieved the authority to institutionalize secularism to a degree that it 
was able to survived its major design faults and the Islamist threat. In the 
process, each side has been compelled to recognize the staying power 
or merits of the other as well as release their own democratic tendencies. 
Similarly, by conveniently adopting the official discourses of Kemalism 
and Khomeinism, Lewis bypasses both the contributions of Kemalism 
and imperialism to the rise of Iranian fundamentalism, and the instructive 
parallels between the evolving legacies of Ataturk and Khomeini. The fun-
damentalist ascendancy in the revolution that Khomeini made his own 
would have been inconceivable without the CIA-engineered coup that 
removed the democratically elected coalition of liberal nationalists and 
Islamists, and paved the path for the last Shah’s suicidal variant of Kemal-
ism. Yet, as a religious example of Huntington’s “torn” states, the Islamic 
republic has survived its own contradictory and crisis -prone foundations 
in part thanks to its competitive, if highly restricted, electoral politics. 
Kemalism and Khomeinism thus meet not only as polarized alternatives 
of their fundamentalist advocates, but also as overlapping trajectories in 
emerging religious-secular democratic fields. This is not to equate Tur-
key’s evolutionary developments with that of the 
still theocratically gridlocked Iran or to suggest 
that the latter will necessarily be reformed without 
a major upheaval. But it should be clear that Iran’s 
theocracy or Turkey’s military-led shadow state, let 
alone the altogether more regressive autocracies 
in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, will not be hurried off 
the historical stage by Huntington’s “international 
multiculturalism” or the more familiar versions of 
conservative realism now back in vogue following 
the Iraq disaster. 
Under the double banner of “the Middle East is 
not ready for and Islam is not interested in democ-
racy,” the rejuvenated realists are asking the Middle 
Easterners to choose between anti-western theoc-
racies and pro-western autocracies also reliant on 
unreformed Islam for some residual legitimacy. The 
barbaric pluralism on display in Iraq, unleashed as 
well as reinforced and created by the occupation, 
however, can only be overcome by a democratic 
state capable of enforcing the joint Quranic and lib-
eral injunction that “in religion there should be no 
compulsion.” Such states will not arise by Western 
leaders or Middle Eastern elites (and counter elites) 
preaching democracy and practising autocracy; 
but nor will they emerge if all started preaching and 
practising autocracy. The democratic (re-)fusion of 
the state and society in the Muslim world would be 
advanced not only through the evolutionary recov-
ery of Islam’s democratic and rationalist heritage in 
its ongoing reformation, but also by the reform of 
the US dominated regional/international regime 
that has altogether retarded the progress of such a 
project in the name of democracy and rationalism.
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Clifford Geertz: 
A Memory
P E T E R  V A N  D E R  V E E R Clifford Geertz (1926–2006) was one 
of the most influential anthropolo-
gists of his generation. His influence 
extended far beyond anthropological 
circles, mainly into the broad field of 
the humanities. I met him for the first 
time when he came to the Netherlands 
in May 1994 for the Erasmus Ascension 
Conference on The Limits of Pluralism: 
Neo-absolutisms and Relativism, a con-
ference seemingly set up to show the hidden connections between the 
weakening of the Enlightened West by postmodernism and relativism 
and the growth of anti-Western obscurantist fundamentalism. For such 
a purpose it was clearly appropriate to invite the British anthropologist 
Ernest Gellner, who gave the opening keynote lecture in the Aula of the 
University of Amsterdam. Afterwards, the invitees left for Oosterbeek 
where a closed symposium was held, in which Geertz was one of the 
speakers. Gellner had with his usual polemical flourish stated his case 
for objective truth and universal morality against the relativists, and 
Geertz rose to the occasion with a brilliant dissection of Gellner’s argu-
ments. I cannot keep myself from quoting the beginning of Geertz’s 
lecture, because it shows its spirit: 
“I find it peculiarly difficult to respond to Ernest 
Gellner’s most recent animadversions upon the 
various developments in social theory that he 
calls, insofar I can see amidst the splutter of it 
all, in a wholly indiscriminate and arbitrary way, 
“postmodernist,” not because they are telling, but 
because they are cast in such an arrogant, corro-
sive, and self-congratulatory tone: the last honest 
man resisting fools, sophists, nihilists, aesthetes, 
Middle Americans, snake-oil salesmen, and ca-
reerists. Polemics is a more delicate art than the 
inflamed and righteous sometimes take it to be, 
and when faced, as we are in Professor Gellner’s 
Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, with such 
a degraded form of it, the temptation, to which 
I have perhaps yielded more than I should have 
done, to respond in kind, and thus reproduce 
what one most deeply objects to—mere invective 
paraded as argument—is very strong.”
Geertz’s lecture could hardly be followed by the 
uninitiated, because his delivery was characteris-
tically bad, mumbled into his beard and without 
connecting to his listeners. It was a response to 
a book by Gellner (mentioned above) in which 
he had attacked Islamic Fundamentalism as well 
as Postmodernism. The latter was exemplified by 
the group of mostly young American anthropologists that had pro-
duced the volume Writing Culture in 1986, in which, following Stephen 
Greenblatt and Hayden White, attention was given to the narrative 
structure of ethnographies, to the problem of producing coherence 
without creating “master-narratives,” to power and the authority of 
texts. Gellner had identified Clifford Geertz as the Godfather behind 
this “postmodernist” movement, as evidenced in Geertz’s famous “Anti-
Anti Relativism” lecture for the American Anthropological Association 
Meetings of 1984. Although Geertz in private conversations always 
emphasized that academics got so worked up about things because 
usually for them there was so little at stake, in his response to Gellner 
he really seemed to think that something was at stake. Certainly there 
were academic issues involved. Ernest Gellner had made his reputation 
in Anthropology on the basis of his Saints of the Atlas, a study of Sufi 
saints in Morocco, a typical example of 
British functionalism, and Geertz had 
led a team of researchers also in Mo-
rocco, some of whom had published 
in Writing Culture. Moreover, there was 
a direct attack on Gellner in Writing 
Culture by Talal Asad who had demol-
ished Gellner’s concept of language 
and translation. But, beyond academic 
issues, there was Geertz’s defence of a 
more fragmented, almost hesitant interpretive intellectual style in a 
political context, that is perhaps best exemplified by Bernard Lewis’s 
writing of the causes of “Muslim Rage” and by Samuel Huntington’s 
Clash of Civilizations. Geertz was inclined towards an interest in cultural 
difference, in the details of how people construct their worldview, in 
local knowledge without immediately judging differences in terms of 
superiority or inferiority. His voice did have an audience in the circles of 
the New York Review of Books and among fellow academics such as the 
historian Robert Darnton and the literary scholar Stephen Greenblatt, 
but his influence on political currents remained marginal as compared 
to that of Huntington and Lewis.
Geertz went to Antioch College after he served in the Second World 
War through the G.I. Bill that made free college education available for 
former soldiers. He then studied Anthropology at Harvard with Clyde 
Kluckhohn in an intellectual setting dominated by Talcott Parsons. It 
was also at Harvard that he struck up a lifelong friendship with the 
sociologist Robert Bellah. Geertz went to do fieldwork in Indonesia 
and produced books like The Religion of Java, Peddlers and Princes, and 
Agrarian Involution, the most-cited books on Indonesia for many years. 
He thus belongs to the generation that developed the study of Indone-
sia after the Dutch had left as colonial rulers and Dutch social scientists 
returned to their narrow focus on Little Holland. With his first wife Hil-
dred he worked on Bali which was the home turf of Dutch philologists 
like Hooykaas, with whom he had a furious polemic that boiled down 
to the difference between textual knowledge and local knowledge. 
Later Geertz went to Morocco and wrote a little book comparing Islam 
in Morocco and Indonesia, Islam Observed. Islam is the main religion of 
Java and of Morocco and Geertz’s interpretations of Islam have been 
quite influential in the anthropological study of Islam. 
Broadly speaking, one can say that Geertz was a typical product of 
American anthropology, deeply influenced by the German philosophi-
cal thought about Culture that was brought to the USA by Franz Boas, 
inherent in the sociology of Max Weber, and so important for Talcott 
Parsons, Edward Shils and later generations of American social scien-
tists. Obviously, he modernized this approach by bringing the term 
“symbol” into play, but he did not have much interest in abstract argu-
ments about semiotics or symbology. His strength was rather in broad 
comparative analysis that tried to formulate an interpretive approach 
to politics and culture. At the University of Chicago he was for a decade 
in the 1960s a member of the Committee for the Comparative Study of 
New Nations that tried to understand the cultural basis of the new na-
tion-states in a world that had been decolonized by American power. 
Nevertheless, Geertz is not known for his analysis of the nature of im-
perial power, of either the Dutch or of the Americans. He did have an 
interesting intervention in the study of state power in Negara, but his 
analysis of the pre-colonial Balinese state as a theatre-state has been 
criticized precisely for its emphasis on power as culture which is both 
its greatest strength and its greatest weakness.
As an undergraduate, Geertz was trained as a “man of letters” in lit-
erature and philosophy, and despite his tendency to come up with “the 
worldview of the santri” or “the system of symbols,” he is best known for 
his vivid, almost literary descriptions of the Balinese cockfight or the 
His strength was 
rather in broad 
comparative 
analysis that 
tried to formulate 
an interpretive 
approach to politics 
and culture.
On 30 October 2006, Clifford Geertz died at 
the age of 80. Known among social scientists 
primarily for his coining of the term “thick 
description” and his related understanding of 
culture as “webs of significance,” Geertz also 
contributed significantly to the study of Islam. 
In this contribution, Peter van der Veer draws 
upon personal experiences to contextualize the 
legacy of this eminent anthropologist.
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Javanese Slametan and for his philosophical probing in the nature of 
cultural difference. He had a great love for ethnography as a genre, but 
like most anthropologists he could not go on doing one fieldwork after 
the other and began writing more general essays on religion, culture, 
rituals, and the like.
In 1970 Geertz was appointed Professor at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton and became the founder of its School of Social Sci-
ence. His intellectual perspective can be readily found when one looks 
at later appointments at that school, the economist Albert Hirschman, 
the political philosopher Michael Walzer, and the feminist historian 
Joan Scott, though he never managed to appoint the sociologist Rob-
ert Bellah or, facing strong opposition from the scientists dominating 
the Institute, the student of science, Bruno Latour. Every year Geertz 
and his colleagues had to select a new contingent of fellows to come 
to the School of Social Science at the Institute, and this gave Geertz a 
unique opportunity to stay abreast of new developments in the social 
sciences and, thus, to influence new generations. As I mentioned, I met 
Geertz at the Erasmus Ascension Symposium in 1994, where I was also 
one of the speakers, and he invited me to come the next year to the 
Institute. During that year I came to know him as a friendly man who 
seemed to be shy or, at least, devoid of great social skills. He was deeply 
private, and as a good anthropologist preferred to observe rather than 
participate. There was a striking difference between the eloquence of 
his writing and the reticence of his speaking. It was not that he did 
not have strong views or lacked confidence in them—on the contra-
ry—but he had a way of delivering them as if he was holding an inter-
nal dialogue. His great essayistic skills allowed him to influence a wide 
variety of intellectuals by showing the possibilities of anthropological 
interpretation for their subjects. His humanistic view of anthropology, 
and of human affairs in general, will be remembered with respect for a 
long time to come.
Peter van der Veer is University Professor at University College Utrecht, Utrecht University. 
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On 10 November 2006, ISIM organized a conference to honour Ab-
dulkader Tayob’s research and teaching activities as ISIM Chair at the 
Radboud University Nijmegen from 2002 to 2006. The conference 
brought together prominent scholars working on intellectual trends in 
the Muslim world.
In his own paper, Abdulkader Tayob reflected on the meaning of re-
ligion in Islamic states. By comparing the works of Ali Abd al-Raziq and 
Muhammed Rashid Rida, he illustrated how Muslim intellectuals have 
rethought the relation between religion and politics in modernity. This 
was followed by a presentation of Abdou Filali-Ansary (Aga Khan Uni-
versity), who argued that too narrow a focus on specific founding mo-
ments of Islam forms an obstacle for a serious rethinking of the faith 
and its implications for our time. He urged Muslims to take history seri-
ously because this is vital in redefining and revitalizing Islam. Michiel 
Leezenberg (University of Amsterdam) presented a paper on the nine-
teenth century reception of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldun. He argued that 
the rediscovery of both intellectuals should not be seen as a mere cop-
ying of colonial powers. In the nineteenth century, a new public sphere 
emerged in which academic works became part of a corpus of Arabic 
literature and thus a part of the Arabic heritage. Changes in language 
and relations between intellectuals show the gradual emergence of a 
public sphere along national lines. 
Mona Abaza (American University in Cairo) discussed changes in the 
tanwir (enlightenment) discourse in Egypt, noting that tanwir is being 
appropriated by a multitude of actors, among whom are included the 
state and Islamists. Although the term was initially promoted to sell 
the idea of democracy, the overuse of tanwir has completely emptied 
the term of content. Muhammad Khalil Masud (Council of Islamic Ideol-
ogy in Pakistan), in his presentation, focused on debates surrounding 
the hudud ordinance in contemporary Pakistan which show that tradi-
tional thought can produce its own locally contextualized “modernity.” 
In this debate, the arguments of Javer Ahmad Ghamidi, a prominent 
writer and media personality whose criticisms of hudud ordinances 
are particularly effective because he has the same traditionalist back-
ground as the proponents. Moving to the Indonesian context, Martin 
van Bruinessen (ISIM/Utrecht University) compared two prominent 
intellectuals of liberal Muslim thought. Nurcholish Madjid and Ab-
durrahman Wahid, notwithstanding their different background, both 
emphasised the importance of religious freedom including minorities 
and defended cultural Islam. Their heritage is still present in the various 
NGO’s despite the conservative turn in Islam in Indonesia.
The discussion by Roel Meijer (ISIM/Radboud University Nijmegen) 
shifted the discussion in a rather different direction. Focusing on the 
Saudi jihadist and self-made intellectual and Yusuf al-Ayiri, Meijer 
showed that action-oriented philosophies may have more currency 
among certain population groups than the more ephemeral ideas of 
most philosophers, and this is an aspect that rarely addressed in stud-
ies of al-Qaida. In the concluding presentation, Asef Bayat (ISIM/Leiden 
University) reflected on the notion of post-Islamism and the ways this 
concept applies to intellectual trends in Iran. Although parallels were 
detected between Iran and other areas of the Muslim world, the sig-
nificant diversity precludes an all-fitting forecast as to the direction in 
which Muslim societies are moving.
Loubna el-Morabet is Ph.D. Fellow at ISIM.
ISIM/Conference
Reflections on Muslim Intellectual History
L O U B N A  E L - M O R A B E T
5 0  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Society & the State
T H O M A S  B L O M  H A N S E N
The India That Does 
Not Shine
India’s Muslim community rarely re-
ceives much attention in the media, 
either in its own country or in the larg-
er world. When it does, the context is 
invariably that of victimization at the 
hands of aggressive Hindu national-
ism—Gujarat in 2002, Mumbai (Bom-
bay) in 1992–3—or, more frequently, 
as a threat to India’s internal stabil-
ity and security. The bombings of the 
“Friendship Express” that runs between 
Delhi and Lahore on 19 February, and 
the even more horrific serial blasts on Mumbai suburban trains on 
11 July 2006, are recent examples of events that have solidified anti-
Muslim sentiments in India. Officials normally accuse specific extrem-
ist organizations based in Kashmir, or the secret Pakistani intelligence 
services ISI, of being behind these acts, but among ordinary people in 
India Muslims are widely seen as “anti-national,” clannish, and hostile to 
India as a nation. These attitudes have deep historical roots in the nine-
teenth century and in the conflicts that led to the Partition of India and 
Pakistan in 1947. They have also been systematically cultivated by the 
Hindu nationalist movement in India to the point that such attitudes, 
today, constitute a sort of common sense among large sections of the 
population. While suspicions and apprehensions regarding Muslims 
have long existed among India’s Hindu communities, blaming all of 
India’s problems on its minorities—as has become standard and unob-
trusive practice in both public and private arenas—was never common 
until recently. After 9/11, by way of contrast, the term “terrorist” has 
been seamlessly imported into the already vicious anti-Muslim rhetoric 
currently circulating in India.
For scholars and activists working with Muslims in India, it has long 
been known that the 140 million Muslims in the country—immensely 
diverse in terms of language, religious orientation, and social class—
were among India’s poorest and most marginalized citizens. It was also 
well known that decades of anti-Muslim rhetoric, everyday discrimina-
tion, and neglect by the government had brought about a situation 
of cultural introversion, economic marginality, and a huge deficit in 
education and social advancement compared to most other citizens 
of the country. 
The Sachar report
Now, with the publication of the so-called Sachar report (named 
after the chairman of the specially-appointed “Prime Minister’s High 
Level Committee,” Justice Rajender Sachar) all of this has become offi-
cial knowledge.1 The report was ordered by Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh in order to shed comprehensive light on the living conditions 
and general situation of the Muslim community in India. The political 
motivations were clear: a large and disaffected Muslim minority—the 
biggest minority in the world—constitutes a significant security chal-
lenge but also a significant pool of votes which the Congress party 
used to be able to bank on but has lost since the 1980s. However, there 
are more than political tactics involved here. The rapid transformation 
of India’s economy demands new forms of intensive governance, bet-
ter infra structure, and a more efficient utilization of the enormous re-
serves of skills and manpower in the country. Muslims are generally not 
part of the ongoing economic boom or even its derived effects, such 
as the service- and security-related industries, which recruit very few 
Muslims. Political and social life in India has always been deeply seg-
mented, but now the new economic boom threatens to disentangle 
India’s Muslims from its mainstream economy. The report states quite 
clearly that it was motivated by a need to collect and systematize exist-
ing knowledge about the Muslims in India in order for the government 
to be able to calibrate future initiatives 
to (re-)incorporate Muslims into Indian 
society, and in order to qualify a debate 
on minorities that “largely revolved 
around perceptions and rhetoric.”2
The work of the Sachar committee is 
both remarkable and deeply disturb-
ing in its documentation of decades 
of systematic neglect, non-action, and 
open exclusion of Muslims from virtu-
ally every facet of life in the country. In 
the preface to the report, the commit-
tee admits difficulties in collecting data and corroborated knowledge, 
but also states that its methodology included a large number of visits 
to different states in India and meetings with many local leaders, busi-
ness people, intellectuals, and social activists in these states. This proc-
ess of consultation received an overwhelming response from Muslims 
across the country. It is indeed remarkable that the first chapter of the 
report is entirely devoted to a compilation of the views and percep-
tions recorded in these meetings. The report does not judge the valid-
ity or veracity of these perceptions, but argues very sensibly that they 
“are not built in a vacuum,” and that such perceptions form an essential 
part of the reality that the government has to deal with.
Laying demographic anxieties to rest
In a country that has been saturated by longstanding right-wing 
stereotypes of Muslims as a “pampered minority” that is against birth 
control and wants to dominate Indian society, the chapter in the report 
on demographic trends is indeed sobering reading. While it is true that 
overall fertility among Muslims is slightly above average compared 
to other groups in Indian society, it has been declining over the past 
decade. It also varies enormously within India and, in many states, 
the birth rate among Muslims is lower than among Hindus. There is a 
well-established correlation between fertility and the education level 
of women. As such, the generally low level of education among Mus-
lims, and especially Muslim women, goes a long way toward explaining 
the birth rate differences. Other factors are that Muslims generally live 
longer than Hindus, and that the survival rate among Muslim children 
is significantly higher than among other communities at similar socio-
economic levels. Muslims are less frequent users of contraception and 
the report reiterates what researchers and activists have known for a 
long time: there exists a longstanding suspicion of government clin-
ics among Muslims, and there are relatively fewer of these clinics in 
Muslim localities. The lack of female doctors is one reason for this lack 
of trust. Another is the perception that the government wants to steri-
lize Muslims. This notion originated in the forced sterilization drives 
during the state of emergency in 1975–77 where mostly poor people, 
among them many Muslims, were targeted. Subsequent “demographic 
anxieties” propagated by right-wing Hindu nationalists keep such fears 
alive. The report states very clearly that even at the present birth rate, 
Muslims would at the most constitute 19 percent of the population in 
2050.
Education and living conditions
The most damning evidence of governmental neglect and discrimi-
nation at all levels of Indian society is presented in the chapters on edu-
cation and economic standing. Muslims have fallen behind on every 
educational parameter since Independence in spite of being more ur-
banized than most communities: literacy levels are far below the aver-
age level and are not improving, the school dropout rate is the highest 
among all groups, and the average years of school attendance among 
Muslims is the lowest in the country. There is evidence of systematic 
The 140 million Muslims in India receive very 
little media attention. The resulting lack of 
knowledge has assisted Hindu nationalists in 
cultivating stereotypical depictions, but has 
hindered policies aimed at the incorporation 
of Muslims into Indian society. This article 
analyzes a recent government report about 
Muslims in India and shows that the oft-
commented upon introversion of Muslims is not 
an innate propensity of Muslims, but a reaction 
to decades of exclusion from broader social life. 
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under-investment in government schools and education in 
areas with large numbers of Muslims, and the discrimina-
tion, or lack of encouragement, of those in the educational 
system is evident. The relative number of young people who 
graduate is falling as compared to every other group, and 
the higher one goes in the system of higher education the 
fewer Muslims one is likely to find. Among graduate stu-
dents at India’s leading colleges, only one in fifty is a Mus-
lim—a figure much lower than any other group, including 
the former untouchable communities.
One of the reasons commonly given for the high drop-
out rates and lack of higher education among Muslims is 
that there is little incentive because a very small number of 
Muslims ever manage to get a job in the public sector, the 
bureaucracy, or the large and rapidly expanding formal sec-
tor of the economy, which includes service, technology and 
industry. The report does indeed confirm that the majority 
of Muslims are either self employed or employed in small 
and informal businesses and enterprises. Many of these are 
in the traditional artisan occupations of Muslims (weaving, 
carpentry, metal work, mechanics, etc.) and in petty trade. 
These businesses are small, low-investment and as a whole 
outside, if not wholly excluded from, the new economy in 
India. The chapter on bank and credit in the report bears 
this out and shows that Muslims are less involved in bor-
rowing and streams of credit than any other community in the coun-
try. My own experience from working in Muslim areas in Mumbai and 
Aurangabad confirms that a majority of employees work for Muslim-
owned businesses, borrow through informal credit systems, and that 
the many Muslims no longer even consider applying for jobs in Hindu 
owned companies. Those owned by other minority groups—Christian, 
Parsi, Sikh, and so on—are generally seen as more open to Muslim em-
ployees. This overall “economic introversion” in the Muslim community 
creates low expectations of formal employment among younger gen-
erations, which in turn adds to the already low level of visibility of Mus-
lims in the public sector. Except for a few states, where Muslims make 
up around a quarter of the population and where there is a consistent 
tradition of left-leaning secularism (West Bengal and Kerala), one rarely 
finds employment rates of Muslims in the public sector exceeding ten 
percent. In most other regions, the figure is below five percent, and 
there Muslims tend to be occupied in lower positions such as clerks, 
peons, or in menial maintenance jobs. The higher the prestige and vis-
ibility of a sector (foreign service, top cadres like the Indian Adminis-
trative Service (IAS), police services, banks, and the armed forces) the 
lower the percentage of Muslims; indeed, it is not uncommon for them 
to constitute less than two percent of the workforce.
The feeling of being outside the state and the mainstream economy 
means that very few young Muslims appear in the qualifying exams for 
the civil service and even fewer actually apply for government jobs. A 
longstanding friend of mine, Asif Ali Khan, is involved in an organiza-
tion in Mumbai that assists young Muslims in qualifying and applying 
for government jobs—from the railways to the municipality, among 
others. A few weeks ago, he told me: “we have sent thousands of appli-
cations on behalf of qualified boys in the past few years and all we have 
got out of it is jobs for a few handfuls of them. We have more success 
with private companies, not least security companies that now recruit 
large numbers of guards and watchmen in the city. We have submitted 
this evidence of discrimination to the government but [there’s been] 
no reaction so far. Maybe with the Sachar report they will be forced to 
take some action, at least.”
Diverse Muslim communities
The report lists many more features of the current predicament of 
marginality and isolation of Muslims in India. Throughout, Muslims are 
treated as a single community spelled with a capital C. This reflects a 
certain concession to a longstanding ideal of unity among Muslims in 
the country. The evidence demonstrates a certain common experience 
of marginality but more substantially it shows that Muslims are deeply 
divided along lines of class, caste, and gender. More controversially, the 
report takes on the enduring problem of caste or biraderi among Mus-
lims and argues that there exists three general status and occupational 
categories of Muslims: the ashrafs (noble) who “are without social dis-
abilities”;3 the ajlafs who are equivalent to what in India is classified as 
“Other Backward Classes;“ and finally the arzals who occupy a position 
much like the untouchables, or Scheduled castes, in the Hindu social 
order. The last two categories are eligible for various affirmative action 
programmes and “reserved” jobs and political representation in India; 
but these have hitherto only been offered to Hindu communities. Point-
ing out that caste is a real factor among Muslims and that more than 
half of all Muslims in India belong to these sections may provoke anger 
among conservative Muslims. However, the proposal that these Mus-
lim subgroups should also be eligible for reservations and assistance 
from the government has already provoked a complex set of reactions 
in India. Predictably, Hindu nationalists find the proposal preposterous 
and “anti-national” and have denounced Rajender Sachar as “caring for 
terrorists.” Many leaders and spokespeople of lower caste Hindus and 
ex-untouchables, for whom these provisions are at the heart of their 
political consciousness and organization, have been somewhat wary 
about the prospect of sharing the benefits of affirmative action. The 
issue of reserving jobs and providing education for Muslims is thus 
bound to be controversial, and the debate over this already overshad-
ows the full range of compelling evidence and complex recommenda-
tions made in the Sachar report.
Marginal but proud
The Sachar report describes a diverse community which, though 
marginalized in multiple ways for decades, retains a strong sense of 
pride, and an unusual resilience. The cultural, economic, and politi-
cal introversion among Muslims is often described in public debates 
in India as the essential obstacle for all to overcome, as if these were 
innate characteristics of Muslims. This report has authoratively shown 
that present circumstances are the response of a proud community 
to decades of systematic exclusion from broader social networks in 
India. The question, of course, is whether the report’s many and well 
thought-out recommendations can be transformed into viable poli-
cies in the broad centrist coalition that governs India at the moment. 
A related question is whether any of these recommendations—e.g. to 
create mixed public spaces, mixed neighbourhoods, and mixed schools 
and education—can ever be implemented. Will such policies address 
the apprehensions and anger among young Muslim men with few job 
opportunities, who are routinely harassed by the police, and incarcer-
ated three times more often than anyone else in the country? Whatever 
happens, this report stands as a powerful “myth 
buster” that should significantly reduce the blame 
placed on Indian Muslims for the latter’s margin-
ality and poverty. 
Convention 
of displaced 
Indian Muslims, 
Ahmedabad, 
1 February 2007
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F A R Z A N A  H A N I F F A
Muslims in Sri Lanka’s 
Ethnic Conflict
Muslims in Sri Lanka, categorized as a 
separate ethnic group, are Tamil speak-
ing and have sometimes been claimed 
by Tamil nationalists to be part of the 
larger Tamil nation. Though publicly 
rejected by Muslim leaders at various 
historical moments, this inclusion in 
the Tamil nation has been attractive 
to some Muslims living in the Tamil 
majority areas of the North and East. 
Muslim youth of the Eastern Province, 
for instance, participated with Tamil 
groups in the early militancy against 
the state, and Eastern Muslim politi-
cians often joined Tamil political parties to contest elections. This re-
lationship, always difficult, has now deteriorated—with assistance 
from the state—into a complete polarization between the two com-
munities. Muslims have been targeted, displaced, and dispossessed by 
armed actors of both the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), and recently by the LTTE breakaway faction—the Tamil Makkal 
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP).
While there has been some improvement in recognizing Muslim 
grievances since the beginning of the peace process in 2002, this has 
not resulted in any substantial policy changes to 
address such grievances. The peace process has 
failed to take Muslims’ issues sufficiently into ac-
count despite Muslim political actors being part 
of the government. In fact, the preamble to the 
ceasefire agreement, which set off the 2002–2005 
peace process, referred to Muslims as a “group 
not directly party to the conflict.” While civil so-
ciety and political actors’ agitations reversed this 
understanding to a certain extent, the current 
regime, with its pursuit of a military solution and 
a clear majoritarian platform has little interest in 
Muslim concerns. Today it seems that the meagre 
gains of those times may already have been lost. 
This article—through brief descriptions of the 
expulsion of 1990, the Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure (P-TOMS) of 2005, and 
the siege of Mutur in 2006—will trace the history 
of Muslim inclusion within the conflict and the 
peace process. 
The expulsion of 1990
In October 1990, all over the Northern Province, close to 75,000 
Muslims were compelled to vacate their homes at gun point, hand 
over their belongings, and leave.2 In Jaffna, home to a fairly affluent 
trader community, the LTTE called all the men to a meeting during 
which cadres raided their homes. At the meeting, the men were in-
structed to leave their valuables behind and vacate their homes with-
in two hours. Similar events happened with varying levels of brutality 
in the five other districts of the Northern Province. The expelled are 
still haunted by the manner in which they were compelled to leave, of 
women giving birth on the crowded boats, and of children drowning 
after falling overboard. Some say that the LTTE sold the abandoned 
goods at auctions; some say they were given away. 
These people lost their homes, possessions, livelihoods, communi-
ties, and personal histories in one day. They left behind their belong-
ings, their community, and their sense of citizenship in Sri Lanka. A 
generation of children, unable to complete their education, lost their 
futures. Today they live in over-crowded settlements in the impov-
erished district of Puttalam. Their lives 
parallel the hundreds of thousands of 
Tamils and Sinhalese in the country 
who were also displaced and saw their 
lives destroyed. The Muslim experi-
ence, however, has its own distinctive 
features, which are reflective of their 
“no-”place status in the Sri Lankan 
polity. The story of their forced exodus 
is not widely known. Few commenta-
tors give the expulsion the attention 
that it merits as a highly significant 
historical event that changed the lives 
of the Muslims of the North and East. 
The government has neither established a commission of inquiry nor 
arranged special administrative provisions for the displaced. A newly 
established government secretariat for northern Muslims located in 
Puttalam may handle certain administrative matters for the commu-
nity, but there has been no attempt to find a long-term solution. Six-
teen years after the expulsion they are still living as displaced persons 
in a district other than their own, amongst those that consider them 
aliens. Many of the expelled Muslims fear registering themselves as 
residents of the Puttalam district since they might, thereby, forfeit 
their right to reclaim their property and resettle in the North.3 The 
host community in Puttalam resents the incursion of the refugees 
whom they say threaten the meagre resources available in the area. 
The Tamil-speaking Muslims have problems accessing health care 
and other state amenities due to difference in language. They can-
not go back to their places of origin without the consent of the LTTE, 
the very organization that expelled them as they fall under their de 
facto administrative jurisdiction. The other particularity of the suffer-
ing of Muslims in Sri Lanka is that their plight does not have a place 
in any larger nationalist narrative—either a narrative of a liberation 
struggle (Tamil nationalism), or in a fight to safeguard the mother-
land (Sinhala Nationalism). They remain caught in between, and the 
Muslim political leadership has not been successful in articulating its 
position in a manner independent of the two nationalisms dominant 
in the country. This lack of a larger narrative means that many com-
mentators have treated the story of the Muslims as little more than a 
footnote to the conflict.
The LTTE and Tamil nationalists have different levels of justifica-
tion for the expulsion—some speak of security issues, others speak 
of Muslims as traitors to the Tamil-speaking nation. In the first flush of 
the 2002–2005 peace process, former LTTE political strategist Anton 
Balasingham stated that the expulsion was a “strategic blunder” on 
their part and that Muslims were free to return.4 Tamilcelvam, LTTE 
political wing leader, offered an official apology to representatives of 
the Muslim community visiting him, and assured Muslims assistance 
to resettle when the North was under their administration.5 Return-
ing Muslims however, reported different levels of harassment by local 
carders. Today, close to 75,000 people from the North live in displace-
ment in the North Western district of Puttalam with no status, limited 
state assistance, and barely any voting rights. Given the severe pov-
erty of the area in which they are forced to live, the Muslims have be-
come dependent on politicians, government functionaries, and NGOs 
for all elementary needs.
To make matters worse, the fact that most Muslim political parties 
have their primary vote base in the East means that they are not es-
pecially sensitive to the particularities of the northern experience. 
The political process is forcing “solidarity” between the Muslims of 
the North and the East without taking into account the differences 
between the regions. For instance, the polarization between Eastern 
Regardless of when, precisely, Sri Lanka’s 
protracted conflict began, this conflict is 
most often cast as one between the majority 
Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. In this 
bipolar understanding of the conflict, the 
Muslim community seems to have no place, 
even though Muslims constitute close to 40 
percent of the population in the conflict-
affected Eastern Province and have been 
expelled from the Northern Province. This 
article describes the plight of these Muslims 
and analyzes the discursive and political 
powers by which Muslims are marginalized.1
Sixteen years after 
the expulsion they 
are still living as 
displaced persons in 
a district other than 
their own …
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Tamils and Muslims is intense, while northern Muslims continue to 
speak of cordial relations with their Tamil neighbours and consider 
the LTTE rather than the Tamils as a people to be culpable for the 
expulsion. 
The P-TOMS
The tsunami of 26 December 2004 devastated Sri Lanka’s Eastern 
Province. The Muslims in the area lived in densely crowded communi-
ties that have spread closer and closer to the ocean given the restricted 
availability of land. The tsunami took a devastating toll on these com-
munities: official figures state that 18,000 Muslims, or one percent of 
the total Muslim population of the Island, perished. Given that a large 
portion of the affected area was controlled by the LTTE, the government 
was urged by both local activists and the international community to 
work with the LTTE in formulating a mechanism to channel tsunami 
assistance. After many closed-door discussions, the Post Tsunami Op-
erational Management Structure (P-TOMS) to address reconstruction in 
the North and East was unveiled. To the Muslims it was an affront. The 
arrangement to address the devastation of the tsunami, from which 
the Muslims suffered extensively, had been produced as an agreement 
between the government and the LTTE without the participation or 
consultation of Muslims. While a representative of the Muslim parties 
was to be part of the essentially symbolic apex body, the rest of the 
tiers of the arrangement were weighted heavily in favour of the LTTE, 
which was also given veto power over the decision making process. 
After the 2002 ceasefire, the LTTE cadres had ready access to Muslim 
areas of the Eastern Province and many incidents of intimidation and 
extortion were reported. Muslims feared that the P-TOMS would insti-
tutionalize this harassment. Another reason that Muslims loathed the 
P-TOMS was that, given its links to the peace process, many saw it as 
a precedent for the future exclusion of Muslim parties from the proc-
ess. Muslim parties felt that this was yet another attempt by the LTTE 
to undermine their political leadership. By contrast, members of the 
government felt that the Muslims were not adequately acknowledging 
the important breakthrough of including Muslims in the apex body. 
However, Muslims were not happy with the paternalism of a process 
that “included” them without consultation. Muslim agitation against 
the P-TOMS compelled the government to address Muslim concerns 
even after the fact. However, the P-TOMS became irrelevant when the 
Supreme Court found sections of the agreement unconstitutional and 
a presidential election augured the end of President Kumaratunge’s re-
gime. Moreover, with the current regime’s pursuit of a military solution, 
the little that was gained by Muslims now seems lost. 
Mutur in August 2006
The presidential elections of November 2005 brought to power the 
UPFA candidate Mahinda Rajapakse on an anti-minority, anti-peace 
process, and pro-unitary state platform that was formed through the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s (SLFP) part-
nership with the two Sinhala national-
ist parties. Rajapakse won the election 
mainly since the LTTE prevented the 
Tamil population of the North and East 
from voting. Through this symbolic as-
sertion of their separation, the LTTE ef-
fectively prevented the election of the 
pro-peace, federalist United National 
Party candidate. From the date of the 
election victory, the peace process 
speedily deteriorated, with claymore 
mine attacks and aerial bombard-
ments, as well as suicide bombings in 
Colombo becoming the norm. One of 
the most prominent incidents of the 
military confrontation was the LTTE’s 
attempt to take over the mostly Mus-
lim Eastern Province town of Mutur 
that borders one side of the Trincoma-
lee natural harbour. On 1 August 2006 
the town came under attack as the two 
parties fought for control, with both 
sides firing artillery towards the built-
up areas of the town while the civil-
ian population was still there. Forty-nine people seeking refuge in the 
school buildings were killed. In the nearby mostly Tamil town of Thopur 
a shell landed on St. Anthony MV School, killing twelve people. When 
Mutur town was largely under LTTE control the Muslim community ap-
pealed through intermediaries for the Government to end the shelling. 
The military, however, continued its firing into the town. 
After three days of shelling, Mutur Muslims decided to leave the 
town and were given assurances of safety by the LTTE. On their way 
to Kantale, they were diverted off the main road (A15) by LTTE cad-
res, and taken to Kiranthimunai, which is under LTTE control. Here the 
LTTE picked out individuals alleged to be members of a Muslim armed 
group working with the government. These men were tied up and the 
rest were told to move on. The fate of 66 individuals who went missing 
at Kiranthimunai is still unknown. 
Conclusion
It has long been in the interest of the chief protagonists of the con-
flict—the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—to 
propagate an understanding of the conflict in reductive two party 
terms. While Muslim community agitations in the aftermath of the CFA 
of 2002 have compelled both parties to take notice of Muslim interests, 
their consideration of Muslim issues is little more than perfunctory and 
often for propaganda purposes only. The LTTE’s empty invitation to 
Muslims to return to the North, and the paternalism of Muslim “inclu-
sion” in the P-TOMS are cases in point. The mortar 
attacks on Mutur while Muslim civilians were still 
in the town is an indication of the current govern-
ment’s disregard for Muslim civilian lives.
The Rajapakse regime overturned many of the 
successes of the 2002–2005 peace process. It is 
unclear what direction the Sri Lankan conflict 
will take at this point. The regime is pursuing a 
military solution to the conflict, and its complete 
disregard for civilian casualties from the minority 
communities is troubling and does not bode well 
for the future of Muslims. In pursuing its current 
policies, the regime is also distancing itself from 
the international community, and possible pres-
surizing tactics that civil society groups use via 
the international community may not, therefore, 
be effective anymore. Muslim civil society today 
is compelled to reorganize and strategize how it 
might best address community concerns in the 
new dispensation. 
Notes
1. I thank Shreen Saroor and Mirak Raheem for 
sharing insights and information. This article 
is one part of our joint ongoing work on the 
Muslim community’s concerns in Sri Lanka.
2. For a detailed description of the expulsion, 
see S. H. Hasbullah, Muslim Refugees: The 
Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict 
(Nuraicholai: Research and Action Forum for 
Social Development, 2001). 
3. Catherine Brun, “Local Citizens or Internally 
Displaced Persons: Dilemmas of Long 
Term Displacement in Sri Lanka,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 16, no. 4 (2003): 376.
4. Press conference in Kilinochchi, April 2002.
5. Conversation with Moulawi Sufiyan, member 
of the Muslim community displaced from 
Jaffna, and currently politician, and human 
rights activist. 
Temporary 
shelter at a 
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J O E  S T O R K
Violence and Political 
Change in Saudi Arabia
For the past year, I and colleagues from 
Human Rights Watch have met in vari-
ous Arab countries with civil society 
activists, to discuss attacks against ci-
vilians as serious violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law. Our goal 
is to gauge to what extent such attacks 
enjoy public support, particularly in 
opinion-shaping circles that may be 
sympathetic to the professed objec-
tives of the perpetrator groups. We 
then explore ways of raising in those 
circles critical voices against such at-
tacks, as a way of influencing the per-
petrator groups to end those policies. 
Together with a colleague from our Cairo office, I spent the first week of 
December 2006 meeting with a range of individuals, for the most part 
persons out of favour with the government and representing Islamist 
perspectives.1 Many had been active in the establishment, in 1993, of 
the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate (Sharia) Rights (CDLR), 
as well as the different public petitions calling for 
political reforms. Many had spent years in prison 
for their efforts, lost their jobs, and today remain 
banned from media appearances and travel. 
We stressed that our concern was with attacks 
that target or indiscriminately harm civilians, 
and that there is a broad convergence between 
international human rights and humanitarian 
law standards and Islamic principles that tradi-
tionally govern the use of violence. Under inter-
national law, such attacks constitute war crimes 
when carried out in conditions of armed conflict 
and crimes against humanity when carried out as 
organization policy. 
Those we met agreed on two points. First, pub-
lic support for violent opposition groups, or at 
least reluctance to condemn such violence, is 
politically motivated by the close relationship 
between the Saudi government and the United 
States despite the latter’s policies in Iraq and the 
Palestine-Israel conflict. Second, the Saudi gov-
ernment must end its systematic suppression of 
basic civil and political rights, especially freedom 
of expression, to allow peaceful challenges to 
the status quo. There was also widespread agree-
ment, though not consensus, on a third point: 
that the state’s accommodation of a religious es-
tablishment whose intolerance toward non-Mus-
lims and Muslims who do not subscribe to the of-
ficial Wahhabi interpretation of Islam has nurtured violent dissent, and 
that any successful political liberalization requires religious reform as 
well, especially in the education sector. 
“Only civil society can fight terror”
Virtually all our interlocutors agreed that “behind the violence is op-
pression, injustice, and occupation,” referring to conditions in the Arab 
world. With regard to Saudi Arabia itself, they stressed as well the “zero 
framework for civil society and no independent judiciary,” in the words 
of Matruk al-Falih, a political science professor at King Saud University. 
The state, he and others said, was just as hostile to their peaceful criti-
cisms as to the challenge of the violent groups. “A nine-year prison 
term for suggesting a constitution!” said Abdullah al-Hamid, a former 
professor of literature and reform activ-
ist, referring to jail terms handed down 
to himself, al-Falih, and another activ-
ist.2 “Proponents of violence point to 
that and say, see what your peaceful 
petitions get you. Our main demand is, 
protect civil society. Only civil society 
can fight terror.” 
In the view of a former newspaper 
editor, “the culture of radicalism here 
is not new, so what has empowered 
this murderous violence now?” Most of 
those we met agreed with his view that 
“the essence of the [violence] prob-
lem is political. Its widening character 
derives from the U.S. occupation of Iraq, U.S. policy towards Palestine, 
and the perceived submission of the Arab regimes to the U.S.” A uni-
versity professor and a student at King Saud University confided that 
there is virtually no discussion of the violence or other political issues 
in the university for fear of the consequences of speaking out. To the 
extent that these things are discussed, the professor said, students do 
not condone the violence but “they do ask why it is happening.” 
Accommodating intolerance 
Most also attributed the absence of public opposition to violent attacks 
that have harmed civilians to a complex and largely accommodating re-
lationship between the state and a religious establishment imbued with 
zealotry and intolerance toward non-Muslims and Muslims that do not 
subscribe to the official Wahhabi version of Islam. Religious reform need-
ed to be an integral part of, if not a prerequisite for, political reform. 
A lawyer who defends non-violent dissidents, and has himself been 
jailed for his efforts, said top officials are content to attribute the prob-
lem to outside forces and insist that the domestic culture is fine, while 
“those who see a built-in problem, who pose deep criticism of Wahhabi 
ideology and its role in the state, who think military suppression is not 
enough—we have no outlet in the Saudi media. Electronic forums ad-
vocate violence but these were not blocked, unlike those of us reform-
ists.” Authorities “look the other way” when extremists threaten intellec-
tuals and reformers and only respond when they target the state itself, 
he claimed, citing an incident the previous week at Al-Yamanah College 
when militants violently disrupted a theatre production but faced no in-
vestigation or prosecution.
Another factor explaining public tolerance for these attacks, according 
to the former newspaper editor, who has been close to Sahwa circles, 
is “the Wahhabi legacy” of providing religious rulings (fatawa) to expe-
dite the conquests of the Al Saud.3 “How can we [the forces led by the 
Al Saud] attack this peaceful settlement? With a ruling that says villages 
that refuse to ally with us are kafir. How can we fight the last [Ottoman] 
Caliph? Get a ruling that declares him to be kafir.” “These rationalizations 
go counter to Islamic culture,” he claimed, but they have now helped re-
define the culture—a culture reproduced in schools and much of the 
Saudi media. 
“The Sahwa never approved of the pro-Afghanistan policy of the state,” 
the former editor added, “but they also didn’t confront it. Why did some 
Sahwa adherents join those ‘Afghans’? One reason was their louder 
voice, and then there was the fantastic mobilizing impact of September 
11 [2001], which exposed the Sahwa as ineffectual, with nothing to show 
for our boycotts and petitions.” In his view, the current atmosphere of 
reform has left the takfiriyyin [those who proclaim others to be apostates 
and therefore subject to killing] more isolated, “but they still have the 
louder voices. And the issue of killing civilians is never discussed in Saudi 
Arabia. It is kept under the table.” 
Few societies are more identified with Islamist 
armed violence than Saudi Arabia—country of 
origin of Usama bin Laden and 15 of the 9/11 
hijackers, as well as more than a thousand 
insurgents in Iraq, and itself the site of attacks 
on expatriate housing compounds. The author 
draws on discussions with Saudi activists and 
intellectuals to reflect on ambivalent public 
and elite attitudes toward this violence. The 
author’s interlocutors attribute this “neutrality” 
to the accommodating relationship between 
a repressive state and an intolerant religious 
establishment, and argue that only a vibrant 
civil society can combat such violence.
“People don’t 
support violence 
or nonviolence, 
but fight for rights. 
Those harmed 
by the state will 
not criticize those 
fighting the state, 
even violently.”
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“Neutral” about violence 
Although all of those with whom we met asserted a strong opposi-
tion to attacks against civilians, several Islamist activists challenged our 
characterization of particular attacks, claiming the attackers targeted 
military contractors or secret police and therefore suggesting these at-
tacks were legitimate. The groups responsible, they said, were respond-
ing to heavy-handed policies of the Saudi security services and the 
government’s close association with the U.S. One interlocutor claimed 
that the perpetrators of such attacks see “the U.S. fighting Muslims the 
world over, not distinguishing between civilians and military. Those al-
lied with the U.S.”—i.e., the Saudi government—“are just as responsi-
ble.”
“Most of us [Islamist activists] don’t agree with these attacks, kill-
ing innocents, Muslims or Westerners,” this person continued. “This is 
forbidden, unacceptable.” But, he claimed, most Saudis are “neutral” 
regarding attacks on Westerners. He characterized the 12 May 2003 
suicide car bombings in Riyadh as “against military consultants”—and 
therefore not in the same category as the attacks targeting civilians 
that were our concern.4 A former university professor at one point 
closely associated with Shaykh Safar al-Hawali, a prominent cleric with 
the Sahwa movement, said, “people don’t support violence or nonvio-
lence, but fight for rights. Those harmed by the state will not criticize 
those fighting the state, even violently.” 
These two individuals also disputed the view that the prevailing po-
litical culture in Saudi Arabia, particularly as reflected in the education 
system, lays at the root of the armed groups’ violence and public sup-
port for them. “Millions of students have passed through our schools” 
without becoming armed militants, one said. Criticism of education 
policies was part of what he claimed many Saudis saw as “a compre-
hensive liberal campaign against conservative masses.” Popular per-
ceptions of this “campaign,” he said, “helped make people neutral”—i.e. 
uncritical—about the use of violence. 
Challenging the system 
Two other meetings underscored the critical need for educational 
and religious reform in addressing public attitudes towards political 
violence. These were with men I would characterize as Islamic but not 
Islamist—religious scholars but not adherents of clerical rule or govern-
ance oversight. Hassan al-Malki grew up near the border with Yemen 
and was already a prayer leader there when, at 21, he left to attend 
Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. There, he told us, he was 
shocked by the intolerance, especially against Shia, and he became a 
critic of this takfiri ideology. Al-Malki said that at the time when he 
was a student the curriculum, in contrast to the growing trend among 
students and teachers, was moderate, “but the Wahhabis have rewrit-
ten it. The educational system now produces 200,000 radicals a year.” 
You can criticize the radicals, he said, but not the system that produces 
them, and the state tolerates radicalism “as long as it doesn’t directly 
challenge their legitimacy.” Al-Malki wrote a critique of Saudi curricu-
la, which coincidentally appeared just after September 2001, and the 
then-minister of education enlisted him as a consultant on curriculum 
reform. The minister “liked what I came up with, but it was killed by 
others in the ministry and I was dismissed.” Al-Malki’s own books are 
banned, and the ministry of interior prohibits him from lecturing. Many 
share his views, he believes, some even among state officials and in the 
religious establishment. But there is not much critical discussion in the 
universities, where “discussions head in more extreme directions.” 
Al-Malki recommended we meet with a younger religious scholar 
who has suffered a similar fate for criticizing the religious establish-
ment on its own terms. In this man’s view, it is easy enough to identify 
those proponents of an Islamic state who physically attack their crit-
ics. It is more difficult to know those who hold similar views but, in his 
words, “use the cover of religion and the law to get their way.” He said 
his troubles began a year or so before September 2001. He was prepar-
ing his MA thesis and teaching at Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic 
University in Riyadh when he spoke at an event on issues of belief, tol-
erance, and “equality of voices” in Islam. Because “these were consid-
ered taboo,” the university suspended him from teaching and refused 
to let him continue to work on his degree. He said he was unable to 
determine who was actually responsible for his dismissal. “It’s easier to 
come out against the government than to oppose this shadow group,” 
by which he meant the religious establishment embedded in the state. 
He has since applied to finish his degree, but said that no university 
would accept him, and the authorities have banned him from work-
ing and from speaking in mosques. Those who practice violence are 
arrested or killed and are forgotten, he said, but those who promote 
the intolerance that feeds this violence “leave [behind] their teachings 
and their books.” 
Abd al-Aziz al-Gassim, a religious scholar and former judge whose 
involvement with the CDLR in the mid-1990s led to his arrest and 
dismissal, saw that period as a high point in public interest in human 
rights issues in the kingdom. “As our confrontation with the authorities 
cooled down, so did interest in human rights.” Suppression of the CDLR 
was followed in 1995 and 1996 by bombings against U.S. military con-
tractors and soldiers—the onset of opposition armed violence. Prevail-
ing values, he said, include the idea that “you can spill the blood of an 
innovator without committing a crime.” It was no great leap for armed 
groups to assume “they could decide whom it was 
permissible to kill.” The attacks of 9/11 brought to 
the fore the issue of the legitimate use of violence, 
“but the debate showed the weakness of human 
rights beliefs and standards here.” This accounts, 
in his view, for the high level of support in Saudi 
Arabia at that time for Bin Laden and Al-Qaida. 
“Islamic thought hasn’t developed legal reason-
ing for peaceful resistance,” he said. “It’s either un-
questioning obedience, even to a corrupt state, or 
armed revolt. So we need to treat the crimes of 
armed groups in a framework that includes politi-
cal rights, and where the space is wide enough to 
exercise those rights. We can see here that when 
there is a positive response to demands for re-
form, support for armed groups subsides.” 
Joe Stork, Deputy Director of the Middle East division of Human 
Rights Watch, is ISIM Visiting Fellow from November 2006 through 
April 2007. 
Email: storkj@hrw.org
Notes
1. Human Rights Watch issued a public 
statement on the visit on 18 December: 
“Saudi Arabia Blocks Promised Access to 
Prisons,” http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2006/12/18/saudia14892.htm. 
2. Al-Falih, al-Hamid, and writer Ali al-Dumaini 
were detained in March 2004 after refusing 
to sign a pledge to cease all public criticism 
of the government. A court sentenced them 
in May 2005 to six, seven, and nine years 
respectively. In August 2005, King Abdullah 
pardoned them but they still are banned 
from travel and from access to Saudi media. 
3. The Sahwa Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening) is 
the term adopted by the Islamist opposition 
that took shape in universities in the 1970s 
and 1980s and attained a public profile in 
the early 1990s under influential Wahhabi 
shaykhs.
4. One of the three simultaneous Riyadh 
bombings on 12 May 2003 was against 
the housing compound of the U.S.-based 
Vinnell Corporation, which provides military 
training and other security-related services; 
the other two attacks killed and maimed 
dozens of Europeans, South Asians, and 
Saudis at other residential compounds.
Security 
services’ 
headquarters 
partially 
destroyed by 
an explosion, 
Riyadh, 21 April 
2004
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L I A Z Z AT  J .  K .  B O N AT E Links between Islam and the chiefly 
clans in Mozambique have existed 
since the eighth century, when Islam 
made inroads into the northern Mo-
zambican coast and became associat-
ed with the Shirazi ruling elites. When 
the region became entangled in the 
international slave trade during the 
nineteenth century, the Shirazi clans 
secured alliances with the most pow-
erful mainland chiefs through con-
quest and kinship relations in order 
to secure access to mainland slaves. 
This process was accompanied by a 
massive expansion of Islam into the 
hinterland. The alliances between the 
Shirazi at the coast and the mainland chiefdoms resulted in a network 
of paramount chiefs and subordinate Muslim slave raiders. This net-
work also served as a marker distinguishing between themselves (the 
Maca: Muslims and “civilized”) and those to be enslaved (the Makua 
and Lomwe: derogatory terms denoting savagery, i.e., “non-Muslims” 
and “uncivilized”).
Some scholars have suggested that kinship ideology in general, and 
matriliny in particular, came under a great deal of pressure from the 
expansion of Islam.1 Nevertheless the chiefly network remained mat-
rilineal. Considering that the network was grounded on the Swahili 
(Shirazi) regional Islamic tradition, the persever-
ance of matriliny appears to be a paradox. It can 
be explained, however, by the fact that Islam was 
the domain of chiefs, whose legitimacy and au-
thority was embedded in matrilineal ideology 
of kinship and territorial/land relations of the 
region.2
Encounters with Sufism
When two new Sufi Orders, the Shadhuliyya 
Yashrutiyya in 1897 and the Qadiriyya in 1905, ar-
rived at Mozambique Island, the rest of northern 
Mozambique was still politically unstable, with 
Muslim chiefs spearheading a generalized resist-
ance against the Portuguese. Crushed at the out-
set, this resistance went on sporadically until the 
1930s. 
On launching the Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya at 
Mozambique Island, Shaykh Muhammad Ma‘arouf 
bin Shaykh (1853–1905) of the Comoro Islands, 
gave the first ijazas (authorization) of the khalifa 
to two local Muslim chiefs.3 However, when he left 
Mozambique, a conflict over the leadership of the 
orders ensued between the chiefs and a recent Comorian immigrant. 
The fact that this Comorian did not establish kinship relationships with 
Muslim chiefly lineages undermined his religious claims in the eyes of 
local Muslims. 
The Qadiriyya reportedly was brought to Mozambique Island in 1905 
by Shaykh ‘Issa bin Ahmad al-Ngaziji (also known as al-Msujini) al-Bara-
wi, a disciple of shaykh ‘Umar Uways al-Barawi (1847–1909). He travelled 
to the mainland of Mozambique Island, Cabaceira Pequena, recruiting 
adepts from among a mixed-race Indian-African group of Muslims, who 
were descendants of the Gujarati Sunni Indian immigrants and local Af-
rican women. Despite intermarriage, the Indo-African group remained 
under Portuguese rule, which kept them separated from the rest of the 
population.
The position of Indo-Africans in rela-
tion to Africans had been safeguarded 
by the presence of the Portuguese 
administration at Mozambique Island, 
but when the administration moved to 
the southern settlement of Lourenço 
Marques (currently, Maputo) in 1896, 
the group was left without colonial 
backing. They had to arrange for their 
economic survival and compete for 
Islamic authority with the Africans. 
They controlled the Qadiriyya until 
1929, when local chiefly clans, in par-
ticular, Sayyid Ba Hasan (also known as 
Abahassan), a descendant of the local 
Shirazi rulers, stepped in to take over 
the order. He was the son of a Hadrami sharif and a relative of numer-
ous important Swahili and Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique. 
The violent transition of the Qadiri leadership from the Afro-Indians 
to the chiefly clans set in motion the competition between the two 
groups, which continued up to the end of the colonial era, and impact-
ed the split of the orders into eight turuq. Until his death in 1963, Ba 
Hasan used his family ties, his chiefly status, and Islamic learning to ex-
pand the orders throughout Mozambican territory. As a rule, northern 
Mozambican Muslim chiefs became the leaders of the orders or they 
appointed their kin for this position. 
The integration of chiefs into the colonial system of indigenato and 
the modernization processes which took place between the 1930s and 
1970s did not halt the expansion of Islam nor impinge on matriliny 
prevailing in northern Mozambique. Individual files of the chiefs of 
the three northern Mozambican Districts collected by the Portuguese 
between 1954 and 1974 indicate that the majority of the chiefs were 
Muslims, and had mostly inherited their positions and title from their 
maternal side, as a rule from a maternal uncle.4 
Encounters with the Wahhabis
Muslim chiefly clans of northern Mozambique provided massive sup-
port to the liberation movements in the early 1960s, in part because of 
the harsh anti-Muslim policies of Portugal and in part because the Mo-
zambique liberation movements were under the patronage of TANU 
(Tanganyika African national Union) that had a wide Muslim support, 
especially from Sufi shaykhs such as Muhammad Ramiya. Between 1965 
and 1967, the Portuguese purged chiefs participating in the liberation 
movements, many of whom were arrested, murdered, and replaced 
by non-kin. Simultaneously, the colonial administration undertook a 
meticulous study of Islam and “traditional authorities.” Because Portu-
gal was concerned with the independence movements and identified 
Muslim chiefs and Sufi Orders as representing a religious leadership for 
the majority of northern Mozambican Muslim territories, it displayed a 
public support to them rather than to the Wahhabi group that began 
emerging in the 1960s. Two Afro-Indians, returning after studying in 
Saudi Arabia, founded a mostly urban-based Wahhabi group centred at 
the Anuaril Islamo mosque in Lourenço Marques. The conflict between 
them and the northern Mozambican tariqa-based and chiefly Muslim 
leadership soon escalated into direct confrontations, with the Portu-
guese intervening in favour of the Sufis. 
Muslim leadership and independence (1975–1983)
The socio-political standing of the northern Mozambican Muslim 
leadership was shaken to the core after independence. In 1977, the 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxism 
and “scientific socialism,” and sought to eliminate a wide variety of so-
Muslim leadership of Northern Mozambique 
historically has incorporated Islamic authority 
and chiefship at once. Throughout the colonial 
period, Muslim chiefs defended their version 
of Islam against non-local conceptions of 
Islam, such as Sufism and Wahhabism. After 
independence the links between chiefship 
and Islam in northern Mozambique became 
less visible. This resulted primarily from the 
policies of the post-colonial government, 
which saw African chiefship and Islam as two 
separate spheres. Islam was viewed as an 
“organized faith” similar to Christianity, while 
chiefship was understood to represent African 
“traditional authority.”
Islam was the 
domain of chiefs, 
whose legitimacy 
and authority 
was embedded in 
matrilineal ideology 
of kinship …
Islam and Chiefship in 
Northern Mozambique
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cial practices and beliefs which they deemed “obscurantist,” 
“backward” and thus contrary to the modernist norms of 
revolutionary “scientific” socialism.5 These practices included 
the initiation rites, traditional healing, as well as ceremonies 
of ancestral supplication, all of which crucial for the legiti-
macy and authority of chiefship.
Religion was identified as another “obscurantist element,” 
and the post-independence Mozambique government 
banned religious teachings from schools, nationalized re-
ligious institutions, and harassed and persecuted religious 
leaders. With this, Muslim chiefs of northern Mozambique 
lost yet another one of the pillars of their power, that of 
Islam. 
To make matters worse for the northern Mozambican 
Muslims, a 1976 government decree outlawed associations, 
including religious ones. To counter this move the Wahhabi 
group, led by Abubacar Ismael “Mangira” met on December 
23, 1978 in the Anuaril Isslamo mosque in Maputo in order 
to delineate new strategies, especially because Anuaril Issla-
mo was an association too. They concluded that an organ 
representing all Muslims nationwide must be created in the 
face of the new circumstances. In doing so, the Wahhabis 
took advantage of the government’s ban on associations 
to establish their position as the legitimate body of Islamic 
authority and to eliminate their historical rivals once and for all. The 
nucleus of the would-be national Muslim organization was set up there 
and then, and it was presented as such to the government when in 
1981 the Frelimo decided to reconsider its positions toward Islam and 
create a national Muslim organization. 
A nation-wide Islamic organization, called the Conselho Islâmico de 
Moçambique (Islamic Council of Mozambique), was established in a 
meeting between the government and a group of Maputo imams in 
January 1981, who went on to elect Abubacar Ismael “Mangira” as its 
co-coordinator and later on its first national Secretary of the Islamic 
Council.6 As the northern Mozambican Muslims were not consulted on 
the creation of the Council, let alone invited to take part in it, its crea-
tion signalled a definitive victory of the southern Afro-Indian Wahhabis 
in their long-term historic struggle over Islamic authority against the 
northern Mozambican tariqa-based Muslim leadership. 
Northern Mozambican Muslim leadership’s disenchantment with the 
post-independence state became aggravated when Frelimo became 
associated with southern Wahhabis. The Frelimo’s favourable stance 
toward Wahhabis seems to have stemmed from the government’s per-
ception that Islam and “traditional authorities” were unrelated; from 
allegations that “traditional authorities” had collaborated with coloni-
alism and were, therefore, less nationalistic; and from the “modernist” 
outlook of the Wahhabis, who were well versed in Arabic and armed 
with university degrees and first-hand experience of Middle Eastern 
Islamic culture.
Accordingly, in 1983, Maputo Muslims who disagreed with Wahhabis 
created their own national organization, called the Congresso Islâmico 
de Moçambique (Islamic Congress of Mozambique), to which most of 
the pre-colonial associations and confraternities, including Sufi Orders, 
became affiliated. The Council attempted to de-legitimize the Congress 
in the eyes of the Frelimo government by denouncing confraternities 
and associations as incompatible with the spirit of Islam, and linking 
them to the colonial power and “traditional authority” as opposed to 
a “true” and “legitimate” Islamic authority of the ulama with “adequate” 
religious training.7 This did not result in the elimination of the Congress 
as the Council expected. From that time on, the two organizations have 
continuously competed with each other for the Frelimo party and gov-
ernment patronage, as well as for the funding of international Islamic 
NGOs. 
However, the Northern Mozambican Muslim leadership, perceived as 
both “un-modern” and either completely African “traditionalist” or fol-
lowing an Islam which had “syncretized” with these “traditions,” were 
not able to play any significant roles in the official Islamic public sphere 
or be considered as unequivocally and legitimately “Islamic.” 
Muslim leadership and liberalization (1983–2006)
Rather than relying on the culturally loaded notions of a “chief” of 
régulo, the Frelimo government has preferred to use the term “tradi-
tional authorities” to indicate a group comprised of chiefs and their en-
tourage of subordinate chiefs and healers. Realizing the social impor-
tance of this group, Frelimo gradually reinstated “traditional authority.” 
In 1989, the ban on traditional healing was lifted. After the signing of 
the peace accord in 1992, which ended the civil war with Renamo, the 
Frelimo recognized that “traditional authority” could powerfully influ-
ence voter behaviour in the first democratic election of 1994. From 1991 
to 1997, the government, through the Ministry of State Administration, 
undertook research on “traditional authorities.” In 1996 a change in the 
Constitution placed local authorities under the administrative protec-
tion of the state. The 1997 Land Law attributed legal rights within the 
State Law to “traditional authority” by recognizing the right of “local 
communities” to use land and benefit by occupation, in accordance 
with “customary norms and practices.” And finally, a government de-
cree fully reinstated the “traditional authority” in Mozambique.
While with these legal reforms the Muslim leadership in northern 
Mozambique seems to have recovered the “traditional” side of their 
authority and power, they have not been able to recapture their claim 
on Islam yet. They are still largely associated with chiefship and African 
culture rather than Islam. Because of this they are 
barely able to access benefits or gain socio-politi-
cal influence through Islamic platforms or organi-
zations. This situation has been the source of their 
continual frustration and resistance to the alleged 
racial and cultural discrimination perpetrated by 
Frelimo allied with southern Wahhabis, Afro-Indi-
ans, and Indians. 
Many northern Muslim leaders have preferred 
to perform their religious leadership through tra-
ditional patrimonial relationships thus perpetuat-
ing the links between Islam and chiefship. These 
links, historically and culturally grounded in local 
tradition, still enjoy legitimacy and positive re-
sponse in rural or peri-urban areas of northern 
Mozambique.
Liazzat Bonate is Lecturer in History at the Eduardo Mondlane 
University in Mozambique and is finishing her Ph.D. dissertation 
at the University of Cape Town on Islam and Chiefship in northern 
Mozambique (ca. 1850–1974).
Email: liazbonate@hotmail.com
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K A R I N  W I L L E M S E
Interview Jan Pronk
Structures of Violence 
in Darfur 
Jan Pronk’s relationship with Sudan 
stems from the early 1970s and the 
1990s when he was Minister for De-
velopment Cooperation in the Nether-
lands.3 Appointed by Kofi Anan in June 
2004 as Special Representative to the 
United Nations, he led the UN Peace-
keeping mission (UNMIS) in Sudan. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
signed on 8 January 2005 put an end 
to almost half a century of civil war in 
Southern Sudan. UNMIS was also given 
the task of providing political and lo-
gistical support to the African Union in 
Darfur. The Sudanese Liberation Move-
ment, together with the Justice and Equality Movement, started a war 
early in 2003, accusing the government of socio-economic and politi-
cal marginalization of Darfur. The conflict has been portrayed as one 
between “Black African farmers” and the Janjawiid, or Muslim “Arab” no-
mads. The latter are considered to be the perpetrators of the so-called 
ethnic violence, carried out with the support of the Sudanese govern-
ment. The Darfur Peace Agreement reached on 5 May 2006, however, 
was only signed by the Sudanese government and part of a rebel fac-
tion of the Sudanese Liberation Movement.4
Jan Pronk was scheduled to step down from his post as under-Sec-
retary General on 1 January 2007, when Kofi Anan would end his term. 
However, on 22 October, the Sudanese government requested Pronk to 
leave the Sudan within 72 hours as it was of the opinion that, by com-
menting in his weblog on clashes between the Government troops and 
rebel factions in Darfur, he had “interfered unwarrantedly ‘in matters 
that do not fall within [his] mandate’ and ‘acted in a way incompatible 
with the impartial and interna-
tional nature of [his] duties or 
inconsistent with the spirit of 
[his] assignment’.”5 As the situa-
tion in Darfur has not changed 
much since the interview took 
place, the views expressed by 
Pronk in the interview remain 
relevant.
Asked for an analysis of the 
current problems in Islam-
ist Sudan Pronk6 highlighted 
some similarities between the 
conflicts in South Sudan and 
in Darfur. Both civil wars were 
referred to in the media as “re-
ligious” conflicts between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims. Pronk, 
however, denounced the idea 
that religion is a major factor in 
the conflicts, stressing instead 
the multi-dimensional nature 
of both conflicts, arguing that 
they were rooted in environ-
mental, economic, and demo-
graphic developments. In both 
cases nomadic peoples were forced to 
settle and engage in agriculture, there-
by clashing with farming communities 
over access to land and water. These 
conflicts were rooted in colonial iden-
tity politics, which had the effect of es-
sentializing tribal categories. In Darfur, 
for example, the colonial government 
granted sedentary peoples “dars,” or 
homelands, while Arab nomads were 
not allotted any land-rights or positions 
of power. Moreover, the state borders 
were colonial constructions that cut 
right through nomadic peoples’ lands. 
Pronk pointed out that the history of 
slavery in Sudan was at the core of the racist attitude of “Arab” peoples 
towards “African” communities. In short, the nature of the conflicts is 
highly complex, with religion playing only a minor role in it.
Q: Why is it then, that religion has been prominent in media analyses of 
the conflict?
P: This is the result of a complete misconception of the reality on the 
ground. Darfur is an Islamic region with a strong Arabic orientation. 
Everyone speaks Arabic; even the African groups speak Arabic as 
their second language. (...) The conflict is of an autochthonous-al-
lochthonous nature. Nomadic tribes are not considered to belong 
in Darfur, even though they have been there for over 200 years. (...) 
I consider the religious component to be of little relevance to the 
conflict, and subordinate to the tribal, economic, and political as-
pects. 
Q: So in fact tribal issues have been part of divide-and-rule politics in the 
history of Sudan?
P: The history of Sudanese politics since [independence in] 1956, and 
even before that date, has been characterized by divide-and-rule 
politics. (...) The attempts by the government at destabilizing the 
South were part of these same efforts, which capitalize on tribal 
differences, and that were repeated also in Darfur. Even the peace-
agreement signed in Abuja is a continuation of this politics. It is an 
agreement, which has been signed by only one faction and the least 
powerful one at that. So yes, divide-and-rule. (...) Now there are as 
many as twelve different rebel factions! I have warned against a So-
malization of the situation with different warlords operating inde-
pendently.
Q: Warlords seem to dominate internal conflicts in African countries apart 
from Sudan, like Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Can one compare 
these situations?
P: Not really. The last three countries are examples of failing states. 
Sudan, by contrast, is a strong state where the central government 
is able to control everything. But even in a strong state total depri-
vation and neglect can lead to resistance. When the centre does not 
react with adequate policies, resistance may lead to a spiral of vio-
lence that gets out of control. If the resistance movement is not so 
strong and politically rather shallow like in Darfur, where the intel-
lectuals are not in charge, violence can become a goal in itself. There 
is hardly any ideology among the leaders: some are simply against 
Khartoum, which is an anti-ideology (...); others just aim at gaining 
control over their own area. The resistance movement is as disinter-
Jan Pronk 
addressing 
a press 
conference 
in Khartoum, 
21 September 
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On 25 September 2006, Jan Pronk delivered 
a keynote lecture at the conference “Culture 
is a Basic Need: Responding to Cultural 
Emergencies,” organized by the Prince Claus 
Fund. In his speech, he passionately argued 
that cultural heritage refers not just to cultural 
property but also to traditions, values, and 
practices that make a community.1 Pronk 
explicitly referred to the annihilation of villages 
in Darfur when illustrating that destructing 
cultural heritage also means the destruction 
of a way of life. Pronk’s concern for community 
structures and for Darfur was discussed in more 
detail during an interview earlier that day.2
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ested in its own people—who are living in camps as victims—as the 
government is. 
Q: These movements comprise mainly young men: is there any involve-
ment of women or women’s groups?
P: I have always been amazed, and still am, by the lack of self-organi-
zation and self-protection in the camps. Also in relation to women 
who venture outside the camps; men do not come along to protect 
them. Fear reigns. Now a much more militant generation is coming 
up, with young men turning against each other, also on a tribal basis 
(…) The tribal conflict is transferred to the camps itself which is a 
disastrous development. (…) Youths have no chance to return and 
some might not even want to. There is no employment, no educa-
tion. In Darfur we are losing a generation at this moment, which is 
disastrous. No one cares: neither the resistance movements recruit-
ing them, nor the government. The 40% of affluent Arabs7 living in 
the towns, moreover, consider members of these tribal groups as 
“Untermensch.”
Q: In several interviews you stated that when peace is signed, the main 
perpetrators of violence should be tried by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague. Is there also a role for local mechanisms of 
justice and reconciliation?
P: Yes, for sure. The ICC is important, but I also believe in strengthen-
ing traditional systems of justice and of authority (…), in Darfur, and 
elsewhere, because of the stability these may provide. They can, 
however, never be the only solution as modernization of the state 
is also a requirement for stability. This process will undermine tribal 
systems from the inside; now they are being undermined from out-
side by the accelerated modernization of the 1990s. Maybe, and this 
requires further study, we in the West have played a negative role by 
focusing too much on modernizing the state, on decentralization, 
good governance via western standards, on democracy, etcetera. 
This narrow focus has undermined mechanisms of stability provid-
ed by tribal systems. Traditional leaders have been pushed aside by 
appointed leaders in a modernized state.
Q: Because tribes “deliver” in terms of security and justice?
P: Of course! We may raise our eyebrows about the way conflicts are 
solved by paying blood money,8 but it does provide a way to contain 
violence. It has proven its worth for ages and is well thought out: 
the burden is shared among the members of a tribal group accord-
ing to their capacity. (…) It prevents acts of revenge because this 
kind of reconciliation not only concerns the family, but the whole 
clan or even tribe. All members need to commit themselves to the 
reconciliation by contributing to the payment. [However], in times 
of war this system does not function well. Now it is the government 
that imposes reconciliation on these groups, [which] makes the out-
come very unstable. We really should leave this kind of reconcilia-
tion up to the tribal systems. 
Q: What do you think of the recent turn to religion and human rights as 
foci for development cooperation?
P: Religion is a very important, but long neglected, aspect of develop-
ment processes. Neglect of the cultural dimension, of which religion 
forms part, leads to imbalances. So, if development cooperation 
policies promote knowledge of and respect for other cultures, a “do-
no-harm- policy,” then it is valuable. But I would warn against mov-
ing beyond that.(...) The cultural dimension determines economic 
development to a large extent. In this respect I am not a Marxist; 
there is, of course, a dynamics between both. You can make so many 
mistakes when working in a different culture. (…) I am a traditional 
multi-culturalist and I am not averse to cultural relativism: I relate 
to my own culture where some of its cultural gains, such as certain 
kinds of freedom, have to be continuously fought for. But beware 
of exporting these ideas: do not enforce them on others as this has 
always a destabilizing influence on other societies. Let it please be 
a bottom-up process. (…) The longer you deal with a certain soci-
ety, the more surprises you will encounter and the more you realise 
how little you know. In order to move forward, you have to consider 
yourself a student, you have to be willing to learn, to understand, 
and to place yourself in the position of the other (…). 
Q: And you can take this perspective even when you negotiate with gov-
ernment officials?
P: Well, sometimes I do understand their viewpoint. My concern is that 
at this moment the international political climate does not allow 
for trying to understand the perspective of others. We have now 
a uni-polar system, with Americans holding 
power to the extent that they do not need to 
take heed of other powers. Europe has insuf-
ficiently resisted this development.
Q: Has that been a reason why you did not want to 
use the notion of “genocide” with respect to Dar-
fur?
P: I have three reasons for this. In the first place, 
at the request of the General Assembly, Kofi 
Anan appointed an International Commission 
of Inquiry in November 2004 that was highly 
competent and unprejudiced, in order to write 
a report with just one goal: to inquire if what 
had happened in Darfur was a genocide. The 
inquiry showed that this was not the case, al-
though what had happened was equally hor-
rific. And as this constituted the official view-
point of the UN, I had to propagate the same 
stance. Secondly, I am very careful with the 
notion of genocide since it is also a judicial 
term, which has been codified in the Geno-
cide Treaty. When one proclaims a genocide 
one has [the obligation] to intervene. The Americans have repeat-
edly referred to the conflict in Darfur as a genocide. But when what 
they now refer to as genocide actually took place, they never raised 
the issue. They even refused to put Darfur on the agenda of the Se-
curity Council in 2003 and the first part of 2004, when it all hap-
pened. After that there were many killings, burnings, and murders, 
but nothing that resembled genocide. I consider it a kind of hypoc-
risy: and hypocrisy is not my style. And thirdly, I refer to the conflict 
rather as ethnic cleansing or tribal cleansing, than as genocide. The 
violent character of the conflict is in both cases quite similar, but not 
everyone is killed because he or she is a Fur [a name of one of the 
tribes]. I was the first to use the notion of genocide with reference to 
Srebrenica, but in that case every male Muslim from Srebrenica was 
killed.
Q: Would you like to have an agreement on a UN Peace keeping force in 
Darfur by way of farewell?
P: No, I am not in favour of that solution because that will lead to war. 
(…) In the Security Council I have always stated that a robust force 
is needed, in the sense of its capability to protect, but not that it 
should be a UN force. I think that in the current political climate in 
Sudan sending in a UN force would be counterproductive: it would 
become part of the problem rather than a solution. [Current presi-
dent of Sudan] Bashir would consider it a form of re-colonization, 
as a neo-colonial intervention. He has stated that he would lead a 
war of jihad against it. Though this is an Islamic 
notion, the regime in Sudan is a secular regime 
and it uses this term in order to cover its back 
against Islamic extremists. I am convinced that 
President Bashir will not shy away from lead-
ing or allowing attacks against a UN force in 
Darfur. This would make the political situation 
even more complex than it is now. The extrem-
ists in Sudan are not only religious fundamen-
talists. There is also a strong political notion: 
being Arab. A third dimension of radical op-
position groups is their antagonism towards 
the West. And finally, there is antagonism to-
wards the regime itself. In the West all these 
movements are considered to be one and the 
same. Westerners are inclined to see all op-
position in the region as inspired by Islam. By 
overemphasizing the religious dimension and 
underestimating political and cultural aspects, 
Western politicians have made Islamic extrem-
ism a more forceful antagonistic movement 
than otherwise would have been the case.
Karin Willemse is Assistant Professor in the Anthropology of 
Africa, Department of History, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Notes
1. For Pronk’s speech, see http://www.
princeclausfund.org/en/what_we_do/cer/
index.shtml.
2. The interview was conducted in Dutch. 
The text has been authorized by Jan Pronk.
3. Pronk was Minister of Development 
Cooperation in the periods 1973–1978, 
1989–1992, and 1994–1998. From 
1980–1986, he was Under-Secretary of the 
UNCTAD.
4. For further details on both conflicts see 
www.janpronk.nl and, for example, Willemse 
in ISIM Review, no. 15 (Spring 2005): 14–15.
5. Quoted from: www.janpronk.nl, weblog no. 
37, November 2006. 
6. In 1978–1980 and 2002–2004 Jan Pronk 
held the Chair of “Theory and Practice of 
International Development” at the Institute 
of Social Studies in The Hague. Currently he 
has returned to this position at the ISS.
7. The term “Arabs” refers here to town-
dwellers of Central Sudanese descent also 
called jellaba, and not to Arab nomads, or 
Bedouin, who are engaged in the armed 
conflict.
This narrow focus 
[on modernizing 
the state] has 
undermined 
mechanisms of 
stability provided 
by tribal systems.
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academic and strategic feedback on the 
research proposal to be developed, and on 
further writings; 
• a return ticket to and from Leiden; 
• support in the necessary immigration 
procedures and assistance in finding 
housing. 
For more details on the ISIM Short-Term 
Fellowships please refer to the ISIM website 
www.isim.nl under the link “Fellowships,” 
or contact the ISIM secretariat at 
fellowships@isim.nl.
I S I M  S H O R T - T E R M  F E L L O W S H I P S
25 April 2007
Debate
Islamism and the (Im)Possibilities of a Western Islam
Speakers: Sadik Al-Azm, Fouad Laroui, Marjo Buitelaar, 
Mouad Zagdoud, Abdulkader Benali, chaired by Paul 
Aarts
Organizers: VU, ZemZem, and ISIM
Venue: Amsterdam
10 May 2007
ISIM Annual Lecture
Europe and ‘the Muslim Question’:  
Does Intercultural Dialogue Make Sense?
Lecture by Bhikhu Parekh
Venue: Kriterion, Groothandelsgebouw, Rotterdam
Registration before 8 May 2007 via registration@isim.nl 
11 May 2007
Book Launch 
Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States 
by Lynn Welchman
ISIM Book Series, vol. 1
Organizers: AUP and ISIM 
Venue: Spui 25, Amsterdam
Registration before 10 May 2007 via spui25@uva.nl
23 May 2007
Seminar
Islam and Democracy: Islamic Views
Speakers: Sadik Al-Azm, Abdolkarim Soroush, Tariq 
Ramadan, Nasr Abu Zayd, chaired by Asef Bayat and 
Markha Valenta
Organizers: VU, ZemZem, and ISIM
Venue: Felix Meritis, Amsterdam
3 June 2007
Lecture by Ibrahim Mousawi at the Bazaar Annual 
Festival
Organizers: IKV Pax Christi, Hivos, Partizan Publik, 
Groenlinks, and ISIM
Venue: Amsterdam
28–29 September 2007
Seminar 
Salafism as a Transnational Movement
Convenors: Roel Meijer and Martijn de Koning
Organizers: Radboud University Nijmegen and ISIM
Venue: Radboud University Nijmegen
I S I M  P H . D .  A N D  S T A F F  S E M I N A R S
Venue: Leiden University
– 17 April 2007
 Divorce and the Introduction of a New Family Court 
in Egypt
 Lecture by Nadia Sonneveld
– 1 May 2007
 Lecture by Martin van Bruinessen
– 15 May 2007
 Lecture by Loubna el-Morabet
– 29 May 2007
 Normativity, Creativity and “Fun” in the Muslim 
Diaspora
 Lecture by Jeanette Jouili
– 12 June 2007
 Islamic Institutions of Higher Education and 
Authority
 Lecture by Firdaous Oueslati
 For more information on these and other events 
please consult the ISIM website or contact the 
secretariat at info@isim.nl.
I S I M  E V E N T S
Abdolkarim Soroush 
ISIM Visiting Professor at VU
ISIM is pleased to announce a new cooperation be-
tween ISIM and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
(VU). On Thursday 7 December 2006 ISIM and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) organized the Arrival 
Lecture of Abdolkarim Soroush “Religion of War, 
Religion of Peace” at the VU. This lecture functioned 
as the inauguration of Soroush as the “ISIM Visiting 
Professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.” Soroush 
(Tehran, 1945) is a leading philosopher of Islam, a 
reformer, and a public intellectual. Soroush’s re-
search at ISIM and VU will focus on the philosophy 
of science, philosophy of religion, Islamic philoso-
phy, and the philosophical system of Rumi.
 
– Arzu Unal (Junior Fellow, funded by 
NORFACE)
Islamic Fashion in Europe
1 May 2007 – 30 April 2009
– Mohammed Wildan (Ph.D. Fellow, funded by 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Contemporary Developments in Indonesian 
Islam
10 March 2007 – 20 April 2007
– Mehdi Zakerian (Visiting Fellow)
The Impacts of Islamic Global Cultures on 
the Universality of Human Rights
8 March 2007 – 30 June 2007
N E W  F E L L O W S
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ISIM/Workshop
M A R L O E S  J A N S O N  &  
D O R O T H E A  S C H U L Z
Piety, Responsibility and 
Subjectivity in Africa
On 15 December 2006 Marloes Janson (Zentrum Moderner Orient, Ber-
lin) and Dorothea Schulz (Indiana University) convened a workshop 
titled “Piety, Responsibility, Subjectivity: Reconfigurations of the Moral 
Economy of Gender Relations in Contemporary Muslim Africa” at the 
Snoeck Hurgronje Huis, Leiden. The workshop and the subsequent 
public event were sponsored by ISIM, in cooperation with the Knowl-
edge Centre Religion and Development and ZemZem, Journal for the 
Middle East, North Africa, and Islam. 
The aim of the workshop was to explore the interrelation between 
current trends towards moral renewal in Muslim Africa on the one 
hand, and transformations of gender relations on the other. It situated 
these changes in the context of postcolonial nation-state politics. Re-
cent reconfigurations in the relationship between the state and society 
in African Muslim communities, along with processes such as the de-
mocratization of religious education, the introduction of new media, 
and the new currency of a legalistic discourse, have fundamentally 
altered the basis of conventional understandings of gender-specific 
spheres of action. The claims and concerns formulated by supporters 
of so-called “reformist” movements can be seen as engagements with 
these developments, in forms that are inspired by regionally specific 
traditions, practices, and understandings of religiosity. 
These Islamic movements tend to place a special emphasis on personal 
piety and individual responsibility in moral reform, rather than centring 
their efforts on challenging state institutions and political elites. Protago-
nists of these movements, women and men, understand their endeavour 
as a return to the original teachings of Islam and to traditional gender 
roles. Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching effect of their interventions is 
that they redefine, or temporarily invert, prevailing divisions between 
male and female spheres of moral practice and public action. 
The workshop sought to address these reconfigurations of gender rela-
tions by bringing together scholars working on Islamic reform and gen-
der in Africa. Rather than reasserting the common bifurcation between 
North-Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, it emphasized common themes as 
well as long-standing translocal ties and influences that connect these 
two regions of Muslim Africa. 
In the first panel the focus was on the redrawing of conventional lines 
between gender-specific domains of action and authority. By means of 
the biographic narratives of two marabout women from Dakar, Senegal, 
Amber Gemmeke (Leiden University) explored women’s activities in 
the Islamic esoteric sciences. Interestingly, by “denying” their feminin-
ity—both women emphasized that they did not menstruate although 
they were still young—these two marabout women were able to achieve 
renown in a field dominated by men. Gemmeke argued that this should 
be understood in the context of urbanization. An urban environment, in-
habited by migrants searching for a livelihood in an insecure place, may 
create opportunities for women to launch a career in the Islamic esoteric 
sciences.
Whereas in Gemmeke’s paper female authority in a male domain was 
central, Marloes Janson focused on male participation in a female do-
main by means of a case study of the Tabligh Jama‘at in The Gambia. 
This transnational Islamic missionary movement originated in South Asia 
and proliferated widely in The Gambia during the last decade. Although 
the movement aims at reinscribing a patriarchal gender ideology, at the 
same time it provides new roles for both women and men that depart 
from established gender norms. In order to reduce their wives’ domestic 
burden and provide them with more time for missionary work, Gambian 
Tablighi men actively engage in household work and childcare. Janson’s 
paper showed that this transformation in gender relations is the out-
come of a reorientation to a new form of piety as a means of realizing 
a virtuous life.
The second panel centred on new declarations of piety and ethical dis-
position. Although in Nigeria (as elsewhere) reformists attempt to return 
to the “roots” of Islam, Amidu Sanni (Lagos State University) argued that 
one should not define them as anti-modern. By taking the “ultra-Salafi” 
Nigerian movement Jama‘at Tadamun al-Muslimin Naijriya as starting 
point, he illustrated that “secular modernity” is nowadays giving way to 
“religious modernity.” Highly educated Muslims in Nigeria seek to dem-
onstrate that one can be religious and “modern” at the same time.
The Egyptian repentant singers, dancers, and actresses studied by Karin 
van Nieuwkerk (Radboud University Nijmegen) are likewise searching for 
new ways to express their newly found piety. Tracing the life stories of 
three “born-again” artists, Van Nieuwkerk illustrated the passage from art 
to repentance and devotion. This transition has to be seen against the 
backdrop of a new trend in the religious revival in Egypt, concentrating 
on individual piety.
The last panel focused on women’s ritual participation. Dorothea 
Schulz explained that since the introduction of a multiparty system and 
civil liberties in Mali in the 1990s, Muslim women’s groups have entered 
the public arena. The women leading these groups exhort their follow-
ers to work on individual ethical improvement through ritual worship 
and the choice of “decent” attire, and present this process of personal 
transformation as a means and measurement of societal renewal. By 
emphasizing the relevance of Islamic ethics to public life, these Muslim 
women’s associations assert that individual morality has important po-
litical implications.
Whereas Schulz focused on prayer and dress as markers of Muslim 
identity in Mali, Gerard van de Bruinhorst (ISIM) stressed the role of 
Islamic sacrifice in Tanzania. His paper studied the choice of sacrificial 
animals in relation to women’s involvement in the ‘aqiqa (birth ritual) 
and ‘Id al-adha (the annual festival marking the end of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca). Whereas in the Islamic authoritative texts women’s involvement 
in these sacrifices is described as marginal, the current reformist trend 
in Tanzania tries to include women as ritual agents. Although these re-
formists seem to advocate gender equality, Van de Bruinhorst concluded 
that their attempts actually result in a decrease of women’s ritual agency 
compared with their roles in “traditional” society. The role of sacrificial 
animals seems to be emblematic for this development: the “traditional” 
female sheep gives way to the “Islamic” billy goat.
Finally, Samuli Schielke (University of Mainz) investigated the partici-
pation of women in Sufi saints-day festivals (mulids) in Egypt. Although 
there is a strong objection to mixed Sufi gatherings, Schielke argued that 
the problem is not actually with the presence of women at these Sufi 
festivals, but the kind of presence they have. This issue is not restricted 
to gender, but is also related to class distinctions. Despite the reform-
ists’ critique on women’s participation in these festivals, Schielke’s paper 
showed that they can command respect by displaying middle-class 
standards of piety in combination with matriarchal leadership and Sufi 
spirituality, while delegating formal symbols of religious leadership to 
their male followers.
Marloes Janson was ISIM Postdoctoral Fellow between 2003 and 2005. Currently, she is a 
researcher at the Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin. 
Email: marloes.janson@rz.hu-berlin.de.
Dorothea Schulz is Assistant Professor at the Religious Studies Department, Indiana University, 
Bloomington. She was ISIM Visiting Fellow in 2005. 
Email: deschulz@indiana.edu.
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L I N D A  H E R R E R A
The Making of Muslim Youths II 
On 6-7 October 2007 the second of a two-part workshop “The Making of 
Muslim Youths: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North” (see 
ISIM Review, no. 16 for a report on the first workshop), was held at the In-
stitute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague. Co-organized by Linda Herrera 
of the ISS and Asef Bayat of ISIM, the workshop joined seventeen scholars 
from, and working on, issues involving Muslim youth from Asia, Africa, 
Europe, North America, and the Middle East.
These two workshops have provided a platform for scholars carrying 
out empirically innovative and theoretically informed research on topics 
pertaining to the culture and politics of Muslim youth. The emerging at-
tention to Muslim youth derives in part from the current demographic 
shift, or “youth bulge” in numerous Muslim majority countries. While often 
referred to as the “builders of the future” by the power elite, the young 
are also stigmatized and feared as “disruptive” agents who are prone to 
radicalism and deviation. Although gender, class, and cultural divisions 
may render untenable a homogenous treatment of youths, or even call 
into question “youth” as an analytical category, it is equally true that the 
young undeniably share a certain important habitus, which is recognized 
by both the young themselves as well as by the political and moral estab-
lishment and authority.
To be sure, the presence of a youthful population has caused a remark-
able change in the social composition of youth who have assumed a 
central, if complex, place in the political economy and cultures of these 
societies. At the same time, youth cultures are developing in novel, yet 
little understood ways due to a combination of the shifting moral politics 
at home, the relentless process of cultural and economic globalization, 
the geopolitics of neo-imperialism, the rise of a civilizational discourse 
in which “Islam” is positioned in opposition to the “West,” sluggish econo-
mies, and wide scale unemployment. Young peoples’ expressions of inter-
ests, aspirations, and socioeconomic capacities appear to be producing 
a new cultural politics. In other words, the cultural behavior of Muslim 
youths can be understood as located in the political realm and represent-
ing a new arena of contestation for power. 
The workshop interrogated the cultural politics of youth from the per-
spective of the youths themselves, from the viewpoint of political and 
moral authorities who consider it their role to discipline, control, and 
formulate policies for the young, and from an understanding of market 
and media forces where youth are heavily targeted and represented. 
The papers were organized around six themes; the first of which was 
Locating Muslim Youth. Asef Bayat and AbduMaliq Simon conceptualized 
contemporary notions of youth with particular attention to the relation-
ship between youth and the city in comparative perspective. The session 
on Youth Cultures and Subcultures joined Sophie Sauvegrain, Suzanne 
Naafs, and Gusel Sabirova who examined the intersection of the global 
with the local through inquiries into youth consumption in Syria, repre-
sentations of young women in popular culture in Indonesia, and women’s 
pietistic movements in Russia, respectively. The third theme, Youth Partic-
ipation and Generational Shifts with Marloes Janson, Shamshul Baharud-
din, and Azam Khattam, focused on issues of new patterns of authority 
and politics in the Gambia, Malaysia, and Iran. In the session on Multi-
culturalism and Citizenship, Schirin Amir-Moazami and Moustapha Bay-
oumi looked at debates around and practices of Muslim minority youth 
in North American and Europe. In the session on the Politics of Education 
together with André Mazawi, Linda Herrera and Nabil Al-Tikriti examined 
how educational policies meant to shape the young are often condi-
tioned by geopolitics and crises of national identity. Finally, the panel on 
Radicalism and Identity Politics with Noorhaidi Hassan, Mohamed Khan, 
and Suzanne Hammad critically examined the category “radical” and in-
vestigated organization of youth politics. 
The organizers are planning to co-edit a volume with the papers from 
the two workshops. 
Linda Herrera is Senior Lecturer of Development Studies 
at the Institute of Social Studies.
Email: herrera@iss.nl 
ISIM is pleased to announce its coop-
eration with the Universities of Joen-
suu and Helsinki's project “Making a 
Good Muslim: Contested Fields of Reli-
gious Normativity in the Age of Global 
Islam.” Throughout the Muslim world, 
discourses on “being Muslim” are cen-
tered on issues of morality and good 
life. For most Muslims, Islam is about 
structuring life experiences and social 
relations in meaningful ways, rather 
than about politics. In a globalizing 
world, Islam is a point of reference for 
an imagined moral community, even 
when individual practices do not fit 
agreed upon moral norms. In daily 
life, however, Islam competes with 
other sets of values, and different ac-
tors compete for moral and religious 
authority.
In different Muslim communities 
similar trends of morality and religiosi-
ty are reproduced in everyday debates 
and interaction. These processes have 
been widely studied from the perspec-
tive of the nation-state and the politi-
cally active religious agents. What has 
remained in the shadow is how people 
who are not involved in activist or 
piety movements apply Islam in their 
everyday life in today’s global world. 
This project aims to analyze, in dif-
ferent contexts, how people who are 
generally confident in the objective 
truth of their religion but who are not 
committed to a devoted activist life, 
apply Islam in competition with other 
normative discourses.
The project is based on seven case 
studies in six locations—Morocco, Fin-
land, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Indo-
nesia—and is funded by the Academy 
of Finland and located at the Universi-
ties of Joensuu and Helsinki in Finland, 
in cooperation with ISIM and Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies.
“Making a Good Muslim”
Project leader: 
– Prof. M’hammed Sabour, 
University of Joensuu. 
Ph.D. students:
– Maija Elo, University of Helsinki;
– Fadi Kabatilo, University of 
Joensuu. 
Postdoctoral researchers: 
– Samuli Schielke, University of 
Helsinki (until 31 December 
2007 University of Mainz);
– Leena Avonius, University of 
Helsinki;
– Susanne Dahlgren, Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies;
– Marko Juntunen, University of 
Helsinki.
R E S E A R C H  T E A M
ISIM/Project
6 4  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
A research proposal of Prof. Annelies 
Moors, ISIM Chair at the University of 
Amsterdam, on “Islamic Fashion and the 
Emergence of Islam as a Social Force in 
Europe” has been selected for funding 
by NORFACE (2007-2009). Rather than 
focusing on headscarf issues and “veil-
ing,” this research project centres on 
the public presence of young women 
wearing styles of dress that are both 
recognizably Islamic and fashionable, 
a practice that has become far more 
widespread in the course of the last 
decade. Tracing the emergence of Is-
lamic fashion on the streets of Europe 
this project focuses on young Muslim 
women’s embodied practices and per-
formances, tracing the conditions under 
which Islamic fashion has emerged in 
the European public sphere, investi-
gating the various ways in which the 
tensions between Islam and fashion are 
negotiated, and analyzing the effects of 
such emerging embodied practices on 
young Muslim women. 
A focus on Islamic fashion is helpful 
in understanding the emergence of 
religion as a social force in Europe. This 
is so because wearing Islamic fashion 
is an everyday embodied practice. It 
is also, moreover, one that is publicly 
visible and capable of engendering 
debates about religion in the public 
sphere. While Muslim women are an 
important trope in debates about the 
(in)compatibility of Islam with European 
values, wearing Islamic fashion points 
to Muslim women’s engagements with 
modernity and entails a style of reli-
gious belonging that may function as 
an interface between young women 
from a wide variety of backgrounds.
Research will be conducted in major 
cities in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and 
Sweden in order to gain insight in how 
Islamic fashion circulates internationally 
and to compare between countries with 
substantial differences in terms of the 
backgrounds of Muslim migrants and 
their aesthetics, state policies and pub-
lic debates on Islam, gender regimes, 
and youth and fashion cultures. 
Principle investigator: Annelies Moors at 
ISIM/ASSR, University of Amsterdam.
Research partners: Goldsmith College, 
University of London; Roskilde Univer-
sity, Denmark;  Stockholm University, 
Sweden; University of Bremen, Germany. 
The Netherlands Organization for Sci-
entific Research (NWO) will be funding 
a new research project from Radboud 
University Nijmegen and ISIM: "Salafism: 
Production, Distribution, Consump-
tion, and Transformation of a Transna-
tional Ideology in the Middle East and 
Europe." The Salafi movements are 
currently among the most widespread 
Islamic movements, with a major influ-
ence in the Middle East and Europe. 
The research programme consists of 
four closely related research projects, 
each dealing with a different aspect of 
Salafi movements: 
– an analysis of politically reformist 
Salafism and the Sahwa movement in 
Saudi Arabia (by Roel Meijer, postdoc, 
Radboud University Nijmegen); 
– the production, distribution, and 
the contents of texts from Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Jihadi 
Salafism (by Joas Wagemakers, Ph.D. 
candidate, Radboud University 
Nijmegen); 
– the rise of Salafism among Muslim 
youth in the Netherlands (by Martijn 
de Koning, postdoc, ISIM); and 
– the dissemination and transformation 
of Salafi ideas in the modern 
electronic media (Ph.D. candidate, 
position vacant). 
The research projects approach the 
Salafi movements from the perspective 
of the study of social movements. Thus, 
they focus on the manner in which 
individuals cohere into groups; how 
they react to their social, economic, and 
political environment; how movements 
are built, organized, and expanded; 
how they create models of emulation; 
and how these are, in turn, transferred, 
adopted, and transformed in differ-
ent circumstances. Emphasis will not 
only be put on the organizations or 
networks; rather, the researchers will 
also have to look into such questions as: 
what is the appeal of these movements 
(especially to youth); how do youths 
use Salafi movements in order to create 
ideas of what the correct Islamic be-
liefs are; and how do they relate to the 
Salafi movements in the construction 
of identity. 
The research team further consists of 
Prof. Harald Motzki (Radboud University 
Nijmegen) and Prof. Martin van Bruines-
sen (ISIM), who were the main applicant 
and co-applicant for this project. At ISIM 
the programme is embedded in the 
larger research programme “The Pro-
duction of Islamic Knowledge in West-
ern Europe,” and at Radboud University 
Nijmegen in the research programme 
“The Dynamics of Islamic Culture” of the 
Research Institute for Historical, Literary, 
and Cultural Studies (HLCS).
Radboud University Nijmegen and ISIM 
invite applications for the vacant posi-
tion of researcher on Salafi communica-
tions in the modern electronic media. 
For more information see the vacancy 
announcement on this page. 
New Project on 
Fashion in Europe
In the framework of the research 
project “Salafism: Production, Distri-
bution, Consumption, and Transfor-
mation of a Transnational Ideology 
in the Middle East and Europe” con-
ducted by the research programme 
“The Dynamics of Islamic Culture” 
of Radboud University of Nijmegen 
in cooperation with ISIM, a Ph.D. 
fellowship is available for research 
on “The Media and Salafism: The 
distribution and transformation of 
Salafism in modern media.” 
The successful candidate will hold a 
master’s degree in Islamic Studies, 
Political Science, Social Science or 
Media Science and will be able to 
analyze Arabic TV programmes and 
websites and conduct interviews 
with their makers. Apart from fluen-
cy in Arabic and English he/she has 
to demonstrate a good command 
of Dutch, German, or French. Experi-
ence in media analysis or interview 
techniques will be an advantage.
 
Successful applicants become junior 
members of staff of the Radboud 
University Nijmegen and ISIM. The 
appointments are temporary for one 
year, usually full-time (38 hours a 
week) and will be extended in princi-
ple for another two and a half years, 
if progress is satisfactory. The salary 
is € 1,956 gross per month during 
the first year, increasing to a maxi-
mum of € 2,502 gross per month 
during the fourth year, and is based 
upon a full-time employment and in 
conformity with current salary scales 
under the collective labour agree-
ment (CAO) for Dutch universities. 
Those appointed will be provided 
with office space, a personal com-
puter, and telephone on the ISIM 
premises in Leiden. 
 
The deadline for applications is 
1 June 2007. 
 
Applicants should send their cur-
riculum vitae, list of publications, list 
of language skills, and copies of cer-
tificates of academic qualifications 
to Prof. Harald Motzki, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Department of 
Arabic and Islam, POB 9103, 6500 HD 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
 
For further information please 
contact Martijn de Koning at 
m.koning@isim.nl.
New Project on
Salafism
Vacancy Ph.D. Position ISIM/Radboud
On 13-15 October 2006, ISIM together 
with the African Studies Centre (ASC), 
the Council for the Development of 
Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA), 
and the International Institute for 
Asian Studies (IIAS), organized a 
conference entitled “Youth and the 
Global South: Religion, Politics and 
the Making of Youth in Africa, Asia 
and the Middle East.” The conference, 
held in Dakar, Senegal, offered a 
platform to scholars from the North 
and South from which they presented 
their analyses and visions on the 
problems currently faced by the new 
generations growing up in the global 
South, particularly in Africa. Some 30 
papers discussed social, political and 
cultural themes ranging from youth 
life styles, violence, religiosity, sub-
culture, generational conflict, activism, 
sexuality, and youth political economy. 
The event also offered a unique 
opportunity for young scholars form 
diverse countries of the global South 
and the North to develop scholarly 
networks for exchange of ideas and 
future collaboration. 
Conference
Youth and the Global 
South
ISIM/Projects
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ISIM invites articles written by graduate 
students for the 2007 ISIM Review Young 
Scholar Awards competition. 
Prizes will be awarded to those articles 
submitted to the competition that are 
of the highest academic quality and 
originality. 
Eligibility Criteria
Articles should deal with issues 
relating to contemporary Muslim 
societies and communities from 
within a social science or humanities 
framework. Of particular interest 
is research debate that deals 
with culture, social movements, 
development, youth, politics, gender, 
religion, arts, media, education, 
minorities, migration, public 
intellectuals, and popular culture. 
All articles should be based on the 
author’s personal empirical research. 
Those eligible to submit articles to the 
competition are graduate students in 
the process of completing their MA 
thesis and those who have completed 
their thesis no more than nine months 
before the deadline for submission. 
Prizes
First: € 1,500
Second: € 1,000
Third: € 750
The prize-winning articles will be pub-
lished in the ISIM Review. 
Submission
Deadline for submission is 1 June 2007. 
Submissions should also include the 
author’s curriculum vitae. 
For details on the submission of ar-
ticles, please see the ISIM website 
(www.isim.nl) under the link “Review,” 
or contact the ISIM editorial office at 
review@isim.nl. 
ISIM Book Series
The ISIM Book Series on Contemporary Muslim Societies 
is a joint initiative of Amsterdam University Press 
(AUP) and ISIM. The Series seeks to present innovative 
scholarship on Islam and Muslim societies in different 
parts of the globe. It aims to expose both the distinctive 
and comparable aspects of trends and developments 
in Muslim societies, bringing together expertise in 
anthropology, sociology, political science, social history, 
cultural studies, and religious studies. 
The editors invite monographs and edited volumes that 
are both theoretically informed and grounded in empirical 
research. Proposals will be reviewed by experts in the field, 
under the direction of an international editorial board. 
Titles from Amsterdam University Press in the US and 
Canada are distributed by the University of Chicago Press.
For more information about the Series, please contact 
Mathijs Pelkmans at review@isim.nl. Guidelines for book 
proposals and manuscripts are available at www.isim.nl.
Editors
– Annelies Moors
– Mathijs Pelkmans
– Abdulkader Tayob 
Editorial Board
– Nadje al-Ali
– Kamran Asdar Ali
– John Bowen
– Léon Buskens 
– Shamil Jeppie
– Deniz Kandiyoti
– Muhammad Khalid Masud
– Werner Schiffauer
– Seteney Shami
– Lynn Welchman
First Volume in the ISIM Series
W O M E N  A N D  M U S L I M  FA M I LY  L A W S  
I N  A R A B  S TAT E S
A  C O M PA R AT I V E  OV E R V I E W  O F  T E X T U A L  
D E V E LO P M E N T  A N D  A DV O C AC Y
Lynn Welchman
■ Lynn Welchman
 Women and Muslim Family Laws 
in Arab States
 A Comparative Overview of Textual 
Development and Advocacy
Muslim family law–and its principles 
regarding marriage, divorce, personal 
maintenance, paternity, and child cus-
tody–is one of the most widely applied 
family law systems in existence today. 
A number of states have recently codi-
fied Muslim family law for the first time 
or have issued significant amendments 
or new laws, spurred in many cases 
by interventions from women’s rights 
groups and other advocacy organiza-
tions. Women and Muslim Family Laws 
in Arab States combines an examination 
of women’s rights under Muslim family 
law in Arab states across the Middle 
East and North Africa with discussions 
of the public debates surrounding the 
issues that have been raised during 
these processes of codification and 
amendment. Drawing on original legal 
texts and explanatory statements as 
well as extensive secondary literature, 
Welchman places these discussions in 
a contemporary global context that 
internationalizes the domestic and 
regional particularities of Muslim family 
law. Accompanied by a full bibliogra-
phy and an appendix providing trans-
lated extracts of the laws under exami-
nation, Women and Muslim Family Laws 
considers laws from the Gulf States to 
North Africa in order to illustrate the 
legal, social and political dynamics of 
the current debates.
Lynn Welchman is Senior Lecturer in Is-
lamic and Middle Eastern Laws, School 
of Law at SOAS (School of Oriental and 
African Studies), University of London.
“Lynn Welchman gives us a penetrat-
ing analysis of the different approach-
es to the codification of Sharia-based 
rules and principles in number of Arab 
states. Her rich and informative ac-
count is a must read for both scholars 
and activists working on women’s 
rights and family law reform in the 
Muslim world, and Welchman has done 
them a great service.” Ziba Mir-Hos-
seini, Visiting Global Law Professor, 
New York University
“This is a superb and unique study of 
family law reforms in Arab states, a 
clear and highly instructive clarification 
of the dynamic interaction of legal, po-
litical and social factors with practical 
initiatives that are shaping the theory 
and practice of family law in the Middle 
East. Scholarship of this high quality is 
indispensable for guiding and inspiring 
sustainable transformation of the social 
reality of Muslim women and their fam-
ilies.” Professor Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, 
Emory School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia
May 2007
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■ Asef Bayat
 Islam and Democracy: 
What is the Real Question?
 
Is Islam compatible with democracy? 
This text examines one of the most fre-
quently-asked and yet misguided ques-
tions. Democratic ethos should not and 
cannot be deduced from some essence 
of religions supposedly inscribed in the 
scriptures. Rather, they are the outcome 
of political struggles that push Islam to-
ward democratic or authoritarian direc-
tions. Asef Bayat offers a new approach 
to examine Islam and democracy by 
discussing how the social struggles 
of diverse Muslim populations, those 
with different interests and orientation, 
render Islam ready to embrace demo-
cratic ideas or authoritarian disposition. 
“Islamism” and “post-Islamism” are dis-
cussed as representing two contrasting 
movements which have taken Islam in 
different, authoritarian and inclusive, 
political directions.
Asef Bayat is the ISIM Academic 
Director, and the ISIM Chair at Leiden 
University. 
March 2007 
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Editors’ Picks
Cultures of Arab Schooling: Critical 
Ethnographies from Egypt
Edited by Linda Herrera and Carlos 
Alberto Torres
New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2006
While many studies focus on 
political processes, religious change 
and the media in the Middle East, 
educational systems have received 
remarkably little attention. Drawing 
on critical social theory and adopting 
a solid ethnographic approach, this 
volume manages to shed new light 
on important societal processes in 
contemporary Egypt.
Islam after Communism: Religion 
and Politics in Central Asia
By Adeeb Khalid
Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007
This is one of the first comprehensive 
accounts of the plight of Muslims in 
Central Asia living through the Tsarist 
Empire and the Soviet Union. Detailing 
how this particular trajectory is 
reflected in the cultural and religious 
orientations of Muslims, the book is 
an essential read for those interested 
in the region and those wishing 
to engage with aspects of Muslim 
modernity that have so far received 
scant scholarly attention.
Sufis & Saints’ Bodies: Mysticism, 
Corporeality & Sacred Power in 
Islam
By Scott Kugle
Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007
In this comprehensive study of Islamic 
mysticism, Kugle challenges the view 
that portrays Islam as abstract and 
disengaged from the body. Looking 
at a variety of Sufi communities, 
the author demonstrates the 
centrality of the body in generating 
and channeling religious meaning, 
communal solidarity, and sacred 
power. By mingling an in-depth study 
of individual Saints with a comparative 
approach to Sufism, this book ties 
philosophy to ethnography and the 
study of sexuality to theology.
Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 
1948 to the Present
By Nadje Sadig Al-Ali
London: Zed Books, 2007
Moving beyond the headlines 
covering the war in Iraq, Nadje Al-Ali 
traces the lives of Iraqi women from 
the mid twentieth century to today. 
The book describes how women 
lived within a framework of state 
oppression, economic deprivation, 
and war, without losing sight of the 
intricacies of their everyday lives. The 
author shows that, far from being 
passive victims, Iraqi women have 
been, and continue to be, key political 
actors. Sadly, US-led calls for liberation 
may in the long term serve to limit the 
opportunities of the women of Iraq.
Women in the Middle East: Past and 
Present
By Nikki R. Keddie
Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007
Keddie discusses the interaction of a 
changing Islam with political, cultural, 
and socioeconomic developments. 
Like other major religions, Islam 
incorporated ideas and practices of 
male superiority but also provoked 
challenges to them. By tracing 
women’s involvement in the rise of 
modern nationalist, socialist, and 
Islamist movements, the author 
dismisses notions of Middle Eastern 
women as faceless victims.
Globalization Under Hegemony:
The Changing World Economy
Edited by Jomo K.S.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2006
In nine essays this volume offers 
important insights into economic 
processes in the contemporary 
world. Analyzing historical events 
and processes in “the long twentieth 
century,” the authors manage to 
capture significant aspects of 
globalization, imperialism, and 
colonialism, and their uneven impact 
on countries in the North and the 
South. As such, the volume highlights 
the continued significance of the state 
in shaping conditions for achieving 
economic development. 
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The collection “Anatolian Civilizations” 
reflects Erol Albayrak’s desire to examine 
the concept of fashion as transmitted 
by inhabitants of Anatolia. Albayrak 
envisions his collection as a passage 
through time: rooted in the kingdom of 
Hittites, influenced by ideas of beauty in 
Urartu, reflecting the sorrow of Troya, and 
drenched in the passions and mysteries 
of the Ottomans. These styles are being 
re-imagined in a “modern” or novel spirit. 
“Anatolian Civilizations” is one collection 
in a series devoted to incorporate 
details from Ottoman Anatolian culture 
in contemporary fashion. His newest 
collection, “Mevlana and Prayer,” will be 
presented in ten Turkish cities and in 
ten cities abroad, including Rotterdam 
on 22-23 September 2007.
Ero
l A
lb
a
yra
k
Anatolian Civilizations
I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7  6 7
©
 P
H
O
T
O
S
: 
J
U
A
N
 M
E
D
IN
A
 /
 R
E
U
T
E
R
S
, 
2
0
0
7
Photo Commentary
6 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
Would-be immigrants 
in a Red Cross 
container at the 
port of Gran Tarajal, 
Fuerteventura, Spain, 
27 March 2007 
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